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Résumé 
 
Pour répondre aux exigences du gouvernement fédéral quant aux temps 
d’attente pour les chirurgies de remplacement du genou et de la hanche, les 
établissements canadiens ont adopté des stratégies de gestion des listes d’attentes 
avec des niveaux de succès variables. Notre question de recherche visait à 
comprendre Quels facteurs ont permis de maintenir dans le temps un temps d’attente 
répondant aux exigences du gouvernement fédéral pendant au moins 6-12 mois? 
Nous avons développé un modèle possédant quatre facteurs, inspiré du 
modèle de Parsons (1977), afin d’analyser les facteurs comprenant la gouvernance, la 
culture, les ressources, et les outils. 
Trois études de cas ont été menées. En somme, le 1er cas a été capable 
d’obtenir les exigences pendant six mois mais incapable de les maintenir, le 2e cas a 
été capable de maintenir les exigences > 18 mois et le 3e cas a été incapable 
d’atteindre les objectifs. Des documents furent recueillis et des entrevues furent 
réalisées auprès des personnes impliquées dans la stratégie. 
Les résultats indiquent que l’hôpital qui a été en mesure de maintenir le temps 
d’attente possède certaines caractéristiques: réalisation exclusive de chirurgie de 
remplacement de la hanche et du genou, présence d’un personnel motivé, non distrait 
par d’autres préoccupations et un esprit d’équipe fort. Les deux autres cas ont eu à 
faire face à une culture médicale moins homogène et moins axés sur l’atteinte des 
cibles; des ressources dispersées et une politique intra-établissement imprécise. 
Le modèle d’hôpital factory est intéressant dans le cadre d’une chirurgie 
surspécialisée. Toutefois, les patients sont sélectionnés pour des chirurgies simples et 
dont le risque de complication est faible. Il ne peut donc pas être retenu comme le 
modèle durable par excellence.  
 
Mots clés: stratégies, attente, maintien dans le temps, Canada, hanche, genou, 
chirurgies
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Summary 
 
In response to federal government requirements regarding wait times for 
elective hip and knee surgery, hospitals have adopted wait list management 
strategies, with variable success. This research examined organizational and systemic 
factors that made it possible to keep wait times within federally established limits of 
6-12 months. 
We used a model based on Parsons’ model. Four dimensions were used to 
analyze the following factors: governance, culture, resources, and tools. Three cases 
studies were done: Case 1 was able to meet the requirements for six months but 
unable to sustain this level; Case 2 was able to maintain compliance with 
requirements for > 18 months; and Case 3 was never able to meet the requirements. 
Documents were collected and interviews conducted with people involved in the 
strategies. 
In all, eight interviews were conducted at each site and all documents related 
to each strategy were collected. The results indicated that the one hospital that was 
able to maintain compliance with the wait time requirements had specific 
characteristics: an exclusive mandate to do only hip and knee replacement surgery; 
motivated staff who were not distracted by other concerns; and a strong team spirit. 
The two other cases had to contend with a medical culture that was less 
homogeneous and they were less focused on meeting targets and had resources that 
were dispersed as well as unclear inter-organizational policies. 
          In the end, the hospital factory model is appealing in the context of super-
specialized surgery. However, because patients are selected for simple surgeries, with 
little risk of complications, it cannot be promoted as a sustainable model of 
excellence. 
 
 
Keywords: strategies, wait times, sustainability, factors, Canada, hip, knee, surgeries
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
Improving access to health care services has been a significant issue both in 
Canada and abroad for many years. More than ever, this concern is now being raised 
in the media to direct attention toward producing better wait time data and finding 
better ways to manage long wait lists for specialized health services. According to 
Barua et al. (2010), province-wide wait time 1, meaning the wait time between 
referral from a general physician (GP) to a consultation with a surgeon, was greater 
in 2010 than in 2009. The total wait time between referral from a GP and delivery of 
elective treatment by a specialist went from 16.1 weeks in 2009 to 18.2 weeks in 
2010 (Barua et al., 2010). Healthcare organizations (HCOs) as well as governments 
have responded to these long wait times by putting in place various strategies aimed 
at reducing wait times for specialized health care services. 
Most of the strategies implemented thus far by Canadian entities such as the 
government and various HCOs have focused on the systemic level. HCOs are 
accountable for providing timely access to care, but their direct involvement in 
implementing strategies and policies in that regard has often been overlooked. We 
believe we can learn a lot about each HCO’s unique experience dealing with wait 
times, and consequently, about the determinants of their successful management and 
measurement.  
While resources, financial and otherwise, are an important explanatory factor 
of HCOs’ action or inaction, it can also be hypothesized that governance structures, 
practices, organizational culture, data collection, and management patterns also count 
among the contributing factors (Pomey et al., 2009).  
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The present research report is divided into 13 chapters. First, we focus on the 
project background and the purpose of the study, as well as key concepts related to 
the topic under study. We also outline the conceptual framework. Our literature 
review focuses on the determinants of success for wait time management strategies 
(WTMS). We examine the Canadian policy put in place to better manage hip and 
knee replacement surgeries. We then present the research methodology used in this 
study, followed by the results with respect to the factors that impact WTMS success 
and sustainability. Finally, in the discussion section, we describe the linkages 
between this study and the overall research project and outline this study’s 
limitations.  
Given that this study aims to continue the work done by Pomey (2009) in a study 
entitled Determinants of Waiting Time Management for Health Services: A Policy 
Review and Synthesis, I received permission from Pomey to reproduce portions of 
that study in my masters’ thesis.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
This chapter is divided into in three sections. The first explains the study’s 
background. The second presents the study’s objectives and research questions. The 
third attempts to define and clarify certain key concepts of this study: wait times, wait 
lists, WTMS, organizational change, innovation, implementation, sustainability and 
success.  
2.1 Background 
In 2005, Canada’s federal government entered into an agreement with all the 
provincial and territorial governments aimed at reducing wait times for hip and knee 
replacement surgeries; Quebec, which had its own strategy, was not part of this 
agreement. To improve access to total joint replacements (TJR), Canada has 
implemented a number of WTMS over the last few years (DeCoster et al., 1999; Pitt 
et al., 2003). These include benchmarking, information technology solutions for wait 
list management, central booking systems, clinical assessment and prioritization 
tools, and clinical appropriateness guidelines (Noseworthy et al., 2003). Although 
these initiatives show potential, it is critical that more attention be paid to the steps 
taken by HCOs to implement such strategies. While the literature has analyzed a 
variety of strategies, seldom does it discuss the ways that those strategies were 
implemented or the key factors associated with their failure or success. 
Once the hurdles of implementation are overcome, many of these strategies still 
face problems of sustainability. Little research has been done on the sustainability of 
WTMS: a British study and a Canadian study of Ontario’s Wait Time Strategy are 
two exceptions (Glynn, 2006; Trypuc et al., 2006). It is questionable whether the 
factors Trypuc et al. (2006) mention in their Ontario-based article really led to 
sustainability, since it was written fairly soon after the strategy was implemented, 
perhaps too soon for results that could show whether sustainability was achieved. 
Therefore, they could not really study the factors 
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retrospectively. To date, no researchers have focused on the sustainability of 
Canadian WTMS for TJR, which constitutes the focus of this study. Therefore, our 
aim in this project is to elucidate the factors that enhance or inhibit the sustainability 
of WTMS for TJR surgeries in Canadian provinces aimed at reducing wait times for 
these services and respecting the federal, provincial and territorial (F/P/T) benchmark 
established.  
 Therefore, the following section explains this study’s objectives and research 
questions.   
2.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
The overarching theme of our research project is the sustainability of WTMSs 
for TJR. More precisely, our research project targeted the following general and 
specific objectives: 
2.2.1 General Objective 
The study’s general objective was to understand the pivotal factors that 
enhance or inhibit the functioning, adaptation, and long-term sustainability of 
WTMSs for TJR services in HCOs and systems in various Canadian provinces.  
2.2.2 Specific Objectives 
 To identify which WTMSs for TJR successfully reduced wait times and were 
able to sustain that reduction for 6-12 months between April 2009 and September 
2010, our specific objectives were to analyze: 1) which contextual and organizational 
factors influenced the success and sustainability of those strategies; and 2) which 
aspects of the interface between the organizational and contextual levels helped 
sustain the success of those strategies. 
2.2.3 Main Research Question 
Our main research question was: What factors enhanced or inhibited the 
sustainability, for at least 6-12 months during a defined 18-month period, of WTMSs 
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for TJR surgeries implemented in Canadian provinces to reduce wait times for these 
services and to respect the 26-week federal benchmark? 
2.2.4 Secondary Research Questions 
1) Were there some WTMSs for TJR that were more successful at reducing wait 
times and were sustainable over time? 
2) What aspects of the interface between the organizational and the contextual 
levels facilitated the success of those strategies? 
2.3 Defining Key Concepts 
2.3.1 What constitutes a wait list? 
McDonald et al. (1998) defined a wait list, or roster, as a group of patients 
waiting for a distinct service. These lists usually refer to elective services, but they 
also exist for urgent and emergency services. The lists are made when demand for a 
service exceeds the available supply (Kreindler, 2010). The term “wait time” refers to 
the length of time between the moment a patient is enrolled on a wait list and a 
moment that he/she receives the service. McDonald et al. (1998) explain that, with 
rare exceptions, wait lists in Canada, as in most countries, are not standardized; they 
are erratically organized, poorly monitored, and need serious revision. As a result, 
wait lists may be inflated by 20 % to 30 % by the presence of patients who have died, 
who have already received the procedure, who have refused the procedure, or who 
may even be unaware they have been scheduled (McDonald et al., 1998). According 
to Kreindler (2010), wait lists are more likely to be found in public systems. In fact, 
offering universal access to care, when combined with the government’s desire to 
control health spending, can mean the supply of treatment is inadequate for the 
demand. In this sense, wait lists constitute a form of payment, or rather, a way of 
rationing scarce supply. The author adds that, while the existence of wait lists is not 
necessarily a bad thing, it reflects a value-based decision about how care should be 
distributed. The problem, however, is in the length of the wait times. In fact, long 
wait times are a source of distress to patients and, in some cases, can have adverse 
health and social consequences (Levy et al., 2005; Masri et al., 2005; Pacifico et al., 
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2007).1 Various initiatives have therefore sought to monitor wait list data more 
carefully, accurately, and routinely over the past 10 years (Sanmartin et al., 2003).  
2.3.2 How do we measure wait lists and wait times? 
There are currently no standardized methods to define and assess wait lists 
and wait times for a vast range of healthcare services (Sanmartin et al., 2000; 
DeCoster, 2002). It is important that dependable and comparable wait time data for 
various medical procedures be developed so that governments, healthcare 
professionals, and patients can all have a better understanding of the degree and 
nature of wait times. Until now, the main focus has been on wait times for elective 
surgeries and diagnostic tests. In some provinces, a difference has been made 
between wait time 1, the time between the GP’s referral and the consultation with the 
specialist, and wait time 2, the time between the visit to the specialist and the actual 
surgery. According to the Canadian Institute of Health Information (CIHI, 2007), the 
definitions of wait times (1 and 2) used to collect wait time data vary from province 
to province.2  
2.3.3 What is known about factors that affect wait lists and wait times? 
Different hypotheses exist about the causes of wait lists. For Hurst & Siciliani 
(2003), the causes are essentially reduced to demand factors that influence the inflow 
to the wait list and supply factors that influence the outflow. The population’s overall 
health and the state of medical technology available affect the demand for scheduled 
surgery. Among other things, Hurst & Siciliani (2003) attribute long wait times to the 
important advances in surgical technology and in anaesthesia over the last 20-30 
years that have made those interventions more cost-effective, therefore causing an 
increase in demand for them. Both physician behaviour and patient behaviour can 
also contribute to wait times. For example, for administrators to be able to manage 
wait lists appropriately, in terms of updating, prioritizing, rescheduling cancellations, 
and computerizing the information, physicians need to invest a certain amount of 
                                                       
1 This section is based on the research conducted by Pomey (2009) in her study entitled Determinants 
 
2 Idem. 
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time and effort. The ways in which doctors organize their practice may also 
contribute to the formation of lists (Wolinsky et al., 1983). Competitive fee-for-
service payment of surgeons, unlike salaried remuneration, may encourage many to 
offer fast access – that is, to maintain short queues – especially where there are no 
gatekeepers, and when surgeons can assume primary care responsibilities for patients 
(Hurst & Siciliani, 2003). The supply of elective surgery varies according to public 
and private surgical capacity, as well as the productivity with which that capacity is 
utilized. It is known that wait times are decreased as the number of beds and 
available doctors increase (Hurst & Siciliani, 2003). Furthermore, activity-based 
funding is likely to encourage higher productivity compared to funding based on 
fixed budgets.3 
2.3.4 What is a Wait Time Management Strategy? 
A WTMS is a strategy that aims to reduce the amount of time spent waiting 
for access to healthcare services. Kreindler (2010) explains that the main policy 
levers for reducing wait times involve increasing supply, reducing demand, funding 
information technology and/or other resources, reviewing ways of working without 
funding, collaborating with the private system and/or applying comprehensive 
strategies to foster one or more of these levers at the organizational level. In this 
study, we focus on initiatives that target access to scheduled care. Examples of 
initiatives to increase capacity at the organizational level include: increasing the 
number of healthcare providers, expanding their hours of operation, investing in 
medical and information technologies, and developing coordinated care processes 
and practice guidelines to increase patient throughput. Investments in information 
technology involve developing centralized wait list registries, operating room (OR) 
booking systems and information systems to monitor performance against wait time 
targets. To control demand, clinical assessment (prioritization) tools and clinical 
appropriateness guidelines can be used. Another wait time initiative consists of using 
existing capacity more efficiently.4 Pooling surgeons’ wait times appears to be 
                                                       
3 Idem. 
  
4 Idem.  
8 
 
 
 
another potential solution (Kreindler, 2010). However, it seems the most basic 
supply-side strategy would be to pay for increased activity.  
Kreindler (2010) adds that obtaining capacity from the private sector can be 
another strategy because the private sector may be able to mobilize resources more 
quickly, and deploy them more flexibly, than public or non-profit organizations. 
However, Joshi et al. (2006) see no basis for believing that a parallel private system 
will shorten the queue for publicly funded Medicare or reduce the cost for healthcare, 
irrespective of the impact on equity of access. Moreover, encouraging capacity that is 
privately financed remains a difficult and quite pricey way to increase the supply of 
treatment, something that can be achieved much more efficiently through other 
means (Kreindler, 2010).  
Short-term injections of funding discourage sustainable strategies that can 
address the root cause of wait lists, since backlogs promptly reappear once these 
funds run out. In contrast, recent approaches have stressed long-term funding for 
activities, such as fee-for-service payment to physicians, activity-based payment to 
hospitals, and/or bonuses for achieving extra volume while maintaining a base 
volume (Kreindler, 2010).  
With respect to comprehensive strategies that can influence the organizational 
level, national wait time targets backed up with clear incentives for meeting them 
seem to be effective. As Kreindler (2010) explains, target setting often involves some 
attempt to determine the maximum medically acceptable wait time for a given 
procedure. A consistent problem with establishing targets is that it is difficult to 
know how HCOs will meet those targets. Therefore, it is helpful to include healthcare 
providers in the design and implementation of targets, incorporate some flexibility 
into the system, and promote equality by considering all possible strategies (Hurst & 
Siciliani, 2003; Harrison et al., 2005; Bevan et al., 2006; Walley et al., 2006).  
2.3.5 The Concept of Organizational Change 
To implement WTMS, HCOs face the challenge of organizational change. 
The concept of change invokes the idea of modifications affecting time and space, 
with one or more parameters. According to Thompson (2010), organizational change 
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is defined as a modification in the goals, structure, or operations of an organization. 
Change can also mean introducing an idea or behaviour that is new to an 
organization. More concretely, organizational change can take the form of a product, 
a service, a technology, a program, a policy, or a process. In fact, the term “change” 
has several different meanings in the business world. For Senge (1999), it sometimes 
refers to external changes in technology, customers, competitors, market structure, or 
the social and political environment. However, change can also be internal, such as 
an organization’s adaptation in response to environmental changes. Senge (1999) 
adds that change can also mean top-down programs, like reorganizing or 
reengineering a work process within an organization. According to the author, the 
term profound change can be used to describe organizational change that combines 
inner shifts in processes, strategies, practices and systems.  
Whitlock (2009) defines the types of changes as either transitional, which 
involves making small changes to a process, or transformational, which involves 
making major or radical changes in the organization, such as a large restructuring (as 
cited in Beckhard, 1969, p. 10). According to Thompson (2010), a change is defined 
as transformational when it produces simultaneous changes in multiple system 
elements, including structure, strategy and culture, among others, to achieve rapid 
and organization-wide performance improvement. The author states that this type of 
deliberate change is a major systemic change intended to reshape the entire 
organization and, accordingly, originates at the senior level of the organization. The 
author explains that one way to conceptualize change management is to describe the 
nature of the change under consideration in terms of its various dimensions: scope 
refers to the extent of the change, i.e., whether it is narrow change that affects only 
one area of the organization or whether it affects many areas of the organization 
(Thompson, 2010); depth refers to the complexity of the change, meaning it may be 
an incremental change or a significant transformation for the whole organization 
(Thompson, 2010); and urgency refers to how quickly the change needs to occur. 
Maxwell (2009) states that change can be either planned, in which discretionary 
changes are brought about by management, or unplanned, in which unexpected issues 
create a need for swift management action (as cited in Beckhard, 1969, p. 89). As 
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Doppelt (2003) points out, the organization needs to continually incorporate new 
ways of thinking and acting into how it does business as new knowledge is generated 
and employees gain know-how and skills. Senge (1999) suggests that we need to 
understand change as a form of “dance”, which he defines as the inevitable interplay 
between growth processes and limiting processes.  
2.3.6 The Concept of Innovation 
The concept of change implies that of innovation. A planned innovation is 
one in which the manager has enough time to weigh different options, decide on a 
strategy, and put into place the change. If we look deeper into organizational 
development, Beckhard (1969) defines it as an effort that is (1) planned, (2) 
organization-wide, and (3) managed from the top, to (4) increase organizational 
effectiveness and health through (5) planned interventions in the organization’s 
“processes” using behavioural-science knowledge (MacLean, 2006). Thompson 
(2010) explains that managers must realize that a change is needed, and should 
motivate staff interest and leadership when it comes time to identify opportunities for 
change and transformation within their organizations. The author adds that forward-
thinking, proactive management is critical to changing the organization appropriately, 
given the dynamic external environment. Keeping in mind the external healthcare 
system context, healthcare managers need to focus on the performance of HCOs and 
act to optimize their internal functioning. Campbell (2008) explains that because 
organizational change impacts work tasks and employees’ feelings, it is critical to 
explain the basis for the change, identify benefits of the change, solicit ideas on 
implementation strategies, and address staff and consumer concerns to increase 
support and decrease resistance to the pending change. In fact, Kotter (2008) suggests 
that an effective way to communicate the vision is to develop an engaging story that 
catches the attention of those affected by the change. It is important to preserve the 
feeling of urgency and to demonstrate how the success of the vision will lead to the 
steady development and growth of the organization. As a sense of urgency grows 
among employees, managers must turn their attention to developing a guiding team 
(Kotter, 2008).  
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According to Beckhard (1969), to be successful, organizational development 
efforts should have some of the following goals: (1) to develop a self-renewing, 
viable system that can organize in a variety of ways depending on tasks; (2) to 
optimize the effectiveness of both the stable and the temporary systems by built-in, 
continuous improvement mechanisms; (3) to move toward high collaboration and 
low competition between independent units; (4) to create conditions where conflict is 
brought out and managed; and (5) to reach the point where decisions are made on the 
basis of information source rather than organizational role (MacLean, 2006).  
Lastly, planning the change’s implementation requires analyzing alternatives 
for addressing the problem. Then, the organization’s readiness for change must be 
assessed. These two steps are essential components of any organizational change 
process (Thompson, 2010; Greenhalgh et al., 2004). 
2.3.7 First Phase of Change: The Concept of Implementation 
According to Campbell (2008), implementation is a critical phase of the 
managerial change process, and sometimes change fails because of a flawed 
implementation strategy. For a change to be successfully implemented, managers, 
employees and workgroups must work collaboratively and shift their perceptions and 
behaviours. Furthermore, implementation should include active involvement of staff, 
dissemination of information, and clarification to generate support. Burke (2005) 
defines implementation as a group or series of interventions in the “workings” of an 
organization, its operations, its processes, and its ways of doing things so that the 
system will move toward a particular change goal (as cited in Rothwell, 2005). This 
becomes the focus of the organizational change effort. 
In order for the implementation process to be a success, certain steps need to 
be respected, according to Doppelt (2003): 1) change the dominant mindset 
(compelling need); 2) rearrange the parts (teams); 3) alter the goals (visions and 
principles); 4) restructure the rules of engagement (strategies); 5) shift the flows of 
information (communication); 5) correct the feedback loops (learning and 
motivation); and 6) adjust the parameters (policies and procedures). Thompson 
(2010) adds that managing the change process within public HCOs is important 
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because appropriate and systematic change management is linked to improved 
organizational performance. These healthcare managers are challenged to respond to 
environmental influences by demonstrating leadership in this time of change. Senge 
(1999) adds that all participants in the change process should be offered training and 
support in order to be able to monitor and evaluate the effects of their actions. 
2.3.8 Second Phase of Change: The Concept of Sustainability   
The concept of sustainability will be the focus of the study. It has been 
defined by Tivy and O’Hare (1982) as “the management of a resource for maximum 
continuing production, consistent with the maintenance of a constantly renewable 
stock” (as cited in Brown, 1987, p. 715). Brown (1987) sees a sustainable society as 
one that is enduring, self-reliant and less vulnerable to external forces. More and 
more, sustainability is perceived as being a “desired goal of development and 
environmental management” (as cited in Brown, 1987, p. 715). According to Curran 
(2009), the concept of sustainability should encompass interrelated ideas drawn from 
economic, social and environmental realms. The World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED) defined sustainable development as development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs (UN, 1987, p. 43). This definition could very easily be 
applied to health care and health services. Sustainable development also implies that 
present generations should not be permitted to prevent future generations of their 
access to essential resources. (UN, 1987) It is also a process of change in which the 
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of 
technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance 
both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations (UN, 1987). 
Ulhøi & Ulhøi (2009) explain that hospitals are generally regarded as organizations 
whose main mission is to help human beings in need of surgery and/or medical 
assistance, as well as to advise people on healthy ways of living. That being said, it 
should be difficult for hospitals to justify behaviour that will endanger human health, 
cause reduction in natural resources, or encourage inefficient energy and resource 
management. For sustainable development to succeed, the process of development 
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must be participatory (Lélé, 1991). Frank et al. (2009) also point out that discussions 
among stakeholders informed by useful information would help overcome the 
barriers to creating a sustainable system of accountable care that is desired by all. 
Van Bueren and De Jong (2007) state that policies and initiatives are intended to 
promote a sustainably structured environment at local, regional, national and 
international levels. Achieving this will require a clear understanding of what 
constitutes sustainable structure, as well as of the factors that impact it. For this, a 
variety of actors should be included in the policy process and their knowledge put to 
good use.  
The problem is that there is no clear understanding of what sustainable 
development is. This might be because “the concept includes many interrelated 
attributes, which makes it difficult to establish clear boundaries” (Van Bueren & De 
Jong, 2007, p. 549). The first step in trying to sustain a profound change process is to 
make a fundamental shift in thinking (Senge, 1999). We need to understand the 
nature of growth processes and how to catalyze them. But we also need to understand 
the forces and challenges that hinder progress, and to develop feasible strategies for 
dealing with these challenges. Doppelt (2003) explains that sustainability visions and 
strategies become internalized as people consider what these changes will mean to 
them personally. It is therefore crucial to communicate the need, vision, and 
strategies for achieving sustainability. 
2.3.9 The Concept of Success 
As a general rule, the most appropriate criteria for a project’s success are the 
project’s objectives. The extent to which they have been met determines the project’s 
success or failure. Although measuring progress, cost and quality is largely the 
responsibility of project control, this activity should certainly not be confused with 
measuring success. In the literature, there is general agreement that project 
management has three main goals, termed the “triple constraint”: a project must be 
managed on time, within budget and to quality/performance requirements (Saladis & 
Kerzner, 2009). According to De Wit (1988), a project is considered an overall 
success if it meets the technical performance specification and/or mission to be 
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performed and if there is a high level of satisfaction with the project’s result among 
important people in the parent organization, key people in the project team, and 
essential users or clientele of the project endeavour. Hayfield (1979) lists two kinds 
of factors that could help determine project success. The first are the macro factors, 
or those relating the decision-makers: realistic and thorough definition of the project, 
efficient project execution, comprehension of the project “environment”, and 
selection of the organization to carry out the project. The second kind are the micro 
factors, which relate to the people who put the strategy in place: budget performance, 
schedule performance, client satisfaction, functionality, contractor satisfaction and 
project manager/team satisfaction.  
It is important to point out the difference between the success of the project 
and the success of the project management activity. In fact, project management can 
be successful in itself, but still be unable to prevent a project from failing. According 
to Cooke-Davies (2002), to be successful, a project must satisfy the interests of those 
who established the project (the stakeholders) and what it was that they hoped to 
achieve through the project (the benefits). Rosenau (2001) identifies the following as 
determining factors for the project management process: goal definition, project 
planning, leadership, project monitoring and project completion. We therefore 
consider a WTMS to be successful when it is able to sustain over time. Those two 
concepts are therefore tightly connected.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 - CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter is based on the work done by Pomey (2009) in her study entitled 
Determinants of Waiting Time Management for Health Services: A Policy Review 
and Synthesis. We have adapted the conceptual framework developed by Pomey 
(2009). Our conceptual framework was structured to ensure that we would capture all 
the dimensions within the WTMS being studied that might have contributed to 
sustain the surgical wait times below 26 weeks during at least 6-12 months in an 18-
month period.  
To classify factors that helped sustain successful WTMS, we used a 
conceptual framework based on Parsons’ widely recognized four-quadrant model 
(Parsons, 1977). The Parsonian view offers a structuro-functionalist vision of 
organizations and concentrates on the four functions they need to survive: goal 
attainment, environmental adaptation, production and culture. This framework was 
chosen in this study for many reasons, primary among which was its robust nature. It 
has been used in disciplines as different as sociology, administration, and 
management over several decades. It has also been used in organizational contexts of 
all kinds, including industry, health, and others. In this study, the framework allows 
us to take into consideration not only factors such as resources and tools that are 
usually considered, but also political and cultural factors that are often ignored.  
With regard to presentation, we have modified the arrangement of dimensions 
in Parsons’ paradigm. The four dimensions we used are present at the contextual and 
organizational levels: 
1. Governance factors (goal accomplishment and environmental adaptation), 
defined as “the conduct of collective action from a position of authority” 
(Hatchuel, 2000, p. 42). 
In fact, Doppelt (2003) points out that                 
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for an organization to make the kind of transformation required to become truly 
sustainable, power and authority must be skilfully distributed among employees and 
stakeholders through effective information-sharing, decision-making, and resource 
allocation mechanisms. One example of contextual level governance would be 
stakeholder involvement, and an example of organizational governance would be 
leadership exercised by healthcare managers.  
2. Cultural factors (culture), defined as “underlying beliefs, values, norms and 
behaviours” (Shortell et al., 1995, p. 22). 
To reiterate the importance of cultural factors for the survival of an 
organization, Doppelt (2003) recognizes that the ultimate success of a change 
initiative occurs when sustainability-based thinking, perspectives, and behaviours are 
embedded in everyday operating procedures, policies and culture. An example of this 
in contextual-level culture would be consultation with front-line actors, whereas an 
example in organizational-level culture would be the trust among coworkers.  
3. Resource factors (production), whether human, financial, infrastructure or 
informational.  
An example of contextual resources would be funding levels, and of 
organizational resources, the number of nurses working in the OR.  
4. Tools (production), the instruments or procedures seen as helpful in 
implementing a strategy.  
A contextual-level example of a tool would be the collection and 
standardization of data, while an organizational-level example would be information 
management systems.  
Combining the two levels of analysis (contextual and organizational) with the 
four dimensions of determinants at each level produced the model presented in 
Appendix 1. 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 - LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE DETERMINANTS OF THE 
SUCCESS OF WTMS  
The literature review is based on the previously mentioned work by Pomey 
(2009). For this study, we considered change to have two phases: implementation and 
sustainability. There are few studies that have leaned in on the factors that impact the 
sustainability of WTMS. In fact, most studies explain the factors that impacted the 
implementation phase of a WTMS. WTMS implementation can be regarded as a type 
of change introduced at both the organizational and contextual levels. Therefore, the 
purpose of the literature review is to identify the types of factors that influence 
implementation success, as a prelude to subsequently identifying factors that impact 
WTMS sustainability. Research has shown that for any WTMS to be successfully 
implemented at the organizational level, the following factors must be in place 
(DeCoster et al., 1999; Pomey et al., 2010): 1) physicians must be involved from the 
outset; 2) organizational culture must be taken into account; 3) policy-makers must 
invest in evaluation and quality improvement at the organizational level; 4) 
relationships between managers and physicians must allow the parties to align their 
objectives; 5) policy-makers must earmark funds to launch the strategy; 6) 
institutions must invest in tools and information management; and 7) upper-level and 
organizational policies must be aligned. Our literature review is organized according 
to the factor dimensions at each level (contextual and organizational) presented in the 
theoretical framework (governance, culture, resources and tools).   
4.1 Organizational-Level Factors 
The organizational level refers to organizations at the service delivery level, 
such as hospitals, clinics, or, for some provinces in Canada, health authorities that 
organize patient care. The organizational level differentiates itself from the 
contextual level, which refers to factors at the national and regional levels. Examples 
of contextual level factors are: wider economic conditions, nationwide or provincial 
regulation and policies, and human resource shortages. Coordination, dedicated 
funding, dedicated staff, evaluation tools, equal commitment and collaboration 
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among all stakeholders, as well as an innovative organizational culture have also 
been mentioned as key organizational-level factors. 
4.1.1 Organizational-Level Governance 
With respect to organizational-level governance, leadership was the factor 
most commonly cited in the literature (Ham et al., 2003; Maddison et al., 2004; 
McLeod, Ham & Kipping, 2003; Rozich & Resar, 2002; Worthington, 1991). 
Leadership by senior clinicians, trusted chief executive officers (CEOs) and project 
managers was said to be essential to promote change (McLeod et al., 2003). Having a 
dedicated project group (Maddison et al., 2004), pilot team (Rozich & Resar, 2002), 
or project manager (McLeod et al., 2003; Ham et al., 2003) was also deemed critical 
for success. All these factors had a positive impact on moving the strategy forward. 
Lastly, support from the CEO (Ham et al., 2003), effective organizational design 
(Rozich & Resar, 2002) and clinician accountability (Pearson & Meyer, 1991) were 
also considered positive factors. Other factors, such as mergers between 
organizations (McLeod et al., 2003), had a negative impact on WTMS 
implementation. 
4.1.2 Organizational-Level Culture 
With respect to organizational-level culture, Ham et al. (2003) point out that 
“organizational cultures do have an impact on the implementation of quality 
improvement initiatives like the booked admissions program” (p. 432). Certainly, the 
cultural factor that recurs most often in the literature appears to be physicians’ 
participation in, and feelings toward, WTMS (Botten et al., 2004; Cromwell & Mays, 
1999; Gauld & Derrett, 2000; Ham et al., 2003; Hanning, 1996; Hanning & 
Spangberg, 2000; Hefford & Holmes, 1999; Leach et al., 2004; Lundstrom et al., 
1996; Maddison et al., 2004; McLeod et al., 2003; Ramchandani et al., 2002). For 
example, some doctors were skeptical of the strategy proposed in their HCO (Gauld 
& Derrett, 2000), while others displayed little interest in reducing wait lists (Gauld & 
Derrett, 2000; Hanning, 1996). One study on the implementation of generic wait lists 
for cataract surgery concluded that most physicians were skeptical about putting in 
place such lists. In another article, a survey on a pooled wait list for cataracts 
19 
 
 
 
revealed that 67 % of the ophthalmologists surveyed were against the list, while most 
GPs were in favour (Ramchandani et al., 2002). Also, McLeod et al. (2003) stated 
that consultant physicians’ “reluctance to change established ways of working and to 
give up their freedom to determine relative priority was also widely reported to have 
slowed the implementation of booking” (p. 1149). Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance to engage physicians in quality improvement and, as in the booked 
admissions program, to offer support to the promoters of change (Ham, Kipping & 
McLeod, 2003). Because doctors work with significant autonomy, the 
implementation of any strategy requires their support (Cromwell & Mays, 1999). 
With regard to cultural factors that facilitate the implementation of a strategy, 
focusing on a culture that promotes quality improvement (Pearson & Meyer, 1991) 
and embraces innovations is essential. Other determinants included a culture that is 
patient-centred (Pearson & Meyer, 1991); a flexible system that accommodates 
clinicians’ preferences (McLeod et al., 2003); good organizational memory within a 
learning organization built on previous achievements (Pearson & Meyer, 1991); and 
organizational values, norms and beliefs shared by all employees of the organization. 
Implementing new strategies is easier when staff members embrace the change 
within their HCO: “Staff in the clinical units led the change process but was 
supported by others willing to run with the vision” (Pearson & Meyer, 1991, p. 98). 
An organizational culture that encourages the participation of staff members also 
tends to facilitate change (Rozich & Resar, 2002). Moreover, the lack of trust 
between managers and clinicians when clinicians are not involved in changes that 
affect clinical decisions can sometimes be damaging to the implementation of an 
initiative (Channer, 2001). Likewise, distrust between managers and physicians may 
also result in physicians’ feeling they have been marginalized and have no influence 
on decision-making for policies or strategies (Channer, 2001). Management often 
relies on nurses to maximize the use of beds to help implement new tools for patient 
flow (Rozich & Resar, 2002). According to Ham et al. (2003), staff members affected 
by quality improvement programs need to know there will be benefits for them 
attached to those programs. Finally, it is important not to underestimate the need to 
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allow time for innovations to occur and to create conditions that will foster change 
and reform within hospitals and other HCOs (Ham et al., 2003).  
4.1.3 Organizational-Level Resources  
Human, financial and infrastructure resources are the most typical resources 
mentioned in the literature. Successful implementation of WTMS requires resource 
capacity that is both adaptable and adequate. Indeed, the lack of infrastructure 
resources was mentioned in several articles (Cromwell & Mays, 1999; McLeod et al., 
2003; Rozich & Resar, 2002; Taylor et al., 2005) as a restraining factor. Capacity 
constraints, both in the OR and in post-surgery beds (Ham et al., 2003; Tandon et al., 
2005) were highlighted as hampering WTMS implementation. Often surgical 
capacity is increased to meet wait time guarantees (Lundstrom et al., 1996). Reducing 
bed blocking also clears the way for increases in surgeries by adding bed capacity 
(Hanning, 1996; Hanning & Spangberg, 2000). Bed blocking is a situation in which 
someone occupies a hospital bed even if they are medically stable because there is no 
more suitable place where they can be taken care of. On the human resources side, 
having sufficient staff members dedicated to the WTMS is critical (Bourne et al., 
2001; Brunenberg et al., 2005; Cromwell & Mays, 1999; Ham et al., 2003; Karvonen, 
Rämö, Leijala & Holmström, 2004; Kingston, Carey & Masterson, 2000; Maddison 
et al., 2004; Mills & Heaton, 1991; Mobb, Pugh & Peeling, 1994; Rozich & Resar, 
2002; Tandon et al., 2005). Certain articles mentioned the key role of a dedicated 
project manager or coordinator, although in organizations without those necessary 
resources, the model may still be made to work (Cromwell & Mays, 1999). Both 
professional staff shortages (Karvonen et al., 2004) and limitations on the length of 
contracts for staff recruitment (Gauld & Derrett, 2000) constrained organizations’ 
ability to implement new strategies. In Gauld & Derrett’s (2000) study, one 
respondent suggested that, “If the contract system had a longer-term focus and 
hospitals could offer staff contracts for three years instead of six months or one year, 
then opportunities to perform additional procedures would be enhanced in the context 
of booking system initiatives, which initiatives involve much planning ahead” (p. 
268). This is made all the more difficult because demand for this service exceeds 
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available surgeon capacity (Tandon et al., 2005). On the financial resources side, 
incentives at the individual or the team level were also cited as contributing to the 
success of the result. One contributing factor was the purchase of computers to 
enable doctors to schedule patients themselves (Ham et al. 2003). Contrarily, the 
unavailability of overtime salaries for nurses and support staff constitutes a 
disincentive. However, disincentives can sometimes be effective. In Sweden, 
hospitals run the risk of being forced to send patients elsewhere at their expense if 
they don’t meet the maximal wait time guarantees (Hanning, 1996; Hanning & 
Lundstrom, 1998). 
4.1.4 Organizational-Level Tools  
Organizational tools are instruments or processes used at the organizational 
level. Examples include intranet systems (Rozich & Resar, 2002) or websites that 
offer tools for family physicians and allow physicians to communicate with each 
other (Maddison et al., 2004). A continuous focus on quality improvement and a 
customer service delivery approach aimed at obtaining good quality patient outcomes 
should constitute the drive for change (Pearson & Meyer, 1991). Information 
management systems implemented to meet the high information demands of WTMS 
were the most cited tool. Databases for recording information (Botten et al., 2004; 
Maddison et al., 2004; McLeod et al., 2003; Cromwell & Mays, 1999; Kingston & 
al., 2000) and scheduling software (Hefford & Holmes, 1999; Gauld & Derrett, 2000) 
are two examples. Conversely, overly complex systems can be barriers to WTMS 
implementation (McLeod et al., 2003). Easy, accessible, and effective solutions for 
information presentation are essential, according to Cromwell & Mays (1998, 1999). 
The ability of participants in the initiative to easily access pertinent information 
(Cromwell & Mays, 1999) and the accuracy and reliability of the data (Hanning, 
1996) are crucial. Training and support for users is an important tool. In fact, given 
the increased use of quantitative data, it is important that staff be coached to analyze 
fundamental statistics and time series data and to gain a basic understanding of 
spreadsheets (Cromwell & Mays, 1998, 1999). Training in service redesign provided 
by a national team also helps (Ham et al., 2003). Providing GPs with templates for 
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referral letters is also useful (Maddison et al., 2004). The Harris Hip Score and the 
American Knee Society Score were also mentioned as important clinical instruments 
for assessing and scoring the need for hip and knee arthroplasty (Kingston, et al., 
2000) and for determining which patients were appropriate for placement on a pooled 
wait list (Leach et al., 2004). 
4.2 Contextual-Level Factors 
Contextual-level factors relate to the socio-economic and political setting in 
which organizations function (Pomey et al., 2010). These factors are not specific to 
one organization. Associations representing physicians are one example. Individual 
physicians work at the organizational level while their associations function at a 
higher level. Issues that extend beyond the individual organization, such as broader 
financial conditions that would impact on healthcare systems, are further examples of 
contextual factors.   
4.2.1 Contextual-Level Governance 
High-level coordinating, reporting and monitoring structures constitute the 
first contextual governance factor (Gauld & Derrett, 2000; Ham et al., 2003; Hefford 
& Holmes, 1999; Lundstrom et al., 1996; Worthington, 1991). In Sweden, reporting 
was part of all agreements between Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) (Lundstrom 
et al., 1996) and dedicated policy monitoring structures, which also seemed to have a 
positive impact (Gauld & Derrett, 2000). Political support was also cited as a 
determining factor (Worthington, 1991); without it, participants were discouraged 
from investing effort into putting in place a new WTMS (Hanning & Spangberg, 
2000). Stakeholder commitment, whether in the form of involvement of professional 
associations such as a provincial orthopaedic association or of other partners such as 
patients’ groups (Mullen, 1994) or Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long Term Care 
(Bourne et al., 2001), represented yet another favourable contextual-level governance 
factor. Lundstrom et al. (1996) reported that stakeholders were solicited for 
information on data, for advice on existing processes, for ensuring reporting as well 
for their ideas for improvements (Gauld & Derett, 2000). Successful initiatives had 
two key characteristics: they had been made a priority by political and administrative 
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stakeholders (Bhatti et al., 1999), and they had experienced strong collaboration 
between all parties (Botten et al., 2004). Collaboration was also improved when the 
WTMS leadership and governance were seen to be courteous and impartial.  
4.2.2 Contextual-Level Culture 
While the literature identified a limited number of factors in this category, 
consultations with frontline actors nevertheless appeared to have contributed 
positively to WTMS implementation (Gauld & Derrett, 2000; Ham et al., 2003; 
Hanning & Spangberg, 2000; Leach, et al., 2004; Lundstrom et al., 1996) as did 
liaison between primary and secondary care (Hefford & Holmes, 1999). At this level, 
involving specialists’ and consulting with GPs were shown to be positive factors. 
Physicians’ views regarding an initiative and its relevancy to themselves was also 
likely to have contributed. In fact, Lundstrom et al. (1996) stated that “in the early 
discussions about a national registry, the participating surgeons stated that if the 
compiled data proved to be valuable to participants after the first year, the 
registration should continue” (p. 140). 
Public awareness was recognized as another factor. The public needs clear 
information on changes made to booking processes. Hefford & Holmes (1999) 
explained that if a clear message is shared with the public, most people quickly 
recognize the benefits to patients. The culture of Canada’s healthcare system is in 
itself a contextual-level factor that cannot be overlooked. According to the 
Association of Canadian Academic Healthcare Organizations’ report (2006) and the 
Report of the Federal Advisor on Wait Times (2006), the physician’s role in the 
WTMS is of crucial importance in the system change. It is important to develop a 
collaborative approach among physicians and health authorities participating in the 
development process, and to create a culture of assessment, communication and 
efficient decision-making about WTMS, in order to make all progress public. 
Respondents talking about provincial initiatives recognized the importance of 
communicating information on wait times to the public.  
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4.2.3 Contextual-Level Resources 
In terms of contextual-level resources, funding is definitely the most 
frequently cited contextual resource factor (Botten et al., 2004; Bourne et al., 2001; 
Channer, 2001; Gauld & Derrett, 2000; Ham et al., 2003; Hanning & Lundstrom, 
1998; Hanning & Spangberg, 2000; Hefford & Holmes, 1999; Lundstrom et al., 
1996; Maddison et al., 2004; McLeod et al., 2003; Mills & Heaton, 1991; Mobb et 
al., 1994). A specific strategy, such as addressing a backlog, can occasionally receive 
additional funding (Botten et al., 2004; Channer, 2001; Gauld & Derrett, 2000; Mobb 
et al., 1994) and may also be funded for a specific purchase, such as equipment or 
software (Bourne et al., 2001). An economic recession (Hanning, 1996) or budget 
cuts (Cromwell & Mays, 1999) will tend to limit the monetary resources available, 
thereby reducing the level of financial support, which can have a negative impact on 
the new WTMS. In New Zealand, a scarcity of resources led to raising of the priority 
criteria threshold for eye care, thereby complicating the booking process for patients 
in need of treatment. Such resource scarcity can thus have a negative impact on 
WTMS implementation at a nation-wide level (Gauld & Derrett, 2000). Conversely, 
HCOs in Sweden received additional resources in the form of grants destined to 
finance the guaranteed wait time reform, and the program’s implementation was 
greatly facilitated by these national-level incentives (Hanning, 1996; Hanning & 
Lundstrom, 1998; Hanning & Spangberg, 2000). The incentives that were introduced 
to support the maximum wait time guarantee were mainly intended to change the 
behaviour of the hospital departments, but unfortunately, increasing the number of 
surgeries being performed could not, in itself, clear the long wait lists for elective 
surgery. Setting priorities and applying standardized indications were highlighted as 
important strategies, as was providing adequate incentives to motivate all 
departments to put into practice the recommended priorities (Hanning & Lundstrom, 
1998). Obviously, financial resources are a necessary success factor, meaning 
financial incentives have to be planned, aligned and linked to efficiencies.  
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4.2.4 Contextual-Level Tools 
Tools at the contextual level are instruments affecting multiple organizations, 
such as standards and guidelines (Channer, 2001; Hanning, 1996; Hanning & 
Lundstrom, 1998; Hanning & Spangberg, 2000; Hefford & Holmes, 1999). The 
implementation of a central registry is a positive factor that enables the compilation 
and standardization of information (Hanning, 1996; Hanning & Spangberg, 2000; 
Hefford & Holmes, 1999; Lundstrom, & al., 1996). Training, whether in specific 
professional skills or in management skills, helps during the implementation phase of 
a WTMS (Ham et al., 2003; McLeod et al., 2003).  
As we will see in the following sections, all the factors mentioned in the 
literature review are inextricably tied to the initiatives that were implemented in 
Canada at the national level. 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 - CANADIAN POLICY PUT IN PLACE TO BETTER 
MANAGE HIP AND KNEE REPLACEMENT SURGERIES 
 
In September 2004, Canada’s First Ministers agreed that access to timely care 
across Canada was the country’s biggest healthcare concern and priority. According 
to Health Canada (2004), the First Ministers agreed on an action plan based on the 
following principles: (1) universality, accessibility, portability, comprehensiveness, 
and public administration; (2) access to medically necessary health services based on 
need, not ability to pay; (3) reforms focused on the needs of patients to ensure that all 
Canadians have access to the health care services they need, when they need them; 
(4) collaboration between all governments, working together in common purpose to 
meet the evolving health care needs of Canadians; (5) advancement through the 
sharing of best practices; (6) continued accountability and provision of information to 
make progress transparent to citizens, and (7) jurisdictional flexibility. The First 
Ministers of all Canadian provinces and territories (with the exception of Quebec, 
which had its own strategy) then committed a total of 5.5 billion dollars to achieve 
timely access in five areas of care over a 10-year period. The 2005 federal budget 
attributed another 15 million dollars of funding for the wait time initiatives. 
According to the Government of Canada (2009), this investment was aimed at 
supporting research on patient and provider awareness, and on the perceptions of 
different decision-makers, care providers and patients with regard to wait time issues.  
The health ministers also agreed to collect and provide important data to 
Canadians concerning reductions in wait times (Health Canada, 2004). In fact, they 
did so in the following ways: 1) provinces and territories determined comparable 
indicators of access to healthcare professionals, diagnostic and treatment procedures, 
with a report to their citizens to be developed by all jurisdictions by December 31, 
2005; 2) evidence-based benchmarks for medically acceptable wait times starting 
with cancer care, cardiac care, diagnostic imaging procedures, joint replacements, 
and sight restoration were established by December 31, 2005, through a process 
developed by the Federal, Provincial and Territorial (F/P/T) Ministers of Health; 3) 
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multi-year targets for achieving priority benchmarks were established in each region 
by December 31, 2007; and 4) provinces and territories had to report annually to their 
inhabitants on progress on wait times across their multi-year wait time targets. In 
fact, on December 12, 2005, the provinces and territories defined their benchmarks 
for the five priority areas of care (Government of Canada, 2009). The health 
ministers thereby guaranteed the provision of hip and knee replacements within 26 
weeks. 
 The government announced three programs to support the wait time 
guarantees (Prime Minister of Canada, 2007). One of these programs included 
funding for Info-Route Santé of Canada, a non-profit organization looking to develop 
and adopt IT systems on health. Second, a fund for wait time guarantees was set up. 
According to CIHI (2009), the 2007 budget attributed 612 million dollars to 
accelerate the implementation of wait time guarantees for patients. Of that sum, 
112 million dollars was to be divided among the provinces and territories that agreed 
to establish wait time guarantees before March 31, 2010. The remaining 500 million 
dollars was to be divided according to the proportion of citizens in each province and 
territory and put into a third-party trust. Third, an additional sum of 30 million dollars 
for pilot projects on wait time guarantees was reserved for the period 2007–2010, to 
be offered to provinces and territories that created innovative new projects to reduce 
wait times and to respect their wait time guarantees.  
On another note, the Health Council of Canada (HCC), which had been 
created by the 2003 Agreement of the First Ministers on Health Care Renewal, was 
given responsibility in the 10-year period for reporting on the population’s health 
outcomes. The HCC also recommended: (1) continued research to support 
comparative analysis and operational progress; (2) adoption of modern and 
innovative management practices in the healthcare system; (3) acceleration of 
information technology (IT) implementation; (4) culture change for healthcare 
professionals in order to improve intervention capacity in crisis regions; and (5) 
increased public awareness about transformation of the system (HCC, 2007). 
 CIHI has been responsible for reporting progress made across jurisdictions 
since the 2004 Health Accord (CIHI, 2009). Apart from consolidating the 
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information on wait times submitted by each province, CIHI incorporates into its 
report the data on a strategy adopted by most provinces to improve access, which is 
to increase the number of surgeries in priority areas of care. In fact, CIHI publishes 
an annual report of health indicators including health status, non-medical 
determinants of health, health system performance, and community and health 
system characteristics. CIHI also produces a document entitled Tables on Wait 
Times: A Comparison by Province. However, it is impossible to determine to what 
extent provincial differences in wait times, as reported in that document, can be 
attributed to differences in definitions or constitute actual deviations (CIHI, 2009). 
CIHI (2009) also solicits research proposals on evidence-based benchmarks for the 
five priority areas. 
According to CIHI (2009), the Canadian Joint Replacement Registry (CJRR) 
is a pan-Canadian registry that collects information on Total Hip and Knee 
Replacement surgeries performed in Canada and follows joint replacement recipients 
over time to monitor their outcomes, including revision rates. Other groups have also 
focused on developing knowledge about the outcomes of waiting. The Wait Time 
Alliance (WTA) was created in the fall of 2004. It includes members of the Canadian 
Medical Association and specialty associations related to the wait times matter and 
was created in response to physician associations’ concerns about Canadians’ access 
to health care. It has published a report with recommendations to governments and 
certain organizations on how to achieve the pan-Canadian benchmark for wait times 
and how to improve access to care. Each year, it publishes a bulletin on wait times 
that presents data on the country’s accomplishments in that area.  
Other organizations have been taking action in order to reduce wait times. For 
example, the Fraser Institute publishes annual surveys that report physicians’ 
estimates of hospital wait times across the country. The WCWL released a set of 
maximum acceptable wait times in 2005. Bone and Joint Canada (BJC) is an 
organization leading other HCOs and individuals to improve access and quality of 
care for people with musculoskeletal problems across Canada. One of their 
accomplishments has been the attainment of consensus in regard to the National Core 
Model of Care for Hip and Knee Replacement Surgery and the development of a 
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Toolkit to guide implementation across the country. Certain organizations promote 
sharing on best practices, exchanging ideas on what experiences work. For example, 
the Taming of the Queue holds colloquia and the Association of Canadian Academic 
Health Care Organizations publishes reports in order to share WTMS used by their 
members (CIHI, 2009). Together, these organizations try to monitor and improve 
wait times in Canada.  
A description of the provincial initiatives undertaken following this national 
initiative can be found in Appendix 3. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 - THE METHODOLOGY 
This chapter summarizes, in five sections, the methodology used in this 
research to address each of the study’s objectives. The first section explains the 
research team as well as my specific involvement in the study. The second presents 
the research design. The third explains the recruitment method and sample 
population. The fourth illustrates the method and technique for data collection. The 
fifth and final section explains how the data was analyzed.  
6.1 The Research Team  
The overall research project has been funded by the Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research (CIHR). The team is comprised of professors and students from 
universities in Alberta and Quebec, including the University of Calgary (Dr. Tom 
Noseworthy) and the University of Montreal (Dr. Marie-Pascale Pomey). It also 
includes Claudia Sanmartin, Senior Researcher in the Health Analysis Division at 
Statistics Canada, and Carolyn DeCoster, Director of Clinical Service Optimization 
and Data Integration at Alberta Health Services. As a masters’ student in health 
administration at the University of Montreal, I was invited to participate in this study 
by Marie-Pascale Pomey. *As a participant in this study, I actively contributed by 
recruiting the various case study sites, going on-site to conduct the interviews with 
the participants, collecting and analysing the data and lastly, writing the final report. I 
also made sure to ensure a constant level of communication and collaboration with 
the research group.  
 
6.2 Research Design  
The study’s research strategy is a multiple case study of three WTMSs 
implemented in Canadian HCOs with two embedded levels of analysis: contextual 
and organizational levels. By means of an in-depth analysis of organizations’ and key 
informants’ experiences implementing WTMSs for TJR surgeries, we analyze the 
tools, resources, cultural and governance factors linked to the success of these 
strategies and to the organizations’ capacity to sustain wait times for hip and knees 
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below the federal benchmark. As Baxter and Jack (2008) explain, using qualitative 
case studies facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety 
of data sources. Co-researchers from the Western Canada Waiting List (WCWL) 
project reviewed and validated each step of the study. Direct quotes from interviews 
with key informants are used to support and to reinforce the credibility and 
verifiability of our results. Moreover, transcripts of the interviews were provided to 
the participants for their feedback. The information from those interviews was 
triangulated with internal documents from the three HCOs to validate the findings. 
Each site’s main participant has reviewed the interpretation of data to ensure 
accuracy. Finally, the robustness of our conceptual framework supports the study’s 
conclusions. For all these reasons, we consider the chosen research strategy to be 
appropriate. 
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6.3 Recruitment Method and Sample 
6.3.1 Sampling 
I decided to select three types of WTMSs for TJR that would be classified as 
sustainable, moderately sustainable and unsustainable, from three Canadian 
provinces. Bone and Joint Canada (BJC) and the Canadian Orthopaedic Association 
(COA) helped us identify these cases. With the information provided by these 
organizations, we were able to select the three cases.  
6.3.2 Classification of WTMS 
To select our three case studies, we needed a classification system. We 
developed this system in collaboration with the research group. Appleby et al. (2005) 
used three categories to define a WTMS’s success: 1) successful – consistently low 
proportions of patients waiting over six months; 2) variable performance – some 
success in reducing the proportion of people waiting over six months but not 
sustained; and 3) unsuccessful – consistently high proportions of patients waiting 
over six months. Based on that study, we developed our own classification system:  
1. Sustainable: WTMSs that have resulted in all patients waiting less than the 
federal benchmark of 26 weeks for TJR for at least 6–12 months within an 
18-month period (April 2009–September 2010). 
2. Moderately sustainable: WTMSs that temporarily reduced wait times to less 
than 26 weeks for TJR for at least 6–12 months within an 18-month period 
(April 2009–September 2010). 
3. Unsustainable: WTMSs that failed to reduce wait times to less than 26 weeks 
for TJR for at least 6–12 months within an 18-month period (April 2009-
September 2010). 
6.3.3 Recruitment of health care organizations and key informants 
To recruit HCOs, we consulted with BJC to identify hospitals in different 
provinces that would fit the type of WTMS we were looking for and to validate our 
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choices. Then, focusing on these HCOs, we analyzed the data from the various 
Health Ministries regarding wait times for HKR surgeries to determine whether they 
revealed initiatives that were sustainable, moderately sustainable or unsustainable. 
We then collected more detailed information on the initiatives themselves from 
various websites and articles. We contacted people from those HCOs via email to 
inform them we were interested in studying their WTMS; if they did not respond to 
our first email, we sent one to three reminders. Once contact was established, we 
obtained from them the name of the person to contact in order to apply for approval 
from the hospital’s ethics board. To recruit participants, we also asked these main 
contacts at the HCOs to provide us with the names of surgeons and key informants 
involved in the initiative. In the end, we recruited our first case in Ontario. We 
recruited our second case in a metropolitan city in Ontario and our third case in Nova 
Scotia.  
Our research coordinator (RC) managed the ethics board approval process. In 
each case, the main contact person at the HCO was designated the site Principal 
Investigator (PI) for ethics board purposes. Once the approvals were obtained, the RC 
asked the site PI to contact the other potential participants to inform them of the 
study. We then sent an email to each potential participant describing our study and 
asking them about the objective of the initiative, whether the status assigned to it in 
our classification system (sustainable, moderately sustainable or unsustainable) was 
accurate, and whether the site was exclusive to TJR surgeries, and to confirm the 
surgical volumes for HKR surgeries between April 2009 and September 2010. We 
then conducted on-site visits for a period of two days at each site. 
When the data from each of the case study sites were reviewed and analyzed, 
all the data were combined and overall findings produced. The results of this data 
analysis can be found in chapters 8–10. 
6.3.4 Ethical consideration  
The project received a certificate of approval on October 14, 2010, from the 
University of Montreal research ethics committee. Ethics approval was also obtained 
from each hospital that agreed to participate in the study. Participants in the study 
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read and signed the consent form developed by the research team before their 
interviews. Participants were informed they were free to withdraw from the study at 
any time, before or after the interview, and that they could refuse to participate in the 
study entirely or to answer certain questions during the interview. They were also 
assured that the information they provided would remain confidential and that 
anonymity would be guaranteed during the collection, analysis and publication of the 
data. Finally, transcripts have been stored in a computer with a private access code, in 
a locked office at the University of Montreal. This database, which forms part of a 
larger study that includes three other projects, some of which are expected to 
continue until 2013, will be securely conserved for a minimum of five years to a 
maximum of 10 years from that time. 
6.4 Data Collection and Materials 
The primary data source consisted of semi-structured, in-person interviews 
with key informants; only two interviews were conducted by telephone due to 
participants’ schedules. Interviews dealt with questions on factors that inhibited or 
enhanced the sustainability of WTMSs implemented in Canadian HCOs and the 
informants’ involvement in these initiatives (see Appendix 2 for the interview guide). 
Secondary data sources included pertinent documentation on the initiatives being 
studied, wait times between April 2009 and September 2010, and surgical volumes 
for that time period, as well as various sources and studies regarding the different 
WTMS.  
6.4.1 Interviews 
For the interviews we used a semi-structured format. The interview guide we 
developed was based on the previously mentioned study by Marie-Pascale Pomey 
(2009). The guide made it possible to translate one or more research questions into 
verifiable indicators. It was structured around our conceptual framework and covered 
the same four dimensions (governance, culture, resources and tools). The same 
interview guide was used for all participants. Unlike a questionnaire with closed 
questions, the guide was a flexible instrument that could be adapted to the nature of 
the case study, while the research question explained the content and nature of what 
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we were looking for. Thus, the questions could vary from one case to another. This 
guide could be applied to people involved in wait time management for HKR in a 
variety of settings: Health Ministry, hospitals or clinics. Our aim was to interview a 
variety of healthcare professionals at the organizational level, including the medical 
director, the director of operations, the orthopaedic OR chief officer, other 
orthopaedic surgeons and high-volume surgeons, healthcare professionals involved in 
triage or initial assessment, the person responsible for surgical bookings, as well as 
nurses involved in wait time management. At the contextual level, our aim was to 
interview participants working at the Ministry level whose role was to collaborate 
with the hospitals who put in place a WTMS. For data collection purposes, we 
planned to encounter five people per site for a total of 15 interviews; we ended up 
doing 24 interviews.    For our first case study, we conducted nine 
interviews with the following participants: director of surgical services, post-
operative nurse, chief of surgery, pre-operative nurse, orthopaedic surgeon, operating 
room coordinator, advanced practice physiotherapist, decision support manager and a 
responsible at the LHIN (Ministry level). For our second case study, we conducted 
eight interviews with the following participants: pre-operative coordinator, 
orthopaedic surgeon, operations director at the musculo-skeletal program, medical 
director, post-operative nurse, physiotherapist, booking clerk and a project manager. 
For our third case study, we conducted seven interviews with the following 
participants: two orthopaedic surgeons, two nurses, two managers and a decision 
support manager. Interviews lasted between 15 minutes and 60 minutes and were 
conducted in English. The interview guide contained six sections:  
- Background 
- WTMS/Policy at the provincial level 
- WTMS at the site of the case study 
- Implementation phase 
- Sustainability phase 
- Conclusion 
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The interview questions were originally drafted in French, then translated into 
English and re-evaluated in English by two key informants to test the validity of the 
interview guide. (See Appendix 2 for the complete interview guide.) 
6.4.2 Timeframe for Data Collection 
The in-person interviews were conducted between June and November 2011. 
The three researchers who visited the case study sites were Marie-Pascale Pomey, a 
masters’-level student from the Faculty of Medicine who was specifically interested 
in the unintended consequences of WTMSs, and myself.  
6.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
The following section outlines how the data was collected and analyzed. 
6.5.1 Data Collection 
During the on-site visits, each interview was audio taped. One researcher 
asked questions while the others took notes. All interviews were transcribed by the 
same person and checked for accuracy by the site PI and myself. 
6.5.2 Data Analysis 
Content analysis was chosen as the method of data analysis. Content analysis 
is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the 
contexts of their use (Krippendorff, 2004). According to Neuendorf (2002), content 
analysis can be defined as the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message 
characteristics. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) defined it as a research method for the 
subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns. Huberman (1994) 
distils content analysis into three steps:  data reduction, data displays, and conclusion 
drawing and verification. According to the author, data reduction consists of 
selecting, simplifying and transforming the data that appear in transcripts. Data can 
be reduced either through selection, summary or paraphrase. It is essential not to strip 
the data from its original context. The second major component of content analysis is 
data display. According to Huberman (1994), a display is an organized, compressed 
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assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and action. The author adds 
that deciding on the rows and columns of a matrix for qualitative data and on which 
data should be entered in the cells constitutes an analytic activity. The last step, 
conclusion drawing and verification, is a dynamic process that begins when data 
starts being collected. As the researcher proceeds, he holds the conclusions lightly 
while maintaining a critical view of his preliminary conclusions. The meanings 
emerging from the data have to be tested for their plausibility, their sturdiness, and 
their validity (Huberman, 1994). 
In our study, each transcript was read twice. We developed a color code used 
to draw squares around the verbatims according to themes. Once this was done, the 
data from each respective theme was extracted and placed into different files 
representing the factors in our framework (themes): contextual governance, 
contextual culture, contextual resources, contextual tools, organizational governance, 
organizational resources, organizational culture, and organizational tools. Sub-themes 
were associated with each theme and then the results were analyzed. This was done 
for all 24 transcripts.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 - RESULTS  
The results of the three case studies are presented in the following three 
chapters. Each case presentation is organized according to the factors that influence 
the success and sustainability of the WTMSs implemented in three different 
Canadian cities, and includes excerpts from interviews expressing the opinions of 
various respondents.  
In presenting the cases’ results, we begin by describing the type of HCO 
involved, the province in which it is located, our classification of the case, the 
provincial wait time management initiative adopted, and the organizational initiative 
implemented at the HCO level. Then we present the organizational and contextual 
factors relevant to each case, as the interviewees perceived them.  
As mentioned in our methodology chapter, the information gathered from the 
different interviewees was also validated by means of the many documents provided 
to us by the sites’ participants, including published articles, balanced scorecard 
templates, wait time monitoring templates, wait time data, and so on.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 - CASE 1 
 
8.1 Description of the case 
8.1.1 Type of health care organization 
This HCO is a community teaching hospital that offers acute medical and 
surgical care to a North-western Ontario population. They collaborate with different 
HCOs in the region to offer care to a demographically diverse population. There are 
375 acute care beds in the hospital. The ER receives 95,000 visits per year.  
8.1.2 Classification of the case 
Originally, there were supposed to be five interviews but over the course of 
the on-site visit, nine interviews were conducted in total. We had classified the 
initiative as moderately sustainable based on the wait time data available from the 
Health Ministry’s website. In fact, we found that the average wait time for hip 
replacement surgeries was at 135 days between April and June 2009, while it was at 
181 days between July to September 2009. From April to June 2009, the average 
knee replacement wait time was at 232 days, while it was at 278 days from July to 
September 2009. Based on our classification system, we considered the case to be 
moderately sustainable because they had been able to maintain wait times within 26 
weeks for six months during the April 2009–September 2010 period for hip 
replacement surgeries. However, once we were able to get and review the monthly 
wait time trends for April 2009 to September 2010 from the HCO’s financial 
specialist, it became clear the initiative was in reality an unsustainable case. In fact, 
wait times for hip surgeries ranged from 113 days to 285 days between April 2009-
September 2010. Wait times for knee surgeries ranged from 170 days to 356 days 
from April 2009-September 2010.  
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8.1.3 The Provincial Wait Time Management Strategy 
As a result of the national Wait Time Strategy declared by Canada’s First 
Ministers in the fall of 2004, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 
invested 410 million dollars on May 18, 2006 for additional procedures, including 
43,850 cataract surgeries, 18,210 hip and knee replacements, 16,650 cardiac 
procedures, 11,260 cancer surgeries and 182,700 MRI scans (Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, 2006). Most of Ontario’s 14 Local Health Integration Networks 
(LHINs) decided to implement initiatives to reduce HKR surgery wait times. Their 
role was to work with the Ontario government, local health service providers, 
community agencies, residents and others to ensure a well-coordinated system of 
health services. They established accountability agreements with HCOs that specified 
expectations regarding outputs (e.g. access requirements, websites, and provincial 
access targets) and short-term outcomes (clear roles and responsibilities and 
performance measured against expectations) (Solomon, 2006).  
8.1.4 The Hospital’s Wait Time Management Strategy 
In response to the national WTMS, this regional hospital decided to create its 
own Regional Joint Assessment Centre (RJAC) in January 2009. In this RJAC, an 
advanced practice physiotherapist (APP), a physiotherapist specially trained to 
manage patients with hip and knee arthritis, triages and screens patients and arranges 
a consultation with an orthopaedic surgeon if needed. This is usually done within two 
to four weeks after receiving the referral. The APP sees the patients for follow-up 
assessments after surgery. If patients are not fit for surgery, the APP offers them 
conservative management treatment options and provides education, exercises and 
referrals to physiotherapists, nutritionists and other healthcare providers. According 
to Larmour (2011), GPs from across the territory refer patients to the RJAC and are 
kept in the loop through timely reports. To further expedite the process, GPs and 
patients may opt for the first available surgeon rather than their surgeon of choice. In 
terms of surgical volume, the hospital performs approximately 650 cases per year. 
The surgical unit consists of 10 beds located in one surgical unit; it is staffed by 
41 
 
 
 
nurses, physiotherapists and occupational therapists with the knowledge and 
experience necessary to offer HKR patients a high quality of care. 
A hip and knee care pathway had also been developed, prior to the RJAC, in 
July 2007. According to this pathway, in the pre-operative process patients are 
separated into three groups according to the expected length of stay (LOS) and level 
of care they will need. Patients in the fast track can expect to be discharged two to 
four days after surgery. Patients in the average track generally leave the hospital on 
the fourth day. Patients in the slow track are transferred to a regional rehabilitation 
centre on day two. The hospital website offers information booklets on Total Hip or 
Knee Replacement (THKR) surgeries as well as guidelines on activities, although in 
actual practice, these varied depending on the orthopaedic surgeon who operated the 
patient.  
8.2 Factors that influence the WTMS’s success and sustainability  
8.2.1 Contextual Governance  
Since the implementation of the WTMS, the provincial Health Ministry 
guaranteed that hip and knee surgeries would be done within 182 days. To achieve 
this, the Ministry designated a person at the LHIN to monitor implementation of the 
strategy in HCOs. Thus far, in this case, the LHIN has clearly taken its job seriously.  
The LHIN has set a target for us which is the same as the Ministry’s target, essentially 182 
days. We haven’t set an internal target. We’re struggling to do 182 days so… we have a 
demand that makes it difficult for us to keep up with the supply of service so... it’s been a 
challenge for us to get to 182 days on a consistent basis. (I.9.) 
 
Accountability agreements were signed between the LHIN and the HCO 
specifying the agreed-upon goals. Consequently, the LHIN expected the organization 
to give them regular reports, including data on how the hospital was performing.  
We don’t micromanage the providers and tell them specifically what activities to undertake. 
They’re basically required to meet the accountabilities in their agreements so... there is an 
accountability agreement there that specifies that […] they have to hit... 182 days is the 
number for wait times, and basically whatever reasonable activities they need to undertake to 
do that is up to them. (I.3.) 
 
The LHIN also tried to be involved, without micromanaging the team, in the 
co-ordination of certain activities the hospital wished to implement to reduce surgical 
wait times. An example of this was helping the team implement care pathways. 
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Certain differences in opinion, however, caused some friction between the LHIN and 
the orthopaedic surgeons. For example, the LHIN did not recognize the benefits for 
the team of surgeons to hire an APP. 
When we went to the LHIN […] this is what their perspective was: “Why are we doing 
something that’s going to help the doctors? This is simply doing a doctor service.” (I.6.) 
 
A large percentage of the problem is related to their perception that they were providing a 
service that was covering surgeon overhead and that, “Why would we be doing something 
like that? Surgeons have to pay an overhead for their office, why shouldn’t they be hiring 
these people?” (I.6.) 
 
As a partial response to this debate, the Health Ministry conducted its own 
evaluations with an independent evaluator of certain aspects of the WTMS in order to 
determine how well it was functioning.  
On another note, the orthopaedic surgeons were given the opportunity to 
participate in the hip and knee working group created by the Health Ministry right 
before the strategy was implemented. This allowed the HCO and the LHIN to get the 
strategy up and running. Since its debut, the organization no longer participates in the 
working group because both parties feel it is no longer relevant in order for the 
organization to function successfully.   
I was on the hip and knee working group with the LHIN when […] these discussions first 
started in 2007/2008. Since this program started up and [is] running we no longer have those 
working group meetings, we just don’t need them. (I.8.) 
 
Another stakeholder, the Ontario Medical Association (OMA), also became 
involved. However, their involvement revolved around opposition to a request from 
the LHIN that each orthopaedic surgeon’s individual wait list be made public. This 
opposition made orthopaedic surgeons’ involvement that much more difficult, 
according to the hospital’s decision-support manager.  
The wait time system as it was originally conceived in Ontario was expected to publish 
individual physician wait times. […] the Ontario Medical Association got involved and 
forced the province to back down from that, which is unfortunate in many ways because it’s 
made our job of engaging physicians much more difficult (I.9.) 
 
Lastly, the LHIN is responsible for ensuring the organization receives the 
funding needed to increase surgical volumes and for monitoring whether this leads to 
reductions in wait times. For an organization to get the funding, it needs to show the 
LHIN specific data about its wait times. If the LHIN does not see an improvement, it 
can choose to withdraw the funding.  
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The LHIN got really upset about our wait times probably about seven months ago because 
they had been funding and they weren’t seeing improvement, and I was trying to tell them,  
well we’re doing our volumes so[…] what do you want us to do? So it’s a bit back and forth, 
useless […]. The only way they’re going to give us money is if they see what they think are 
results. (I.1.) 
 
The problem with this is that the funding received is to increase the volumes. 
However, increasing volume does not necessarily reduce the wait list. Once the 
organization has achieved its target in terms of volume, there is not much else it can 
do to reduce wait times. These two goals are not always easy to pursue at the same 
time, according to certain interviewees. 
8.2.2 Contextual Resources  
The main factor that had an impact on the program’s sustainability was the 
external funding they received, as previously mentioned. In this particular case, the 
amount of funding was approved by the Ministry and given to the HCO by the LHIN. 
This point was raised in all the interviews conducted at this site. The problem did not 
lie in the base funding the program received from the hospital, but rather in the 
incremental funding received yearly from the LHIN. This amount was negotiated 
each year between the LHIN and the hospital’s surgical director. Together, they 
determined the following year’s surgical volume based on the current queue and the 
surgical team’s capacity. Because the HCO in this case was associated with teaching 
activities, they received the academic funding rate for hip and knee surgeries. Since 
funding was re-evaluated yearly, there was no guarantee the program would receive 
funding from one year to the next.  
Each year we provide one-time funding to the hospitals to perform incremental cases above 
and beyond their base volumes […]. The LHIN is responsible for funding the program. It 
does not take any responsibility for the actions taken by the organization or the obstacles they 
face in trying to respect their accountability agreements and ultimately, their goals. (I.3.) 
 
For 2010/11 they were funded for[…] 545 or 585, I’m not sure, cases is what they had as a 
base. Basically they were funded for 700 cases total last year, so they’re expected to do a 
certain volume out of their base volume, so the hospital covers that through their global 
budget, and then they get incremental funding for the difference. (I.3.) 
 
In theory, the principle is simple. If a program receives increased funding to 
increase volumes, more surgeries will be done to clear the backlog, which may cause 
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increased wait times at first. However, there has been back and forth tension between 
the LHIN and the HCO on this matter.  
In an ideal steady-state environment, if there was an increase in volumes, you would see wait 
times drop, but in many cases there’s actually an inverse relationship because […] the wait 
time isn’t measured until the procedure is done. So I often say on a lot of these indicators that 
it’s going to get worse before it gets better. (I.3.) 
 
There had been an apparent improvement in the way the funding had occurred 
in recent years. Initially, the funding needed to be negotiated and reallocated every 
three months; this was now done on a yearly basis. However, the HCO still faced the 
risk of having a deficit because of the way the Ministry funding was structured.  
It was clearly very important for the HCO to establish a good relationship 
with the LHIN to be able to negotiate additional resources when needed. In fact, an 
important factor seemed to be the trade-offs that the organizational level was willing 
to make to get additional resources from the contextual level.  
So we were funded for initially 630, so once I got to the point where… I knew 630 wasn’t 
going to be enough to keep the wait times to where the LHIN wanted them, I started making 
deals with the LHIN and saying: Okay, we need more resources; give us more money and 
we’ll try to drive some changes […] even though I don’t see that being directly relatable. I’d 
see the average wait time being more relatable to the number of cases you’re doing than this 
90th percentile number that the government uses. (I.1.) 
 
It seems that despite the HCO’s best efforts to achieve its goals and to report 
to their direct authority, the LHIN, they risked seeing their budget reduced due to 
certain political events. In fact, it seemed that the funding level could vary according 
to who was in power at the Ministry level.  
This lack of alignment between perceptions at the contextual and 
organizational levels in relation to funding could have unintended consequences. In 
fact, actors at the organizational level could decide to do the opposite of what they 
were required to do, for fear of losing their funding if they were doing too well.   
Apart from the funding from the LHIN, the program also received funding 
from an external source to kick-start the initiative, Healthforce Ontario. Healthforce 
Ontario is a collaborative initiative involving Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care and Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities. However, this 
funding was not sustained beyond the first year of the strategy’s implementation. As 
for the RJAC, it was funded from the hospital’s annual budget from the Ministry. The 
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reason the Ministry had funded this initiative so far is because they were trying to 
prioritize activities aimed at reducing wait time 1. Although some interviewees 
mentioned that the cost of funding the RJAC program, including the APP’s salary, 
was quite high, it was still one of the least costly assessment centres operating in the 
province. The situation was the same as with the wait times funding, in the sense that 
there was no guarantee they would continue receiving funding from one year to the 
next. This uncertainty regarding the recurrence of funding has created an important 
level of tension among the team around the fear of losing that money.  
8.2.3 Contextual Culture  
There were contextual culture factors mentioned throughout the interviews. 
Public awareness was not really taken into consideration at the contextual level. Of 
course, wait times data was available to the public, mainly through the provincial 
Ministry website giving the public access to information on wait times per hospital. 
However, because these wait times could be due to more than one thing: backlog, 
surgeon’s popularity, etc., patients may not have been able to interpret this data 
adequately. Little work went to explaining the data to the public.  
The public doesn’t see these kind of things, but the problems make it the public’s problem, or 
the hospital’s problem by saying the hospital will manage its wait times. We can manage 
volumes, but we can’t necessarily manage physician lists. (I.6.) 
 
Effective communication between primary and secondary care was made 
possible by certain professionals’ commitment. In fact, the APP responsible for the 
RJAC put enormous effort into teaching GPs how to assess patients and refer them to 
the RJAC, did marketing to the public, gave presentations, engaged with the media, 
and did mail-outs to the GPs. In addition, this APP sent GPs updates on how many 
patients were seen at the RJAC, what the wait times were and how many patients 
went on to surgical consultations. However, this was no easy task to accomplish and 
it has been an ongoing process. 
So we did marketing to the public and to the family physicians to redirect referrals to one 
central intake, being the Regional Joint Assessment centre, so that you’ve got one point of 
contact for entry into the system. Now there are still family doctors that continue to refer to 
the orthopaedic surgeons, and most of the time the orthopaedists will pass the referral on to 
the physiotherapist. (I.8.) 
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It’s difficult to tell a practitioner – a medical doctor – that they’re going to send their patients 
to a physiotherapist and the patient’s going to get more information than the medical 
doctor’s going to give them. So that takes self-awareness on the part of the family physician 
that’s not common. (I.6.) 
 
An important contextual factor was the fact that the LHIN made an effort to 
work with the physicians and managers at the organizational level, as previously 
mentioned. This participative approach between these two parties was seen as a 
positive factor reflecting a culture that promotes innovation at the organizational 
level.  
If they’re trying to implement specific strategies or pathways or that sort of thing, then we’ll 
work with them, but […] we don’t generally tell them “you have to operate this way” or “to 
use this type of...”, whatever clinical practice or whatever; that’s really to the discretion of 
the hospital. (I.3.) 
8.2.4 Contextual Tools  
There seemed to be a lot of difficulty in regard to how the province measured, 
and therefore, collected data on wait times for surgical procedures. This seemed to 
provoke strong reactions among personnel and managers at the hospital. In fact, 
looking at the 90th percentile of wait times for hip and knee surgeries may not give 
the full picture. The Ministry asked HCOs to measure the 90th percentile because they 
wanted to know how long the longest-waiting patients were waiting. The 90th 
percentile wait time means 90 % of the people admitted to hospital are admitted by 
this time, i.e., a 90th percentile wait time of 10 weeks means that 90 % of patients 
admitted were admitted within 10 weeks of going on the list. However, when 700 
procedures are done in year, looking at the 90th percentile is essentially looking at the 
longest-waiting 70 patients. On a quarterly basis, this means they are evaluating 15 or 
20 patients out of the 700 patients operated on during the year. To counterbalance 
this way of collecting the data, i.e., having to look at the 90th percentile guideline 
established by the Ministry, interviewees stressed the need to look at the ‘big 
picture’. 
I see so many problems with the way they measure wait times and the way that all of that was 
rolled out in the province of Ontario (I.3.) 
It’s just crazy because they’re measuring the wrong things. They’re measuring what they 
think they should be measuring but it just doesn’t make any sense! (I.1) 
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[…] talking to the providers, I’ll say “Let’s look at the 90th percentile, but let’s also look at 
the entire picture.” I generally like to have […] the distribution curve... and then you can 
really see what’s going on there. If you have every case logged in a distribution curve you 
can see a more meaningful picture. (I.3.) 
8.2.5 Organizational Governance  
Analysis of the governance of the organization yielded a few observations. 
The first was the fact that two key individuals exercised significant organizational 
leadership. In fact, the director of surgical services and the APP acted as instigators 
for change. It was also interesting to see that the director did not have a clinical 
background. He was therefore able to bring his own expertise from his accounting 
and management background, and get the clinical input from his colleagues.  
We were a little sceptical when it first happened… I mean, the director of surgical services 
used to work beside me, and he was just the analyst for the surgical services, and then the 
director job became open and they filled it with him. So everybody kind of went, “Okay, so 
he’s got no clinical background but he’s running the place.” But it’s worked out really well 
and he knows […] that he doesn’t have the clinical background, and he’s not afraid to ask. 
(I.7.) 
 
Second, it was interesting to learn that no new governance mechanisms had 
been created in relation to the implementation of the WTMS. The current committees 
already existed prior to implementation of the strategy. There was the Surgical 
Executive Team, responsible for business decisions, time allocation and physician 
engagement programs. Another committee was the Surgical Care Team, essentially 
responsible for nurse practice issues, patient-centred issues, policy-making and 
reporting. There was also a board-level Quality Utilization Committee, where the 
wait time data was now reported. Another quality committee had been disbanded a 
few months before our visit, according to the decision support manager. Lastly, the 
lack of involvement on the part of the hospital’s CEO with regard to reducing 
surgical wait times was not helpful for the team. In fact, it was evident that the staff 
thought wait time reduction was not a priority for their CEO.  
It should also be mentioned that the hospital had established an effective 
partnership with the regional rehabilitation centre. In this respect, the clinical 
pathway created for the strategy allowed for continuity of care. If ever the staff from 
the rehabilitation centre had questions about specific matters, they could simply get 
in touch with the patient’s surgeon at the hospital. 
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We do have orders for the regional rehabilitation centre we partner with. That pathway that 
we send with the patient, sometimes they’re filled out by the physicians, sometimes they’re 
not, but they follow the patient to the regional rehabilitation centre regardless of whether 
they’re written on or not. (I.2.) 
8.2.6 Organizational Resources  
With regard to organizational resources, there initially was a shortage of 
human resources during the implementation phase of the strategy, which seemed to 
have been resolved over the past three to four years. Hiring more healthcare 
professionals, especially nurses and anaesthesiologists, provided more stability with 
regard to human resources, and consequently, helped increase surgical volumes. 
However, a more recent problem has been to deal with the upcoming retirement of 
anaesthesiologists. 
In a community like this there’s always a pendulum. We either have too many 
anaesthesiologists, not enough anaesthesiologists, too many nurses, not enough nurses. (I.1.) 
 
So we had to hire some nurses, but the first thing that we did was we went into trying to 
increase the number of multi-joint days that were done. (I.6.) 
 
It looks like we’re probably going to lose up to three anaesthesiologists this year, maybe 
another two next year due to retirement. So to me that’s the biggest threat right now. (I.1.) 
 
Luckily, the HCO’s university affiliation provides a steady source of 
additional surgeons through the university’s medical residency program. Students 
who have done a residency program in surgery and anaesthesiology have a higher 
chance of working at their training hospital once their residency is complete.  
The most critical factor in accomplishing the goal targeted by the strategy—
reducing wait times—centred on whether the program would continue to receive 
proper and constant funding from the Ministry. Moreover, as previously mentioned, 
the funding was essentially focused on increasing the surgical volumes and not 
necessarily on reducing surgical wait times.  
They think that once they have solved the wait time problem, they should cut back the 
funding, because now it’s not paying for anything, right? It’s just stupid, I don’t know why 
they think this way, but they do. You can’t pull the funding, because as soon as you do, all the 
resources get pulled and then the wait times start to grow again. I mean…it makes perfect 
sense. (I.1.) 
 
Another problem seemed to be budget shortfalls in the first years of the 
strategy’s implementation. Due to the team’s efforts, they were able to justify getting 
ongoing funding from the hospital by demonstrating the benefits of accomplishing 
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their targets and getting additional funding from the Ministry. Despite these best 
efforts, this year the program experienced its first deficit in five years.  
On another note, the available infrastructure was an important element of the 
strategy in this particular organization. Significant capacity-related issues were 
mentioned. Although there was a sufficient number of ORs, with 12 OR theatres for 
seven orthopaedic surgeons, the utilization of OR rooms was not as efficient as it 
could be, such that certain surgeons would spend half their day sitting in the lounge 
watching TV when they could have been performing four or five more surgeries that 
day. One surgeon proposed that all the surgeons could do a “surgical blitz”, either by 
running double OR rooms exceptionally or by asking the booking clerks to book time 
for orthopaedic surgeons when other types of surgeons did not need the OR time. 
However, this was not a sustainable solution because it was too resource-intensive. 
For one surgeon, the answer was simple: extend arthroplasty days by 25 % to 30 %. 
The problem with that surgeon’s plan was that other healthcare professionals would 
also have had to extend their work time by 25 to 30 %. 
The barriers to that are anaesthesia and nursing. So no matter what kind of practice they 
choose to run, no matter how slow they are, no matter how unwilling to work late they are, 
we don’t have somebody to replace them, so they can basically act any way they want to! 
(I.6.) 
 
If we had a free room we would run a double room during the week. So that means I had two 
sets of staff ready to go, so that as one was setting up, he was operating in the other room 
so… a lot of our numbers came from double joint days. That’s what we called it: double joint 
days. (I.7.) 
  
Proper organization of the operating schedule according to the complexity of 
the cases also helped maximize surgical capacity in this case. However, some 
interviewees mentioned difficulties around efficient bed management and utilization. 
The fact that few beds were reserved for orthopaedic patients was, according to some 
surgeons, a negative factor that hindered proper planning of surgeries. One common 
problem was that poor bed management caused a lot of surgical patients to be 
hospitalized near the end of the fiscal year, when surgeons were under pressure from 
management to reach the volume target. Unfortunately, since this was also flu season, 
these patients were more at risk of developing nosocomial infections. Proper bed 
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management would encourage a higher number of surgeries to be done in the 
summertime. 
There’s really not a good way to manage beds, because all of a sudden you come in and you 
have eight joints plus whatever else was going on. So we’ve been struggling... My perception 
is that’s not the right way to do it. If you allowed an orthopaedic surgeon to get to another 
hour and a half, then he would definitely do six primaries in a day, and […] that’s completely 
sustainable. (I.6.) 
 
We could do more. There’s no question we could do more... and I think, to do that, the steps 
are going to be beds that are pure arthroplasty and that nobody other than a primary well 
patient goes into it. So our bed management needs to improve for us to be able to do this. So 
we need Saturday and Sunday physiotherapy at the same level as normal. (I.6.) 
 
However, this type of surgical capacity increase would also require further 
structural changes, such as having seven-day-a-week physiotherapy and staff to co-
ordinate regional patients’ discharges. 
Lastly, the informational resources used by the team essentially consisted of 
internal wait time reporting sheets. The healthcare professionals, as well as upper 
management, review the wait times on a monthly basis in order to get feedback and 
to be able to act accordingly.  
We’ve been doing it at least for three or four years now for the wait time data. So we review 
the wait time summary data with the board every month and provide a written report, 
sometimes monthly but more often quarterly, it depends whether we have enough content 
that’s changed to make it meaningful. And then we actually have more of an operational 
quality committee; we used to call it our quality and utilization management committee. It’s 
comprised of managers and directors and physician leads from various areas, and we would 
review our wait time data at length with them as well. (I.9.) 
8.2.7 Organizational Culture  
A first observation regarding the organizational culture was that the surgeons 
appeared to exercise significant authority over the entire team of healthcare 
professionals. For the surgeons to become involved in the initiative, they first needed 
to see that the initiative would benefit them and their patients in both the short and 
long terms. 
Physicians are independent practitioners, they’re not employees of the hospital, so unless 
you’re partners with them and doing some of these creative collaborative things and getting 
them on your side, you can maybe get some traction but otherwise… there’s no incentive. 
(I.1.) 
 
Second, one surgeon’s leadership was also a contributing factor in that 
organization when it came time to implement concrete interventions for the WTMS. 
In fact, he essentially sold the idea of change to his colleagues and created a sense of 
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urgency. He was able over time to motivate his colleagues to take part in the strategy. 
As one surgeon put it, the team had achieved what it had because it remained focused 
and determined. 
The orthopaedic surgeon’s forcing the change, because he believes in the program, and 
everyone tied to his clinic is the same, so he’s sort of the managing partner of the 
orthopaedics organization. (I.1.) 
 
Third, there was an evolution in the culture, which went from being very 
hierarchical and fearful of change to one based more on innovation and trust. To 
achieve this meant navigating a long and sometimes difficult road. Initially, there was 
a negative subculture between surgeons and nurses that could have been a negative 
factor in terms of establishing a participative culture. In fact, interviewees used the 
term “adversarial”, and some nurses even felt as if they were working for the 
surgeons rather than working for the opportunity to provide more surgical care to the 
community. A similar adversarial subculture existed between surgeons and 
anaesthesiologists. In fact, the underlying root of this animosity between 
professionals was the work team’s negative perception of surgeons’ intentions. They 
believed the surgeons’ sole aim in this initiative was to make more money by doing 
more surgeries. What seemed to bring together nurses, anaesthesiologists and 
surgeons was the influence of the director of surgical services, who was impartial and 
had a neutralizing effect on the tensions between these professionals. Over time, a 
culture has evolved built on trust, collaboration and commitment for the common 
good.  
I’m not a nurse or a surgeon. I came in and said, well, this doesn’t really make any sense. We 
need to work together. So… over the years we’ve really improved that. It was very 
adversarial before; nobody was listening to the other side of things (I.1.) 
 
I keep trying to tell people that if an orthopaedic surgeon doubled his income, his lifestyle 
wouldn’t change. They already earn enough to live the way they want, even at half their 
income […] so it really is, from my perspective, silly... It’s a silly argument, but it is 
unfortunately a very real barrier and probably the biggest barrier for co-operation in the 
operating room. (I.6.) 
 
I think the culture is much better in the OR than it was when we first came here, and there’s a 
greater sense of cooperation for the common good. (I.4.) 
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8.2.8 Organizational Tools  
The total knee and hip clinical pathway adopted in July 2007 was a 
collaborative effort to standardize patient care among nurses, physiotherapists, as 
well as orthopaedic surgeons. The pathway consists of three different paths: the slow 
track, the regular track and the fast track. These tracks are a way of orienting patients 
according to how long they are expected to take to recuperate after their surgery. For 
example, the regular track means the patient will go home four days after surgery. 
The fast track means the patient recuperates quickly enough to go home two days 
after surgery. Lastly, the slow track means the patient is transferred to the regional 
rehabilitation centre two days after surgery for an eight-day rehabilitation. Because of 
this, the program has progressed toward a process-based organizational design. In 
fact, this pathway specifies the goals of the orthopaedic surgeons’ treatment and the 
order and timing of interventions necessary to attain these objectives with optimal 
efficiency. Furthermore, the pathway has fostered continuity of care beyond the 
confines of only one department and has led to an optimization of work processes.  
[…] not everybody’s going to follow the same pathway as everybody else. You have to make 
allowances for that, every case is different. The pre-admission clinic does have a checklist of 
things that have been done pre-operatively for the patient and things that are missing, and 
that goes on the patient’s chart when they’re seen in pre-admission clinic and it transfers 
over to surgical daycare so that they see what’s still missing off of the chart. So that’s where 
that communication goes, and then the patient [is] sent from surgical daycare to the OR, to 
recovery, and then to 3A. (I.2.)  
 
Nurses working with the tool perceived the pathway as an added task at the 
beginning of its implementation. However, once they had gotten used to using it, they 
saw an improvement in their work.  
When we first started the pathway it was difficult, because, you know, it’s not just a set of 
orders. Like being a surgeon if you’re doing an appendectomy, you write the orders, you’ve 
got about that many orders to follow, like maybe […] eight to ten orders. This […] is four 
pages of orders, and at the beginning it was quite overwhelming because you felt that you’re 
responsible… (I.2.) 
 
Not only has the hip and knee pathway been beneficial to the team of 
surgeons and nurses working on all levels of patient care, but it has also been an 
incentive, influencing other areas of care to develop their own pathway. 
I think it has been a catalyst. I think they’ve gone into other clinical pathways now for 
cardiac patients and things. (I.5.) 
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On another note, the wait time data collection, before 2004, had been the 
responsibility of a surgical manager who was basically trying to manage this in her 
spare time. Having a background in nursing with no formal training in IT systems, 
she lacked skill in data or computer systems. Then the decision support manager took 
over this responsibility, and his passion for data collection was evident. His strong 
background in IT was a facilitating factor for him.  
The initial wait time system used by the decision support manager and the IT 
department was a province-based wait time system software. However, they quickly 
realized the data collected was of poor quality, and a lot of manual manipulation and 
extraction of data was needed to compensate for this problem. In fact, this led the 
decision support manager and the IT team to use it only for simple data. They did, 
however, use another provincial tool provided to them called Iport. They also decided 
to transform the existing tools into their own, using Excel. The decision support 
manager mentioned that the WTMS’ outcomes are also included in the organization’s 
balanced scorecard. He and his team also get involved in the overall organizational 
scorecard in various components of reporting for the organization. 
So we were asked to take it on and we’ve been doing that ever since. We work with our IT –
our information technology, our information systems department – when we make changes or 
when we ramp up and add new functionality to the wait times reporting system. But for the 
most part we handle the day-to-day operations of the reporting of results and we work very 
closely with our surgical team. We actually work on the data side and on the reporting side. 
(I.9.)  
 
We have an internal score card, and we do some of the reporting that […] rolls up into the 
Ontario hospital report, but we also get involved in the overall organizational score card, in 
various components of reporting for the organization. (I.9.) 
 
With regard to data collection, an important factor was that the group of 
orthopaedic surgeons resisted entering their own data in the system, even though they 
had received the proper training to do so. Because of this, the data quality was poor 
and the organization was unable to produce accurate results.  
They’re not really big fans of the wait times system or the requirements under them. So the 
quality was poor, the data… the reporting was inconsistent, and there were some accuracy 
issues, so we started to streamline the reporting, started to feed the data back to our surgical 
group. (I.9.) 
  
We’ve kind of made significant improvements in data quality but also on physician 
engagement and trying to figure out how we can achieve some improvements. (I.9.) 
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Although clerical staff were also trained in data management, the problem of 
poor data could also be explained, in part, by the high turnover of clerical staff in the 
hospital. 
There is a fair bit of turnover among physician clerical staff. They’re not paid particularly 
well, so they’re making… 13 maybe to 17 dollars an hour. Our clerical staff at the hospital 
here would make 20 to 25 dollars an hour, so whenever we post a clerical position in the 
hospital we’ll get a flood of applications from physician offices, from their staff […] So it’s 
hard to keep staff in those positions, and that means we’re always training. (I.9.) 
 
On a positive note, being able to understand the data from the wait time trends 
has helped managers plan better strategically and has made professionals more aware 
and accountable for their daily actions. To help the team better understand the 
collected data, which can be somewhat overwhelming at times, the person in charge 
at the LHIN has worked with the team of professionals on how to improve data 
collection and interpretation.  
The director of surgical services is looking at the wait time data as a tool to be able to assess 
where we need to put more OR time […] (I.9.) 
 
We’ve now provided the data in a framework that they can start to understand what the 
trends are, what’s happening, and start to make some strategic decisions around where 
they’re going to put additional OR time, who needs it badly. (I.9.) 
 
They had so many priorities there. It’s just staying on top of the data and staying on top of 
the information and looking at it all the time. Because it can get away from you very quickly... 
they’ve done quite a bit of work there. (I.3.) 
 
 
According to the decision support manager, another possible issue related to 
electronic information systems is that no integrated regional data system exists at this 
time. Although this problem has been brought to the attention of the LHIN, nothing 
has been done about it. Such a system would facilitate electronic referrals across the 
region from physician to physician. 
We don’t have a single system right now. I mean we’ve kind of been talking to our LHIN 
about what some of the advantages might be at establishing a regional system where we 
could rely on referrals to happen electronically from physician to physician. (I.9.) 
 
Additionally, there is no internal performance-recording tool yet, although the 
decision support manager and his team are actively working on one.  
We don’t have [an] internal performance recording tool yet. We just bought a brand new 
administrative suite of applications, finished the implementation a little over a year ago. We 
were not  happy with the performance tools that came from the vendors, so we actually chose 
not to buy them. So we’re looking now for an additional product which will allow us to do 
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what we think we need to do for performance reporting, score carding, dashboards, and that 
sort of thing. (I.9.) 
 
Finally, patient satisfaction surveys were administered to patients to assess 
how useful the RJAC had been for them. The development of this tool was the APP’s 
initiative. 
We were able to do an internal rate of reliability study, a patient satisfaction study, and all of 
that. We were able to use that evidence to the Ministry to support our program. That’s what 
got us off the ground. (I.8.) 
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Table 1 
Organizational factors that impact WTMS success and sustainability 
Organizational Governance -­‐ Strong managerial leadership from 
director of surgical services -­‐ Inter-organizational partnership 
with rehabilitation centre -­‐ No new governance structures 
developed 
Organizational Resources -­‐ Shortage of human resources 
during the implementation phase of 
the strategy -­‐ Upcoming retirement of 
anaesthesiologists -­‐ Inefficient use of OR  
Organizational Culture -­‐ Physician Leadership ++ -­‐ Trust + -­‐ Important clinical governance by 
surgeons and manager -­‐ Physician buy-in not easy initially -­‐ Negative subcultures among 
surgeons, anaesthesiologists and 
nurses  -­‐ Evolution from culture based on 
hierarchy and fear to innovation 
and trust 
Organizational Tools -­‐ Information technology -­‐ Reporting to the LHIN -­‐ Hip and knee clinical pathway -­‐ Training for surgeons on data 
collection -­‐ Lack of involvement from the 
surgeons for data entry -­‐ High turnover of clerical staff 
 
 
Table 2 
Contextual factors that impact WTMS success and sustainability 
Contextual Governance -­‐ Benchmarks -­‐ Accountability agreements  -­‐ High level coordinating, reporting, 
monitoring structures -­‐ Stakeholder engagement: OMA 
Contextual Resources -­‐ Funding from the government -­‐ Funding reassessed yearly -­‐ Tension between the hospital and 
the LHIN in regards to funding 
Contextual Culture  -­‐ Collaboration between 
organizational and high levels has 
improved with time -­‐ Public awareness + -­‐ Improvement of consultation with 
front-line actors due to APP’s 
commitment 
Contextual Tools -­‐ Standards and Guidelines + -­‐ Difficulty with how the province 
measures, and therefore, collects 
data on wait times for surgical 
procedures -­‐ Provincial website presents wait 
time data -­‐ No central registry 
 
In the end, this case can be summarized by certain elements that truly make it 
what it is. The initiative was lead by a few people, namely one orthopaedic surgeon, 
the director of surgical services and the APP. Their leadership allowed the initiative 
to take off. This also contributed into making the culture progress from its 
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hierarchical nature to something more based on trust and collaboration among 
colleagues.  
The LHIN has tried to be involved in the initiative by supporting the team but 
without micromanaging them. Nonetheless, certain members of the team have had 
difficulties in understanding how the province measures wait times and how they 
finance them on a yearly basis to increase their hip and knee surgical volumes.  
In order to improve care, the APP has improved the communication and 
collaboration with family doctors in the community in order for them to know how to 
refer their patients to the RJAC. The hospital has also been able to establish a 
partnership with the regional rehabilitation center.  
The clinical pathway developed by the team has helped them to insure 
continuity in the care they offer as well as the care offered by the rehabilitation 
center.  
Nonetheless, their bigger obstacles have to do with capacity. They have dealt 
with a shortage in human resources at the early stages of the initiative, which have 
progressively been able to solve. Oppositely, they have had a difficult time with OR 
scheduling and management of post-operative beds up until now. It is something they 
are still trying to improve. In regard to the IT system they are using, it is a province-
based WTIS. Over time, the decision support manager has tried to tweak it in order to 
make the data collected more valuable for decision-making. Overall, the team is 
conscious of their weaknesses and working on making the program better. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 - CASE 2 
 
9.1 Description of the case  
9.1.1 Type of health care organization 
The HCO in this case is a satellite hospital centre that operates at a different 
location than the main regional hospital with which it was merged 10 years 
previously; the main hospital offers acute medical and surgical care to patients in a 
metropolitan city in Ontario. The satellite hospital focuses primarily on hip and knee 
surgeries (assessment of hip and knee related problems, education, joint surgeries, 
rehabilitation) and accepts patients from outside the city. In fact, the current volume 
for hip and knee surgery is 2,100 cases per year.	   The satellite site’s budget is 
protected in relation to activity at the main site.   
9.1.2 Classification of the case  
We classified this case as sustainable. We conducted eight interviews of up to 
60 minutes each. Thanks to the centre’s project manager, we were able to confirm 
that wait times for all hip patients were less than 26 weeks, in accordance with the 
federal benchmark for TJR, for all 18 months between April 2009 and September 
2010. In fact, the wait times for that period ranged from 83 days to 166 days. As for 
knee replacements patients, wait times were less than 26 weeks for nine consecutive 
months between April 2009 and September 2010. In fact, wait times ranged from 95 
days to 235 days.  
9.1.3 The Provincial Wait Time Management Strategy 
This case is located in the same province as Case 1. Therefore, the provincial 
WTMS described in Case 1 applies also in this case.  
9.1.4 The Hospital’s Wait Time Management Strategy 
In response to the provincial initiative, this region’s LHIN created a Joint 
Health and Disease Management Program (JHDMP) Steering Committee to 
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implement a comprehensive program for effective management of patients needing 
hip and knee replacement surgery across the complete continuum of care. A 
standardized model of care for arthritis was established that promoted local planning, 
consolidation of primary care, and optimization of current resources and expertise. 
The Hip and Knee Replacement Program (HKRP), launched in May 2007, was 
created to reduce wait times for TJR in the region. Most of the development and pilot 
work was done at this satellite centre. The model, named the Central Intake and 
Assessment model, focused on the surgical component of the overall JHDMP, from 
the initial referral through discharge and follow-up. Its major component has been the 
APPs. Their role was initially introduced in 2006 at the site and then expanded 
beyond (MacLeod et al., 2009) after the Ministry launched the Health Human 
Resources Strategy to create innovative and extended roles to meet human resource 
needs (Robarts et al. 2008). According to MacLeod et al. (2009), these APPs triage 
patient referrals, conduct comprehensive physical screening, provide education, and 
recommend treatment. Physiotherapists are more likely to suggest comprehensive 
evidence-based actions, like exercise and weight loss, as well as to refer patients to 
other professionals such as occupational therapists and social workers (Glazier et al. 
2003). After surgery, APPs conduct patients’ follow-up appointments. They are also 
allowed to order diagnostic tests on behalf of the orthopaedic surgeons under specific 
conditions, as well as to play a role in communication, decision-making and patient 
management. Algorithms for clinical decision-making were also developed. Practice-
based development programs were designed and formal training was provided 
(Robarts et al. 2008).  
The HKRP was used as a pilot for development of the provincial wait time 
information system (WTIS). The WTIS is, to date, able to report on wait time 2, i.e., 
the period from the date of decision to treat to the date of the procedure. The referral 
tracking system tracks and reports on patient waits from the date of referral to the 
date of the first consultation with an orthopaedic surgeon (wait time 1). This system 
was developed by the satellite hospital’s IT department in partnership with its care 
team and a division of the provincial Health Ministry. Methods to improve workflow 
for hip and knee surgery were also developed that included four initiatives: 
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anaesthesia block-room opportunities, pre-admission improvements, a two-OR 
model, and an OR scheduling algorithm to improve the bed count. Ultimately, this 
produced a “tool kit” offered as a knowledge transfer tool to hospitals wishing to 
improve their surgical performance (MacLeod et al., 2009).  
9.2 Factors that influence the WTMS’s success and sustainability  
9.2.1 Contextual Governance  
Generally, interviewees thought collaboration between the hospital and the 
LHIN was good, but this varied according to their interactions with the LHIN. 
Professionals who had less contact with the LHIN perceived it as less involved than 
did those who had more frequent contact. In fact, one participant thought the LHIN 
wasn’t sufficiently implicated and had little authority, while others had a different 
opinion. For example, one surgeon who was interviewed thought there was little need 
for an added level between the Ministry and hospitals, while the project manager 
seemed to consider the level of collaboration between the wait time office of the 
LHIN and her team to be important for the development of their electronic referral 
tracking system. 
Likewise, other interviewees said there had been a lot of communication 
between the Ministry, the LHIN and the regional hospitals regarding their various 
mandates. For example, the Ministry had decided to establish a new benchmark for 
patients’ hospital LOS. Therefore, the satellite hospital had to reorganize care to get 
90 % of patients discharged on day four post-operatively. One interviewee mentioned 
that these Ministry wait time targets were set through the Orthopaedic Expert Panel 
and reflected that many hospitals in Ontario were achieving these targets.  
They’re on the units for a shorter period of time. The government has decreased what they 
consider to be the length of time that the patients are on the unit […] We used to tell patients 
three to five days, now the government says four days, so they need to go home in four days. 
The new provincial goal is for 90% of patients to go directly home. So more people go home 
in four days, and less people go to rehab, so more people are going home than they did 
before. (I.2.5.) 
 
I don’t think they’ve been delegated the financial control that they were promised in the first 
place, and the trouble with that is they don’t have the stick they need to make people move, 
and if they don’t have it yet, the chance of them ever getting it is... So that experiment, I think, 
is over, and the trouble is that they’ve created another level of bureaucracy between the 
Ministry of Health and the hospitals. There’s this middle layer that’s got no authority.  
(I.2.2.) 
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In our development of that electronic system to track wait 1, we wanted to make sure that we 
had definitions that were aligned with the provincial wait time office, so we worked with the 
provincial wait time office to build that. We wanted to make sure it was also aligned. (I.2.8) 
 
The creation of the JHDMP Steering Committee for the regional LHIN’s 
HKRP to implement the province’s strategy reflected stakeholder engagement. That 
committee included one (non-surgeon) representative from each of the six regional 
hospitals as well as one surgeon leader from each hospital. The LHIN invested a great 
deal of time and resources in supporting the new Intake and Assessment Centre 
model through the JHDMP Steering Committee.  
 
At the time of our visit, the LHIN was involved with the hospital in analyzing 
the wait time reports. A person from the LHIN who is in charge of the wait time 
portfolio reviewed the data on a monthly basis to assess the hospital’s performance, 
in keeping with the accountability agreement between the LHIN and the hospital. 
So there’s a steering committee for the LHIN hip and knee arthritis program, so those results 
are shared with that committee level. And on that committee there’s representation from all 
six hospitals and the LHIN, and the six hospitals have a surgeon lead as well as the 
administrative lead. (I.2.8.) 
 
At the hospital we have an accountability agreement with the LHIN, we have to report… 
Who’s accountable for that is our president from our senior leadership or… our medical 
director and our operations director; but I don’t have any direct reporting to the LHIN, I 
work through her. (I.2.8.) 
 
The Orthopaedic Expert Panel, linked to the Ministry, had conducted a review 
of the program two years prior to our visit and had made recommendations. 
Following this, the team asked the other regional hospitals if they wanted to create 
their own assessment centre. Each hospital took a different approach. There are 
presently two assessment centres in the region, including this hospital’s.  
It made sense in some ways, because you could have a critical mass of advanced practice 
physios in two centres rather than having bits and pieces of them… But it really didn’t go 
over well, so there was an external review of the program a year, or two years maybe, into 
the work, and the panel that did the review recommended that there be more assessment 
centres in place. (I.2.3.) 
 
On another note, the team has developed many local partnerships. In fact, 
they have incorporated the Ontario Arthritis Society’s (OAS) resources into their 
model in order to give non-surgical patients access to those resources. The College of 
Physiotherapists of Ontario (CPO) helped the team by providing guidelines to 
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improve processes as well as feedback when they were developing the APP role. 
They have also been very helpful in advancing the physiotherapist profession, in 
regard to promoting legislative changes related to communication with patients and 
diagnosis.   
We met with the College of Physiotherapists of Ontario before we even started the model […] 
to get their feedback. They were giving us guidelines in terms of the medical directives scope, 
and we kept tabs with them, and then we did presentations with them, and we've kept a very 
close relationship with them. (I.2.6.) 
 
The model of care developed in this satellite hospital has been well received 
by many local organizations as well as national ones. Even the Canadian Orthopaedic 
Association (COA) has expressed support of their model. The centre has networked 
with many other hospitals at regional, provincial, national and even international 
levels. For example, the director of operations spent a few days with a HCO in 
Halifax explaining the APP model to them. They also partnered with Shoppers Home 
Health to offer pre-op classes for patients before surgery. As mentioned above, a tool 
kit was also developed to encourage knowledge transfer. The interdisciplinary care 
model has served as the framework for the LHIN’s Hip and Knee Arthritis Program. 
Finally, the team was also the recipient of the 3M Health Care Quality Team Awards 
in 2010.  
The Canadian Orthopaedic Association is very supportive of these models, obviously, there’s 
lots of them across the country that have developed – some independently, but a lot of them 
using a model based on our model here. (I.2.4.) 
 
9.2.2 Contextual Resources  
Government funding to increase the volume of hip and knee surgeries was the 
main helpful contextual resource factor during both the implementation and 
sustainability phases of this strategy. In fact, the Ministry provided incremental 
funding at a rate of $8,000–$10,000 for each hip or knee procedure. This funding 
helped cover the costs of OR and inpatient care so that more patients could have 
surgery.  
We got funding through the LHIN for the intake and assessment centre model after doing a 
lot of the legwork. So I mean we were lucky, right? They funded these cases at either $8,000 
for a primary and $9,000 for a revision. (I.2.3.) 
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To receive this funding for hip and knee surgeries, the hospital needed to 
ensure no other area of care (such as spinal surgery) would be compromised. The 
program was given a different amount each year after review and negotiation with the 
LHIN. The financial incentives for doing more surgeries had motivated the team to 
do more and provided an opportunity to outdo their previous performance in terms of 
surgical output. However, the team got used to doing a certain amount of surgeries, 
only to sometimes have the funding cut back because the Ministry thought they were 
doing too many. 
Last year we got burned because we went on a go-forward basis that they were going to give 
us the same number, but the Ministry decided “No, we really want to spread it around” […] 
to more of the smaller centres. And so they told us in December, “It’s too much, you’re doing 
a hundred more cases than you should.”(I.2.2.) 
 
The process for planning annual funded surgical volumes between the 
Ministry, the LHIN and the hospitals has improved significantly over the past few 
years. Each hospital is asked annually what volumes they are able to perform. There 
has been some redistribution of volumes at the beginning of each fiscal year, based 
on current wait times in the province. Areas that were not meeting their wait times 
were allocated higher volumes, and hospitals that were meeting their wait time 
targets received slightly lower volumes. There is also a mid-year review of whether 
hospitals are achieving their volumes and whether funding can be reallocated. 
However, while the methodology and the associated transparency of allocating 
volumes have improved, it has remained difficult for hospitals to adjust to new 
volumes on a year-to-year basis, especially if there are mid-year changes. In that 
regard, there was clearly some tension between the hospital and the LHIN. In fact, a 
lot of planning and effort went into booking and then cancelling those surgeries, 
causing some interviewees to consider that the LHIN was out of touch with the 
realities that hospitals face. They stressed the importance of having clear objectives 
before the start of the fiscal year to better plan their work. The team was concerned 
about whether the LHIN would withdraw funding, which would cause wait times to 
rise again.  
Cancelling and then rebooking, and […] the hours that must have gone into the scheduling, 
you know? For staff... It’s just unbelievable, […] people don’t think about it, but it was a big 
job. So, on a go-forward basis, I think it’s important that the thing is clear, or as clear as it 
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can be, at the start of the fiscal year so that it gets planned out, and then if there need to be 
adjustments, the sooner we know the better. (I.2.2.). 
 
As a pilot for the HKRP, the satellite hospital also received funding from the 
LHIN for the Intake and Assessment Centre model, as well as for the development of 
the referral tracking system. In fact, the Innovation Funding provided by the LHIN 
helped bring on the appropriate members of staff to expand and develop the 
assessment model; the costs associated with this model are almost entirely for 
salaries of APPs and clerical support staff. The LHIN also accessed one-time 
supplemental funding from the Ministry for the development of the Central Intake 
and Assessment Centre model.  
Once we got the LHIN on board, then we got the innovation funding through the project 
funding to bring on appropriate members of staff to actually expand it to everybody and 
develop the assessment centre model. So the assessment centre model actually was […] 
helped a lot by the LHIN with that, and then a Courtyard group that we worked with (I.2.4.) 
9.2.3 Contextual Culture  
According to one interviewee, it was difficult to get all the GPs from the 
community to use the standardized referral form created by the team, which is a 
problem because the population pool of surgical patients resides largely outside the 
city. The form is available on the LHIN’s website and available to whoever wishes to 
use it, but it seems very few GPs have been doing so. 
We created a standardized referral form that we wanted to get referring doctors to use, but 
because this city is a little bit unique as well – a very high percentage of our patients come 
from outside – so it’s not like you’re working with a family health team in your local 
community, and it’s been very hard getting them to adopt a standardized referral form. But 
it’s on the LHIN website if people want it. We give it out to people if they ask for it. (I.2.3.) 
 
Certain members of the team have tried to make the public aware of their 
ongoing efforts to ensure quality care to patients. For example, the physiotherapists 
published a few articles in scientific journals about the role of APPs and its evolution 
over time. However, the director of operations felt that the team had not published 
their successes nearly enough, mainly due to lack of time. This was unfortunate 
since, as one surgeon pointed out, general acceptance and expansion of the model of 
care to other organizations seem to be key elements in ensuring its sustainability. 
Sustainability, I think, depends on sort of a general acceptance…you know, we get buzz from 
all across the country and other countries. So […] the success of the model and people 
adopting that –not exactly as it is, but using it as the framework for their own model…should 
help to make the model…a successful model, sustainable. (I.2.4.) 
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9.2.4 Contextual Tools  
The HKRP was the pilot for development of the provincial WTIS. Initially, 
the WTIS was only able to provide data on wait time 2 (from decision to treat to date 
of procedure). The HKRP developed a web-based electronic referral tracking system 
that supports the collection, processing and analysis of data to manage referrals to the 
HKRP and to report to the WTIS. It also allows tracking and monitoring of wait 
time 1 (from referral to first surgical consultation). This wait time 1 is now being 
reported to the WTIS. The system was developed by this satellite hospital in 
collaboration with the Access to Care E-Health Office and the regional LHIN. This 
hospital being the lead for the LHIN, their referral tracking system is being used there 
as well as in the six other regional hospitals. This is another example of the team’s 
innovation-based culture.  
We actually implemented our own referral tracking system, so I was involved with the 
development of that electronic tool, because the one that was provided by the province only 
tracked wait 2.  That was my involvement. ( I.2.8.) 
 
We were a pilot for the province, because wait 1 had not been collected at all, so that’s why 
we worked with the WTIS for definitions and how we were going to collect the data. (I.2.8.). 
 
The project manager has been responsible for tracking wait time 1 as well as 
reporting wait time 2 to the province. All the information is entered in the Pisces OR 
booking system. The health data resources decision and support department of the 
main hospital is responsible for extracting the data and feeding it to the provincial 
office. Although this work is essentially done at the organizational level, we present 
this element in the contextual tools factors due to the involvement of the LHIN in this 
process. 
The wait 1 will measure from the point we’ve received the referral to the point that the 
patients had their surgical consult with the surgeon. Wait 2 […] we enter all the information 
into our OR system – it’s now integrated, so Pisces is what we enter into – and then that 
system is managed by our wait time information office within the main site. So they’re the 
ones who manage the extraction of the data and such and the feed to the provincial office. So 
my involvement there is more ensuring that all of our cases have been submitted, ensuring 
there’s no issues and managing the person who inputs all of that data. (I.2.8.) 
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9.2.5 Organizational Governance  
Many members of the program have exercised strong organizational 
leadership. In fact, it was evident that the pilot team has been dedicated to their work 
since the program’s debut. Moreover, a lot of credit was given to one physiotherapist 
and one surgeon for elaborating or at least kick-starting, the APP model of care, even 
before the WTMS had begun.  
The operations director for the musculo-skeletal program helped them when it 
came time to pilot the APP model and was later part of the LHIN’s JHDMP, whose 
goal was to recommend a model of care and the implementation strategy to carry out 
the wait time reduction initiative. 
To [give] credit where credit is due, at one of our managers of physiotherapy, she’s been 
responsible for a lot of what we’ve done in the hip and knee program development and one of 
our surgeons. (I.2.3.) 
 
We started here in parallel at about the same time… I mean, clearly we wanted to be part of 
the wait time strategy because there was funding available and it’s hardcore business. Our 
wait times were in the two-year range at the time. Before the strategy really got started we 
were looking at how we could manage things better (I.2.3.). 
 
I worked with our care team, so we had really strong leadership from a physician 
representative. We had our own operations director as well as our Vice President involved. 
(I.2.8.). 
 
In addition, the operations director explained that once the team was able to 
demonstrate that the model of care that had been implemented was useful and 
moving forward, she was able to gain support from people she reports to—the 
executive vice president of medicine and chief nursing officer. Overall, the 
governance has been pretty stable since the implementation of the strategy. 
We started small and just expanded the model once we […] had a certain comfort level. I 
mean, organizationally, once we could demonstrate that things seem to be moving in the right 
direction, we had support from the people that I report to […].  (I.2.3.) 
        
[…] our presidents are very much involved. Our senior leadership is definitely involved with 
the LHIN and the LHIN represents all the hospitals with the Ministry, right? (I.2.8.) 
 
On another note, the program had strong leadership support from the CEO 
and all members of the senior team, although these individuals had less overall 
involvement in planning and implementation of the strategy because of the scope of 
their roles. 
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Five years ago, the medical director position was created after a restructuring 
of the division of orthopaedics and clarification of the relationship between the 
division and the satellite site, where hip and knee surgeries are actually done. This 
allowed the head of arthroplasty to also become the medical director. This seemed to 
be the logical way to proceed, according to interviewees.  
A new position [was] created here, because there was some re-structuring of the division of 
orthopaedics and of the relationship of the division to this campus. And so they re-structured 
the management on the medical side of things, so how the responsibilities were changed. I’ve 
been head of the arthroplasty program for about ten years, but the medical director for five 
years. (I.2.4.) 
 
We got a new chief at the main site. The hospital wanted to merge those two positions 
together so that the chief was also the head of the musculo-skeletal program and 
encompassed more of the surgeons, and in doing so, we needed them to have someone who 
was based on site here that managed the satellite centre. (I.2.4.) 
 
Many interviewees mentioned the abundance of committees created for the 
strategy and that continue to support the ongoing work to maintain it. Among these 
are the outpatient care committee, the nursing council, the new model of care 
leadership team, as well as the patient service innovation team, which all have 
different functions, with the main common one being to communicate on issues or 
progress in regard to the team’s work.  
We have an outpatient care committee that I’m a part of and there’s some upper 
management, and our medical director and a few other people from disciplines are there. 
(I.2.1). 
 
We have a team called the New Model of Care Team, for instance, that runs our new model 
care program […]  So the four of us are the executives for what we call the new model of 
care leadership team […] I work with the other health disciplines, as well, to coordinate the 
care so it all follows the same protocol, etc. (I.2.4.) 
 
It was clear that team-level accountability was important for the healthcare 
professionals. Many interviewees said that they took their jobs and responsibilities 
very seriously. In fact, they realized that their jobs impacted those of others and that 
certain expectations came with each person’s role and function.  
I think the nurses are just really hard working, and I think because we do take that role on 
and the expectation was there, and I guess we feel that part of the responsibility was on us 
because we did kind of develop that role. (I.2.1.) 
 
Although most interviewees thought the contact between them and the GPs 
was difficult, one participant mentioned how the model of care implemented at the 
hospital encouraged better communication with GPs. In fact, one family practice 
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resident spent six weeks with the team to learn more about musculo-skeletal 
problems.  
It's been great because we're actually even fostering better inter-professional education with 
family physician residents […] We just recently had a family practice resident who spent six 
weeks with us because they deal a lot with arthritis issues, so they were learning from us – it 
was one of the rheumatology residents [who] spent time with us – because there's a lot of 
interaction possible because of the way we've aligned our clinics. (I.2.6.) 
 
9.2.6 Organizational Resources  
Since the implementation of the APP role, these professionals are now doing 
a lot of interventions surgeons had to do in the past. They now see all patients that 
come to the assessment centre, as well as seeing the post-operative patients along 
with the surgeons in the clinics. The APPs play a large part in post-operative review 
for hip and knee replacement issues. To moderate expectations, patients are advised 
that they may not be seen by the surgeon for their follow-up appointment. Certain 
patients are unhappy about this, but overall patients do not mind. In general, the 
group of surgeons has shown much appreciation for the APP role, given that they 
want to provide access to care to their patients but simply cannot do it by themselves. 
This may explain why there are now five full-time APPs on board. One interviewee 
raised the concern, however, that even though the model has been highly successful, 
the APP positions continue to be funded on a year-by-year basis. 
The APPs and the occupational therapist, they actually have taken over seeing the post-op 
patients along with the surgeons in the clinics, so that was a new role that has been 
developed. After they developed the assessment centre role, they expanded on that role and 
they now have a large part to play in the post-op review for hip and knee replacement issues 
and other areas. (I.2.1.) 
 
We’re not trying to teach them all about fracture care. We’re not trying to teach them about 
tumours or all these other things. It’s fairly well-defined... fairly clear boundaries, and so it’s 
doable. (I.2.2.) 
 
Well, the bottom line really is you can only see so many patients in a day, and so the ones you 
can’t see don’t have access to care, right? So […] if you can’t see them and they need care, 
why can’t somebody else see them, right? (I.2.4.) 
 
In addition to the APP role, the team has implemented other new roles, such 
as the nurse in the OR, the registered nurse first assistants who function effectively as 
an assistant to the surgeon throughout a patient's surgical experience, and nurse 
practitioners who help on the pain team.  
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The Ministry named the hospital a Centre of Excellence for Hip and Knee 
care. At the time of our visit, their surgical capacity had reached about 2,100 per 
year. Of those 1,990 were primary surgeries and the rest, revisions. The presence of 
APPs allowed surgeons to focus entirely on surgery. Another favourable factor was 
that the entire building is largely dedicated to hip and knee care, so there were no 
capacity constraints or bed blockers. In fact, it often happened that there were empty 
beds. Many interviewees mentioned this as a luxury. Another interviewee mentioned 
that, because the hospital is single-focused, staff can customize the care given to 
patients, with the result that there are very low levels of nosocomial infections. 
Furthermore, there is no intensive care unit, emergency room or burn unit. On the 
other hand, they only take patients who are in need of simple hip or knee surgery and 
who have few co-morbidities. Thus, patients with complex needs are diverted to 
other hospitals in the area. 
There are four ORs in the hospital, run by ten orthopaedic surgeons. A small 
amount of surgery time is allocated to six surgeons from the main site who specialize 
in non-arthoplasty surgeries. In fact, most trauma or spine surgeries are done at the 
main site, where there are many more ORs. Because of this, orthopaedic surgeries at 
the satellite center are never bumped for other types of surgeries (cardiac, 
neurospinal, etc).  
Most orthopaedic surgeons around the country don’t have the luxury of just doing hip and 
knee replacement. Most of them are covering emergency departments or have much broader 
community practice where they do a little bit of everything. So it is a little different here. 
(I.2.3.) 
 
We’ve seen that we’ve had a lot of success with the wait time management and also with 
decreasing our length of stay significantly […] I think it’s because[…] our staff are entirely 
focused. This is the patient population that we deal with each and every day, so we know this 
population well, and it’s very different than another facility that might be having … to deal 
with all orthopaedic procedures, right? So I think there are advantages to it as well. (I.2.8.) 
 
The team has always aimed to perform approximately 48-50 surgeries per 
week, which allows them to close the hospital for the holidays, a period of two 
weeks. Achieving this has required a lot of effort and planning. The administrative 
assistants responsible for entering data in the Pisces OR booking system and for data 
collection received the required training, and played a significant role in requesting 
OR time and surgical dates for patients. The project manager, who essentially 
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implemented the IT system at the satellite hospital, added that it was important for 
the team and everyone involved in data entry to be focused on what the data is 
revealing.  
The Pisces OR booking system is run by the operating rooms […] The folks who enter the 
data into the system is the doctor’s secretaries. They schedule, they put requests in for an OR, 
the database office, the group… The person who enters the data – the wait time data – she 
will enter that information, and then they have an OR booking clerk who then takes […] all 
that information and puts it onto the scheduling grid to schedule the OR. (I.2.8.)  
 
Here again, funding by the LHIN for incremental cases was a favourable 
factor in reducing orthopaedic surgeons’ backlog and wait times. However, when the 
hospital received the funding, one surgeon noted that the patients who had been 
waiting the longest time were sometimes deceased. Also, GPs had reduced the 
number of referrals they were sending him because his output had considerably 
slowed down before the strategy. Once the strategy was implemented, he was able to 
clear his backlog of 12 months and bring it down to about six weeks in little time. To 
achieve this, his OR time nearly doubled, as it did for most other surgeons. 
I would have had one and a half to two days, and then we went two and a half to three days. 
(I.2.2.) 
 
Because surgeons are paid on a fee-for-service basis, their main incentive for 
doing more surgeries was the increased income. As one surgeon pointed out, since 
they were putting more surgery lists back into the system, these were shared among 
all arthroplasty surgeons, allowing them all to do more surgery. This produced a 
collaborative culture between surgeons. 
 
Although the proper funding for incremental surgeries was critical in reducing 
wait times and sustaining the effort, many interviewees mentioned the importance of 
having sufficient human resources and equipment to do the necessary work. For 
example, more nurses were put into the OR to support the higher volume of 
surgeries. The amount of time the team dedicated to this effort was not really 
accounted for, however.  
[…] we had to put in incremental resources in some areas […] operating room time, you 
needed nurses, so all of those direct costs went into place. We invested a little bit in IT to 
support some of the early work we were doing, but for the intake and assessment centre 
model the primary cost […] is the salaries of the APPs and clerical support. […] we’ve not 
included much in the way of overhead, so… many of us put in a lot of time! That’s really not 
accounted for in the funding of that model.   (I.2.3.) 
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I think, for sustainability, one of the biggest concerns is always resources, right? Like hitting 
that is always... it hangs over your head. That is a potential challenge. (I.2.6.) 
 
To maintain their status as a high surgical volume centre, the team continued 
to hire new talent. They had recently hired an orthopaedic surgeon with a background 
in education, physiotherapy, and sports medicine. They also get a few medical 
residents and students yearly, although in limited numbers. 
However, a challenge for the team was to plan for the recruitment of new 
surgeons to replace retirees. At the time of our visit, there were a few surgeons 65 
years of age or older working there. However, as one interviewee pointed out, 
because there is no obligation for surgeons in that age range to disclose when they 
plan on leaving, it was impossible to plan for this impending shortage of manpower.  
The challenge right now is we have a couple of surgeons who are over sixty-five. Still 
productive, still good surgeons but because of the rules in the University they’re not obliged 
to say when they’re going to stop, which is a little frustrating for those trying to plan for 
manpower, as you’d like to know whether you need one person in a year, or two years, or five 
years, not just have somebody hanging around waiting. (I.2.2.) 
 
One aspect that is unique to this site is that they have their own rehabilitation 
unit. The Ministry has determined that patients should be able to go home on day 
four post-surgery. Patients who are slower to recuperate and cannot go home after 
four days are transferred to the “fit unit”, as some interviewees called the 
rehabilitation unit. A multidisciplinary team meets daily to discuss each patient on 
the post-operative floor to assess whether they will be fit to be discharged at day four. 
Each team member has input into the decision.  
Every morning on each unit here we have what we call a multidisciplinary huddle. So we 
have a room with a board with all the patients’ names and doctors and procedures and stuff, 
and we go through each patient. We talk about their discharge […], whether they can make it 
on day 4, or if they need longer, or if they need to go to our fit floor – which is our rehab 
floor – so that they can get up to seven days more if […] they’re old, or their surgery was 
complicated. (I.2.5.). 
 
Patients who have undergone hip or knee surgery come back approximately 
six weeks after surgery for post-operative physiotherapy classes. This is usually when 
they are seen for their follow-up appointment. Patients are separated into groups and 
taught exercises by the outpatient physiotherapists. This allows the team to ensure 
continuity of care for patients.  
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Their first post-op appointment is at week 6, they come back to clinic. A fair amount of them 
come here for […] post-op classes for hips and knees. (I.2.5.) 
 
It’s run by the physiotherapists in the outpatient department, where they come in as groups 
and they do exercises and get stronger. So a fair amount of them come here […]usually it’s 
after their six weeks […] and they come for physiotherapy. (I.2.5.) 
 
With respect to information resources, many interviewees referred to the 
electronic information system, which helps monitor wait times and facilitates 
decision-making. A leadership team meets monthly to review the data and track the 
team’s progress. Occasionally, the satellite hospital’s leadership will host a one-hour 
forum to inform the staff on their progress and to share any updates. There was also a 
significant use of email communication among employees. Lastly, a program 
newsletter was developed to promote the transfer of information.  
In terms of sustainability, it's that you're constantly monitoring to see how it's functioning. I 
think the referral tracking system – you know how we have the electronic system – I think 
that’s really important, because you get regular data. […] we have to track our data to see 
what's happening, and we still have regular team meetings – not to the same frequency – but, 
for instance, even our leadership team, we still try and meet at least once a month to network 
and see where things are at. (I.2.6.) 
 
9.2.7 Organizational Culture  
Many interviewees said their workload had increased after the 
implementation of the strategy. Some surgeons mentioned how big a change it was to 
have their OR time nearly doubled. However, they continued to work hard and 
persevere because they associated it with positive outcomes. They were also 
consulted when it came time to develop the new model of care, which made them 
feel involved in the strategy. The staff’s sense of involvement, collaboration, and 
appreciation, as well as the feelings of trust among colleagues were evident.  
A contributing factor might be that all the healthcare professionals working in 
this satellite hospital had been there a long time (i.e., more than 10 years), such that 
there has been long-standing stability and cohesiveness among them.  
I think they all get along fairly well and we work well together. We have to, because if an 
issue comes up with a patient then you have to be able to go to that person and talk to them 
and say, “Well, what do you think about this? Do you think we should maybe send them in 
this direction instead of the direction we’ve decided upon?” So we have a discussion and 
then we… then we go down. So I can’t say that there would be any real tension per se. (I.2.1.) 
 
There are a lot of old timers, as we call each other. We all started when we were ten, you 
know? We have a great team here and that, I really believe, has been another […] critical 
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success factor, because it’s a very cohesive team. There’s input from everybody, everyone 
takes part in [the] initiative…so you really do get the best of […] everyone. So I think that the 
team works very wel. [When] we have a solid team like that, you’re at an excellent starting 
point right? (I.2.8.) 
 
The merger between the main hospital and this satellite orthopaedic centre 
that occurred ten years ago created tensions between surgeons and anaesthesiologists. 
The anaesthesiologists who were used to working in the main hospital were 
sometimes asked to come to this site, and would often complain about having to 
come or about the equipment available. To overcome this reluctance, anaesthesia 
processes were changed to facilitate the anaesthesiologists’ work, such as by doing 
more regional anaesthesia than general anaesthesia. Surgeons agreed, on the 
condition it would not impact turnover time. This required trust and, in turn, became 
an integral part of the model of care.  
 
Similarly, the implementation of the APP model required a lot of trust among 
healthcare professionals. This was done very gradually, in order for the APPs to get 
used to their new roles but also for the surgeons and other team members to get used 
to this new way of functioning. There seemed to be ongoing support for everyone to 
get comfortable with their roles. Soon enough, most of the team saw the benefits of 
having APPs doing things that would free up surgeons’ time. The medical director 
said it was essentially a matter of redefining the professionals’ boundaries.  
The question was: why not give them a chance? It’s not like they’re taking your patient down 
the hall into a dark room and not telling you what’s going on. […] we have a large clinic 
room. The therapists, while they’re in the program, they come with us and work with us, and 
then the model would be that that would be their spot, that’s where they see their patients, 
and we would be in the other space. And so if the patient had questions, the physiotherapist 
had questions, if there was any issue to do with the x-ray […] we were readily available. 
(I.2.2.) 
 
The culture of this organization seemed to reflect its small physical structure. 
Everything and everyone was always accessible. Certain interviewees mentioned 
how easy it was to talk to people, to ask questions directly of one another. One 
interviewee often described the main hospital site as being very bureaucratic and 
frustrating when it came to getting satisfactory answers, in contrast with the 
orthopaedic satellite centre. He even said that, in the main site, surgeons’ opinions 
didn’t seem to matter. At the satellite centre, the ten orthopaedic surgeons seemed to 
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run the place. One interviewee even compared it to a little “hip and knee factory”. 
Many interviewees said they had a good working relationship with the physicians and 
that trust and a sense of teamwork were important components of that relationship.  
The interesting thing about a small unit like this is, it can be flexible, innovative, and can 
move very quickly, okay? At the same time, being a small organization, it doesn’t always 
have the largest pool of ideas, so... At the other end, it is a monstrous organization; it is 
hugely bureaucratic and very frustrating to get any satisfactory answers. I’ve got a problem, 
I can […] walk down from my office one floor down this corridor, I can talk to the project 
manager, have an answer generally in eight to ten minutes.  I can talk to the administrative 
assistant, usually have an answer in two to five minutes, or if the boss is available, she’ll say 
“Okay, I understand the problem, give me some time”, and I usually have an email by the 
time I’m back at my office. (I.2.2.) 
 
Also clearly evident was the very strong leadership from the medical director. 
He essentially convinced his physiotherapist and program director colleagues to pilot 
the APP model before funding from the Ministry had even begun. This particular 
surgeon was used to dealing with his surgeon colleagues and had led a lot of change 
through other programs he had implemented internally. This, in turn, created a strong 
involvement of orthopaedic surgeons in the program. After the surgeons were on 
board with the initiative, satisfaction surveys were done to see how they perceived 
the introduction of the APP role. The surgeons saw that having APPs on board gave 
them more time and did not reduce their income in any way. Furthermore, it was 
interesting to hear one interviewee say this was a bottom-up decision that came from 
people on the ground level who knew what they were doing and were able to exercise 
their leadership and inspire confidence in other members of the team. He considered 
that this was a much more sustainable way of doing things.  
I mean, most of my colleagues here would tell you that that’s been a huge benefit to them and 
their practice; it has not in any way diminished their own personal status in any way. But the 
ability to rely on the team to provide the care has taken a huge burden off them as being the 
primary care dealer, right? (1.2.4.) 
 
Well, I think it’s pretty clear that you need to have a surgeon champion in order for this 
process to work; it just doesn’t work otherwise. Regardless of where the team might see the 
surgeon as part of the team, the patient still sees the surgeon as the primary… as the 
quarterback, right? And so […] if you don’t have a surgeon champion to get the other 
surgeons on board, then the system can’t work. (I.2.4.) 
 
Clear communication among team members also played a role in better 
planning the OR schedules. For example, one surgeon told us he advised his 
75 
 
 
 
colleagues when he was planning vacations so that the team could better redistribute 
his OR time among the other surgeons, thus making the OR more efficient.  
Generally, it seemed that the team moved forward according to the principle 
of small steps. Once they saw improvements in a small initiative, they gained more 
confidence and trust in their actions, expanded their model, and so on. The medical 
director would start using the model in his practice for a few months, and if it 
worked, this influenced other surgeons to start doing it as well.  
The team also encouraged anyone with an idea to try it on a short-term basis 
and evaluate whether it worked or not. In fact, they gave people the chance both to 
make their own mistakes, and also to explore their potential.  
So we started small and just expanded the model once we […] had a certain comfort level. I 
mean, organizationally, once we could demonstrate that things seem to be moving in the right 
direction, we had support from the people that I report to. (I.2.3.) 
        
If you change, then you have to pick some sort of low-hanging fruit that’s easy to start with 
and you make it work, and then you get people’s confidence that you can make something 
work on a bigger scale. (I.2.4.) 
 
It’s like you've done your homework up front, you have a plan, you [do] exactly what you say, 
small steps, and [...] we definitely used plenty of study methodology. So we would do small 
cycles of change, and what did work, we built on bigger, but if it didn't, you hadn’t invested 
so much that you couldn't change and do something different and tweak it differently. (I.2.6.) 
 
One distinctive characteristic of this site was their intention to remain the 
best, and to be creative and innovative. They seemed very aware of their status 
among other HCOs, and they worked at maintaining their level of care to keep this 
status. Through the implementation of their own initiative and the fact that it was 
used as a pilot for the six regional hospitals, they exercised enormous leadership in 
the community. Not only was the team innovative and credible, but they enabled 
other HCOs in the region to benefit from their innovation and commitment. They 
exemplified a quality improvement culture, at the heart of which was a reduction in 
surgical wait times.   
This is our core business, so it’s important to us to stay sort of in the forefront and to be 
leading practice. We wanted to be in the forefront; we’ve got a really creative team that 
wants to make things happen. We pushed forward, we didn’t let ourselves get bogged down in 
two years of… analysis paralysis is what they call it. (I.2.3.) 
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9.2.8 Organizational Tools  
As previously mentioned, the model based on the APP was developed even 
before the WTMS originated, due to the team’s strong leadership. It is a team-based 
model that consists of a centralized intake using an electronic referral tracking 
system, timely assessment by a health professional, accent on patient choice and 
empowerment, selective referral for specialist care based on evidence-based data, 
follow-up care post discharge, and community partnerships to encourage patients’ 
healthy living. Although most of the development and pilot work was done at this 
satellite hospital, the Health and Disease Management Program involved the LHIN’s 
six regional hospitals. The project steering committee at this satellite hospital 
included the program operations director, the medical director, the manager for 
program development, and the first APP.  
A patient focus group was initially organized to get information about their 
perceptions on wait times and about the need for more education about their health 
problems. Working groups were developed to focus on design and implementation of 
the APP role, design of the central intake and assessment centre model, 
administrative support functions, as well as information technology to facilitate the 
program. The steering committee visited a hospital in Scotland to learn from their 
model, which used nurse practitioners and extended-scope physiotherapists.  
 The team then used the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycles of change 
methodology, as well as the Participatory Evidence-based Patient-focused Process 
(PEPPA) theoretical framework, to establish the critical pathway for the development 
of the APP role. They also made sure to involve all levels of care in this decision to 
prevent any obstacles from arising during the implementation phase.  
We would meet weekly [and] would do a lot of the operational program development and 
evolving the whole concept, and doing all of the tools and all of the process changes that 
would support implementing a model of care. We used a framework for doing that, so we 
used a nine-step PEPPA framework. We did a lot. (I.2.6.) 
 
The steps are such that you're sort of identifying the target population [and where] the 
barriers and system pressures are, what the model will look like, and […] early sort of 
implementation stages, and then you're implementing and you're evaluating it [...] There are 
nine core steps that you go through. So we were anticipating where the pressure points might 
be so that we could be confident to deal with those, so they weren't barriers. (I.2.6.) 
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As previously mentioned, a pivotal aspect of the model of care was the 
implementation of APPs. They are specially-trained physiotherapists with an 
extended scope of practice through the use of medical directives. They all hold a 
research masters’ degree and have expert level orthopaedic knowledge and expertise. 
Medical directives were implemented to allow APPs to order diagnostic tests under 
specified conditions. Clinical decision-making algorithms were also developed to 
facilitate consultation with the surgeon in cases of clinical variances. Surgeons 
developed a three-month practice development program for the APPs modeled after a 
provincial university’s training program for surgical residents. Even after the 
training, they would meet with the medical director on a regular basis in order to go 
over core learning issues. The team also received help from the College of 
Physiotherapists as well as two Ontario universities for advice on appropriate 
training.  
We developed an intensive three-month training program. And in the beginning, they're more 
observing, and they spend a lot of time in the OR and the clinics, and they're also doing a lot 
of self-directed learning. We have binders of articles and […] we've set up a whole training 
piece. We keep a bank of interesting x-rays, so that when new people start we have all these 
core sort of tools that we can call on when we're working on their training, when they're in 
the training stage, because it does take time. (I.2.6.) 
 
The central intake clinic now serves as a single point of contact across the six 
regional hospitals for patients and referring physicians to access care for hip or knee 
arthritis. A standardized request for consultation form has been developed to support 
this process. However, as mentioned, very few local GPs use it for their patients. 
Referrals are triaged by the APPs to determine urgency and whether a patient should 
be seen at the assessment centre.  
The LHIN was very determined to have a single central intake, but then we created the 
assessment centre […] Now the first point of contact for patients is not with surgeons 
anymore. (I.2.3.) 
 
The assessment centre provides patients with timely access to a full 
assessment of their hip or knee problem, along with education and advice about their 
health problem. The assessments are done by the APPs, who then either recommend 
the patients for surgery or suggest a more conservative approach. If patients are 
surgical candidates, the nurses at the pre-operative clinic assess them. If the team at 
the assessment centre judges that patients have risky comorbidities, they refer the 
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patients to their specialists to be optimized for surgery. Patients are usually seen at 
the assessment centre two weeks before their surgical consultation. 
We have some documents that we use – our interdisciplinary assessment form – so we 
complete that, so that’s a complete system of overview, […] heart, lungs, everything... So we 
find out if they have any specialists who they need to follow up with, what kind of things they 
would need to do to be optimized for surgery […]. (I.2.1.) 
 
Many interviewees pointed out that, no matter how well the model works, it is 
impossible to control patient behaviour. When they are called for their surgical 
consultation, patients might consider it too soon for whatever reason: they have to 
work, go on vacation, play golf, etc. In fact, the booking clerk is responsible for 
moving patients on and off the list according to when they are “available” for 
surgery. If this is not well managed, it impacts the wait times of the hospital.  
If the data doesn’t allow you to enter that in a way that reflects the patient’s behaviour, then 
the system is blamed for inefficiency when it’s in fact the patients that are the source of the 
problem; and that’s a constant problem for us in this whole model of care. (I.2.4.) 
 
“When are you not available?” is the major question. And then all of a sudden you’ll get a 
phone call a couple of days later saying “Oh, well, yeah, I forgot about the wedding I have to 
go to, so I can’t do my surgery in that timeframe”, or “Yes, oh, I forgot about the trip we had 
booked.” So these are all things that you have to try and drag out of the patient so that you 
can record it in wait times accurately. (I.2.7.) 
 
An electronic referral tracking system was developed in collaboration with 
the Access to Care E-Health Office to track every referral and its status throughout 
the program. The team also received help from external consultants, which they 
thought had been very beneficial. Considering this hospital was named a Centre of 
Excellence for hip and knee surgeries, the LHIN decided to adapt and expand the 
centre’s IT system to the six regional hospitals. The system supports centralized data 
collection, processing, analysis and reporting to manage referrals across the six 
hospitals. Wait time 1 is also captured. This has helped moderate patients’ 
expectations, because they can find out how long they must wait before seeing a 
surgeon. 
Well, we created an electronic referral tracking system as part of this program, so there was 
a fairly large investment, and that was the LHIN that led that, in fact. Now, we had done a lot 
of the work, we […] had a working model in place here, so… it needed to be adapted and 
expanded across the six, so there was an investment there, and I don’t even know what that 
investment was. (I.2.3.) 
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The project manager mentioned that her team had their own indicators, which 
they monitored, in addition to the data being sent to the provincial level. Examples of 
these indicators were: number of patients going through the assessment centre, their 
outcomes, and patients seen by the next available surgeon versus any specific 
surgeon. The electronic system made it easy for the team to monitor wait times, 
which helped in decision-making processes. 
There’s multiple indicators. So, we look at patients who are coming to the next available 
surgeon versus any surgeon, we’re looking at patients going through the assessment centre, 
what are their outcomes, and then we measure those outcomes against the outcomes from the 
surgical consults. We look at patients who prefer to stay with a specific surgeon, so that’s 
[…] still very supportive of patient choice; we’re not forcing any of our patients to take the 
next available surgeon. (I.2.8.) 
 
 
In terms of pre-operative process, the patient orientation program was 
designed to assess patients’ overall health prior to surgery. The interdisciplinary 
assessment form is a tool to collect bio-psycho-social information on patients. Pre-
operative education program classes were developed to provide patients with the 
information they need before and after their surgery. The hospital partnered with 
Shoppers Home Health Care to provide those classes. 
We strongly encourage them to come in for the pre-op education classes. I can’t tell you 
exactly what percentage, it’s still relatively small – but, again, very positive feedback. (I.2.3.) 
 
Another tool they developed was the Guide for Patients Having Hip or Knee 
Replacement. It contains a DVD that explains what patients should expect before and 
after surgery. With regard to the surgical and post-operative processes, two programs 
were created—the regional anaesthesia program and the acute pain program—which 
include anaesthesiologists, nurses and respiratory therapists, whose goal is to 
improve the post-operative experience of patients. Care pathways were also 
developed to guide and standardize the care of patients after surgery. Patients could 
either do inpatient rehabilitation, outpatient rehabilitation or go home with home care 
services provided to them according to their evolution.  
As previously mentioned, patients are seen in the post-operative review clinic 
by an APP, usually six weeks after their surgery. If patients encounter complications 
at home, they can also call either pre-operative nurses or the APP who evaluated 
them before the surgery. Of interest, the team of APPs published an article about 
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patient satisfaction after evaluating 123 patients seen in the post-operative clinic. In 
general, patients were highly satisfied with the care provided by APPs.  
The patients have a very detailed booklet, which gives them a whole bunch of phone numbers. 
So, after hours, they can call the hospital coordinator. We have the pre-op nurses who looked 
after them before they had surgery, they have their phone numbers. We have a set of people 
called advanced practice physiotherapists they also can call. So if patients run into trouble 
there’s a lot of people that they can call for any information. (I.2.5.) 
 
When asked about the model’s sustainability, one interviewee emphasized 
how important it was to keep monitoring how it was running and to tweak it when 
necessary, i.e., it was important for the team to meet on a regular basis to improve 
efficiencies and to look at the available data from the IT systems to reassess how 
things were going. Additionally, that interviewee highlighted the importance of not 
only sustaining their efforts for hip and knee surgery, but also expanding the model 
of care into other areas that were under similar pressures.  
You're constantly sort of evaluating and seeing and responding to any changes that are 
happening in the system […] and looking for ways to continue to expand. We're also looking 
at, as the role matures, spreading that model into other areas that have pressure points. 
(I.2.6) 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Organizational factors that impact WTMS success and sustainability 
Organizational Governance -­‐ Strong leadership from managers 
++ -­‐ Inter-organizational partnerships 
++ -­‐ Dedicated decision-making and 
management structure -­‐ Accountability of staff -­‐ Stable governance ++ -­‐ Abundance of committees created 
and maintained over time +++ 
 
Organizational Resources -­‐ Seed money -­‐ Individual and team incentives -­‐ Dedicated staffing +++ -­‐ Adequate capacity +++ -­‐ Entire organization dedicated to 
hip and knee surgeries -­‐ Surgeries only done for simple hip 
or knee arthroplasties -­‐ Own rehabilitation unit -­‐ Internal wait time reporting sheets 
and assessment of data every 
month by staff and management 
 
Organizational Culture -­‐ Innovation ++ -­‐ Teamwork ++ -­‐ Trust ++ -­‐ Physician involvement and 
leadership +++ -­‐ Evaluation ++ 
Organizational Tools -­‐ Information technology -­‐ Reporting to the LHIN ++ -­‐ Clinical pathway: APP model -­‐ Staff/patient oriented interfaces -­‐ Education resources ++ 
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-­‐ ‘Small steps’ culture -­‐ Training and support ++ 
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Table 4 
Contextual factors that impact WTMS success and sustainability 
Contextual Governance -­‐ Benchmarks -­‐ Accountability agreements -­‐ High-level coordinating–reporting 
structure  -­‐ Stakeholder engagement: LHIN 
+++ -­‐ Partnerships +++ 
Contextual Resources -­‐ Financial incentives for surgeons 
to do more surgeries  -­‐ Funding levels reviewed annually -­‐ Tension with LHIN about year-by-
year funding  
Contextual Culture  -­‐ Public awareness ++ -­‐ Difficulty in getting all the general 
physicians (GP) from the 
community to use the standardized 
referral form  
Contextual Tools -­‐ Central registry -­‐ Standards and guidelines +++ -­‐ Collection and standardizing of 
data very good +++ -­‐ Public website for wait time data 
 
  In the end, there are certain elements that characterize the case. The initiative 
was lead by one orthopaedic surgeon, one physiotherapist as well as the operations 
director for the musculo-skeletal program. They took the time to plan out the 
initiative with different methodologies and visit hospitals that had already 
implemented such strategies. They quickly gained the trust and collaboration from 
their colleagues to pursue the strategy in the hospital. The culture has been stable for 
the outset of the initiative. Moreover, the team has been able to receive support from 
the CEO and new governance structures were specifically put in place to support the 
change. They have also been able to get an important level of collaboration from the 
LHIN. With time, the process of planning annual funding for surgical volumes has 
improved due to this level of collaboration. Many local partnerships have been 
developed in time to support the initiative as well.  
  The model of care has improved the quality of care provided to patients 
undergoing hip or knee surgery in the hospital but the team has also shared their 
model with many health organizations locally and nationally. They have also 
developed and piloted the WTIS. Many local hospitals within the LHIN also use the 
system now.  
  The center has the opportunity of being dedicated to hip and knee surgeries. 
The patients they operate on have a minimal amount of co-morbidities since the 
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center is not equipped with an emergency room or an intensive care unit. The more 
complex cases are sent to neighbouring hospitals. Additionally, they also have the 
opportunity of having their own rehabilitation unit for patients that need it after their 
surgery. There are no capacity issues, whether it be for OR scheduling or post-
operative beds. The work done by APPs has been able to give more time to surgeons 
to perform more surgeries, therefore increasing their capacity. Lastly, the center has 
been considered the Center of Excellence for hip and knee care in the province.  
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 10 - CASE 3  
 
10.1 Description of the case 
10.1.1 Type of health care organization 
This case is a tertiary-care teaching hospital in Maritime Canada. The hospital 
provides medical and surgical care, offering the full range of orthopaedic services, 
and is also the regional trauma centre for all of the province as well as surrounding 
regions. Moreover, they do a large number of spine and cardiac surgeries. There are 
1,100 beds in the hospital.  
10.1.2 Classification of the case 
We classified this hospital’s WTMS as unsustainable. Validation of the data 
provided to us by the access manager of the surgical services of the hospital 
confirmed that the site was, in fact, an unsustainable case, because it had not been 
able to maintain wait times for hip and knee surgeries below the 26 week benchmark 
from February 2010 to September 2010. Data has only been collected since February 
2010 at this site. Wait times for hip surgeries ranged from 357 days to 602 days 
during that time period whereas wait times for knee surgeries ranged from 433 days 
to 616 days within that same period of time.  
10.1.3 The Provincial Wait Time Management Strategy 
In 2008, as part of a broad-based strategy, the Department of Health approved 
a contract between one regional hospital and an ambulatory clinic at another regional 
hospital that enabled more than 500 additional orthopaedic surgeries to be performed 
over the following year. Under this arrangement, the hospital’s surgeons were able to 
use the clinic’s OR facilities to do publicly insured, minor orthopaedic surgical 
procedures. The project also provided more space at the main hospital site for 
surgeons to tackle more difficult orthopaedic cases. The Department of Health 
allocated almost 1 million dollars to the project. 
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In February 2010, a province-wide patient access registry was launched 
(Nova Scotia Health, 2010). The registry constitutes a provincial database that 
includes all patients waiting for surgery. It allows hospitals to be better informed 
about surgical wait times and the factors that contribute to longer than appropriate 
wait times. 
10.1.4 The Hospital’s Wait Time Management Strategy 
In response to the provincial strategy, a steering committee was created in 
January 2008 consisting of members of the regional hospital and the Department of 
Health. Consequently, many groups were formed to identify problem areas that 
needed development and improve the functioning of the hospital. Subsequently, the 
provincial Orthopaedic Assessment Clinic (OAC) opened at the hospital in October 
2008 (Morrison, 2010). The purpose of that project was to develop and implement a 
patient-centred model to improve access for patients waiting to see an orthopaedic 
surgeon. A central intake process was created that made it possible to schedule 
appointments with “next available” surgeon within two to three weeks of the referral 
being received, in contrast to the previous wait of 12-18 months. The OAC focused 
initially on patients requiring arthroplasty/revisions only. However, it acts as a central 
intake for referrals for all patients requiring orthopaedic assessment or consultation. 
Patients are put into three different categories: 1) patients fit and ready for surgery 
with predictably good outcomes with low variability; 2) candidates for surgery but 
unfit due to co-morbidities; 3) patients who do not require surgery but do need 
treatment depending on diagnosis. According to Bayers (2009), all new referrals for 
non-urgent orthopaedic assessment and consultation in the region were now to be 
sent to the OAC rather than to individual orthopaedic surgeons at the hospital. GPs 
could request a patient evaluation either online or by fax. A new standardized referral 
form was developed that gave GPs the option to specify whether the patient was to be 
referred to a particular surgeon or could be seen by the next available surgeon. 
Moreover, all GPs who referred patients to the OAC would now receive a clinical 
summary outlining the assessment findings and any follow-up surgery. At the OAC, 
assessments, consultations and ongoing care are provided in innovative ways. 
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Patients have access to a team of healthcare professionals including case managers, 
nurses, surgeons, physiotherapists, occupational therapists and dieticians. Patients 
meet with a case manager/orthopaedic surgeon team who do a complete evaluation 
and then develop a care plan with the patient. That care plan addresses the need and 
readiness for surgery as well as health determinants such as diet, physical health and 
activity, and social supports. A case manager provides ongoing support to patients 
working through their care plans. After surgery, the patient is followed by a case 
manager in collaboration with that patient’s GP, and the healthcare team uses 
standardized care plans during the patient’s inpatient stay at the hospital, i.e., a 
standard care plan or a fast-track care plan. 
10.2 Factors that influence the WTMS’s success and sustainability  
10.2.1 Contextual Governance 
Stakeholder engagement proved to be the strongest factor in this strategy.  
Because the province had significant problems with surgical wait times, particularly 
with regard to hip and knee arthroplasty, the directive to reduce wait times came from 
the national level, the Health Ministry. In fact, the province was the outlier for the 
country when it came to wait times in the early 2000s. At this point, BJC had been 
given the mandate to develop a national benchmark. Therefore, the team followed the 
directive from BJC to look at their wait times and to develop pathways for their hip 
and knee arthroplasty. Also, the fact that BJC relied on evidence-based practices to 
develop its guidelines gave some healthcare professionals the ammunition they 
needed to convince their more resistant colleagues to embrace changes in practice to 
promote evidence-based patient-centred care.   
We addressed some of the issues regarding the wait lists both for pre-operative evaluation 
and post-operative care by getting involved with Bone and Joint Canada, and they came to us 
and asked us if we would be interested in getting involved in a new model of care. (I.3.1.) 
 
Most of the pathway is not around physician practice, it’s around good patient care. So we 
have much more – I’m going to say ammunition – now, especially with Bone and Joint 
Canada. (I.3.4.) 
 
It’s the government that supported moving in that direction. (I.3.4.) 
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Two members of the team were provincial representatives to the BJC steering 
committee. Additionally, they were helping the three other districts in the province 
that offered orthopaedic hip and knee surgery to get their model of orthopaedic 
assessment clinics up and running.  
Both myself and one of my managers – who manages the orthopaedic assessment clinic – 
were the representatives on the steering committee for Bone and Joint Canada, so we 
actually assisted the other three districts that offer orthopaedic surgery for hip and knee in 
the province get their model of orthopaedic assessment clinics up and running; and then both 
of us had also been involved with bone and joint and hip fracture care. (I.3.4.) 
 
Also of interest, the Red Cross, a community organization that helps patients 
in need, had often provided help to patients who had undergone surgery and needed 
mobility equipment to return home from the hospital but could not afford equipment 
such as walkers. They therefore formed a partnership with the hospital to lend such 
equipment to patients in need.  
A lot of our patients don’t have a lot of money, and the other thing is equipment. A lot of our 
patients should use walkers […] before surgery or whatever. A lot of them can’t afford to buy 
or rent this. A Red Cross service will loan it out for three months at a time. Most of our 
patients are waiting six months, nine months a year for surgery; and even after surgery 
sometimes they need some specialized equipment and there are some challenges…. We’re 
getting more help […] there’s sort of services that we can contact, and we’re trying to make 
more use of community services, sort of finding out what’s out there that we can use for these 
patients. (I.3.3.) 
 
Lastly, at the time of our visit, the program had recently been audited by the 
Auditor General for accreditation. 
We were just audited by the auditor general, but from an accreditation standpoint […] as 
much as possible we try to have equipment that has the proper read-outs. They’ve got very 
good recall if a biological indicator is positive. They’ve got a very good recall to get those 
instruments back and make sure that physicians and patients are notified, and so on […] I 
think those processes help ... (I.3.4.) 
10.2.2 Contextual Resources 
The single most important contextual resource factor found in this case was 
government funding for the initiative. This funding was meant to finance specific 
items according to the Department of Health. With this funding, the hospital was able 
to renovate space for the assessment clinic as well as pay for the staff working there: 
the two case managers, the physiotherapist, the part-time occupational therapist, a 
full-time project manager, and clerical staff who received all the referrals, processed 
them, put them on wait lists and did all the background work. They also received 
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funds to purchase a machine to facilitate patient registration. Also, the government 
funded a person to develop a website for patient information about surgery and what 
to expect after the surgery.   
In addition, they were funded by the government for more OR time. This was 
done through the above-mentioned agreement with the ambulatory clinic of a nearby 
regional hospital, which allowed the team to do arthroscopies there instead of at the 
hospital, which helped increase the OR time at the hospital by two days per week. 
They were therefore able to increase the amount of joint surgeries they were doing. 
Lastly, the government also gave them incremental funding for surgeries when they 
exceeded their target.  
We were given OR time where we could do smaller cases outside of the hospital, and that 
allowed us to increase the number of joints that we did. (I.3.5.) 
 
It was done in an ambulatory setting across the city so that, arthroscopy and feeds and things 
like that, we could take them out of here and take them over there,  which would free up time 
here. With those two extra OR days that we obtained a week, we were able to increase the 
number of joints. So, yeah, we had an increased amount of OR time, plus from the 
Department of Health – Federal Department of Health – initiative of allowing payment for 
more total joint replacements if you exceed a certain target, that helped us to do more joints 
as well. (I.3.1.) 
10.2.3 Contextual Culture  
Public awareness was regarded as a potential negative factor by some 
interviewees, who seemed to think it would play a role in increasing the demands on 
orthopaedic care at the hospital. They reasoned that if GPs and patients saw that a 
certain hospital had reduced its wait times, those GPs would start referring more 
patients to that hospital, making it difficult to maintain low wait times for hip and 
knee surgery. However, one interviewee seemed to think this was not so much the 
case in Nova Scotia.  
Some of the unexpected things could be, will we just end up with more referrals? Because 
[…] now people are going to start reporting their wait time by province, by district, or by 
land – whatever the term is for the different provinces – so if we were somewhere like 
Toronto […], you could end up getting more referrals because your waits are lower, right? 
You’re meeting, meeting, and then all of a sudden, if it’s out on the public website, and all the 
family docs… and the hospitals are so close that, “I’m not referring to this, I’m referring to 
here!”  So it starts becoming referring to a hospital versus referring to a surgeon… right? 
It’s the hospital benchmark of where they are. So you could get a dump with a lot of referrals 
pretty quick, and here are your good results of meeting the benchmark of today, and if you 
get a huge amount coming in, then if you were going to report a quarter later, you’re 
probably not going to be needing your benchmark anymore.  (I.3.4.) 
 
89 
 
 
 
According to certain interviewees, the relationship between the hospital level 
and GPs was initially difficult but had improved since the beginning of the initiative. 
A referral form was developed to make it easier for GPs to refer their patients to a 
specific surgeon or to the next available surgeon. It seems certain GPs were a bit 
confused initially and thought that sending their patients to see the next available 
surgeon meant that they would get their surgery faster. However, that only applies to 
the initial assessment. To correct this understanding, information sessions were held 
for GPs to inform them on how to properly refer their patients to the central clinic. If 
the surgeon had a lengthy wait list for surgery, a letter was sent to inform the 
patient’s GP of the situation. Close to 70 % of GPs in the community now check off 
“next available surgeon” for their patients. According to interviewees, this has greatly 
contributed to reducing wait times. Through this process, communication with GPs 
has also improved. In fact, they receive a letter from the hospital indicating that the 
clinic has received the referral, as well as the time and date of the patient’s 
appointment.  
I’m going to say it was close to 70 % of family doctors were putting ‘next available surgeon’ 
down. So… but again, a lot of education with them, and really we’re probably hitting more of 
the family physicians in metro with that than across the province. (I.3.4.) 
 
When they fill out the referral system now they’ll have the list of the doctors that do the 
arthroplasty, or next available surgeon. So the next available surgeon,  sometimes some of 
the doctors were getting that a little bit confused.  They were thinking that it would be the 
next available surgeon that could get the patient’s surgery done quicker, but that is only 
related to the initial assessment. So you can actually have one doctor who… the wait time to 
see him could be… say two months, but his wait list for surgery could be twenty-four months. 
Then you could have another surgeon whose wait time was approximately the same amount 
of time, but the surgery wait time could be six to twelve months. So that wait list with the next 
available surgeon, sorry… is just related to the visit, not the surgery date. (I.3.5.) 
 
One interviewee thought the problems with wait times were largely due to 
their public healthcare system. According to him, governments were constantly 
reducing hospital budgets, requiring healthcare professionals to do more with less. 
When salaries could not be cut, services suffered. He believed qualified graduates 
were unable to obtain jobs because hospitals lacked funds. He favoured the UK’s 
public–private system in which the public can contract out to the private sector, but 
felt no Canadian politician would have the courage to promote such a system here. In 
his view, Canada has a de facto two-tiered system, in that politicians or others who 
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are “connected” can be prioritized over regular patients. He felt that, if Canada had a 
public–private system, every healthcare professional would have a job, which is not 
the case presently. 
This is a universal thing in Canada right now, the governments are shrinking the hospital 
budget and you’re expected to do more with less. But when 75% of your budget is salaries, 
you can’t cut that, so you cut the service. So that’s an issue and so… why should Canadian 
people go to India or some place like Germany to get a total joint replacement and pay with 
insurance, when you could have that service in Canada with Canadian trained surgeons and 
nurses, in a private facility? And there’s a lot of emotion around that because people say… 
you know… in Canada if we all can’t have it, none of us can have it. Well, that’s not the way 
it is. The way it is now, people are waiting, and they’re going to continue to wait, and it’s 
going to get worse (I.3.1.) 
  
Fifty percent of the orthopaedic graduates cannot find a job in Canada. There are all kinds of 
nurses that are looking for work […] There are no jobs, because there’s no money to pay 
them. And so then I think that if a two-tiered system started up, there would be jobs… quality 
healthcare jobs for people to look after patients. And I think that’s an inevitable thing that’s 
going to happen in this country. Every other country in the Western world has a public-
private system except Canada […] and we can afford the system. (I.3.1.) 
10.2.4 Contextual Tools 
The province established the standard for patients in need of hip and knee 
surgery to undergo surgery within 182 days or less, much like other provinces in 
Canada. The hospital has therefore been trying to achieve this target, like other HCOs 
in the country. Some interviewees pointed out that, although this is a national 
benchmark that has to be achieved at the organizational level, the province has a 
particularly overwhelming population with arthritis. This may partly explain why 
they cannot achieve consistently low wait times for hip and knee surgery. This led 
one interviewee to say that the government needs to intervene to increase capacity so 
that the hospital could offer more care to the population.  
So I’m always trying to meet the target… We’ve met the target but there’s more coming in 
through the door, and […] in our determinants of health, we have a very high arthritis 
population… So it’s not a surprise that as we become older there’s going to be more people 
waiting. So at some point… if the expectation is to get down to that 180 days or 182 days – 
whatever people dispute that it is – then, at some point, there’s got to be some capacity. 
(I.3.4.) 
 
One surgeon noted that there are no clear guidelines for orthopaedic surgeons 
to objectively choose surgical candidates. Patient assessments are still done on a 
case-by-case basis according to each orthopaedic surgeon’s opinion. Also, each 
surgeon decides when patients are to be seen for follow-up assessments. This means 
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the team has not been able to agree on how to standardize these elements of patient 
care.  
On another note, the provincial government has created a public website that 
gives patients, families and GPs access to wait times for hip and knee surgeries at the 
different hospitals in the region. While this would theoretically allow GPs to redirect 
patients to hospitals with the shortest wait time, as previously mentioned, this is not 
always done in practice.  
One interviewee also pointed out that, although there is a provincial central 
access registry since February 2010, as mentioned earlier, the data is inaccurate and 
therefore unreliable.  
10.2.5 Organizational Governance 
Strong management and leadership seemed to be exercised by only a few 
members of the team. For example, the surgical services manager was on the 
committee that oversaw the implementation in 2008. He started out working as a 
physiotherapist, giving input for the pathway and advising on physiotherapists’ role 
in the clinic. Later, he was given the position to manage the process when the 
previous manager left in 2010. 
I took over this [process] in July of 2010; so just over a year now. I was on the committees 
that were working towards it, I worked as a physiotherapist, I gave the physiotherapy input 
for the pathway and what their involvement should be in the clinic, from that perspective. So I 
was a committee member at the time, and then when M. left […] I was given the position to 
manage the process. (I.3.2.) 
 
This same manager was trying to involve nurses more in decision-making and 
in sitting on different committees. In fact, nurses had showed no interest in taking on 
any responsibility outside of their normal work. Therefore, he focused on developing 
incentives to make them more interested and involved in committees, for instance, by 
inviting them to take part in committees during their regular work hours rather than 
taking extra time after work to attend committee meetings. This interviewee believed 
these nurses needed to be educated about the benefits of buying into pathways and 
processes that would ultimately make their work more efficient. He also mentioned 
the importance of finding a few nurses who believed in the pathways and the benefits 
that come from being more involved, who could positively influence their colleagues.  
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There have to be incentives. So the incentives could be either paid time – incorporating that – 
so instead of coming in and working on the unit today, come in and do committee work for 
me, go and do one of your re-certifications for part of the day and then come and do some 
committee work for part of the day; so it has to be scheduled into their regular time. It’s 
usually not above their normal time… Educating them on the benefits is a big part of it; if we 
can find some people that see the benefit of having a pathway or reducing the wait time so 
that the patients come in healthier, then that information will then spread. But it’s more… it’s 
a lot of education with the nurses to get them to buy into processes. (I.3.2.) 
 
Considering the province is rather small, it appeared some surgeons had been 
using their friendship with members of the Ministry to exert power over the hospital 
to get what they wanted. For example, if the organization tried implementing 
something and one surgeon was against it, he would phone up the government and 
the initiative would come to an end. A new leader at the management level had 
recently been able to reverse this type of behaviour to make things more equitable for 
everyone working in the organization, saying: “there’s got to be guidelines here, we 
can’t afford to provide care that way anymore.” (I.3.4.) 
We’re a pretty small province and our government is so close, there can be people that work 
here that are friends of people in the government. So we’d have people going through the 
back door. As an organization, if we try to implement something and they didn’t agree, they’d 
get the phone call. So that’s our old tradition. So we’re really trying to flip that. (I.3.4.) 
 
Some interviewees mentioned the lack of involvement by upper management, 
i.e., the CEO or VP, in promoting innovation in the hospital. In fact, IT systems were 
slow to be implemented in the hospital because upper management was not very 
active in giving directives, even though the IT department had been steadily working 
on an electronic chart for the past ten years. There just had not been enough pressure 
from management to get that done, leaving the hospital with paper charts until now.  
The administrative culture is slowly changing. It’s a very slow turning wheel; it’s very 
difficult to get change. For example, from an IT perspective we still have paper charts, and 
they’ve been working on an electronic medical record here for more than ten years, and we 
still don’t have one. So from the upper administration – VPs, CEO, that sort of thing – to give 
the direction to have a medical record – an electronic medical record – there’s not enough 
pressure to get that done, so it’s not happening at the rate that it should be.  We have a 
retrospective electronic chart; it’s paper that’s been scanned, and then you can go on and 
look at it – old charts that way – but it’s not a true electronic medical record. (I.3.2.)  
 
10.2.6 Organizational Resources  
The hospital received money from the government to fund the initiative, as in 
most provinces. In turn, they were able to collaborate with a neighbouring hospital 
and to do arthroscopies in their ambulatory unit. This freed up two more OR days a 
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week at the hospital for the team. Overall, at the time of our visit, 1,300 total joint 
surgeries were done in this hospital on a yearly basis and another 200 simple 
arthroscopy cases were done in the neighbouring hospital’s ambulatory unit. 
Altogether, the hospital has five ORs running five days per week, for all surgeries. 
There are eight orthopaedic surgeons in the hospital; a ninth orthopaedic surgeon gets 
a bit of OR time in the hospital but has his private office, where he charges his 
patients for the assessments. However, the eight regular orthopaedic surgeons have to 
compete with surgeons from other areas of care (neurospinal, cardiology and trauma) 
for OR time, and the arthoplasty cases can often get bumped if a more urgent cardiac 
case comes along, for example. This is a daily struggle for orthopaedic surgeons, 
according to one interviewee.  
 On another note, many interviewees spoke about inefficiencies in the OR that 
they were trying to address to improve throughput by reducing wait time 2. This 
meant that getting patients to the OR once they had seen their surgeon was still the 
most difficult part of the process. One interviewee pointed out that the team has faced 
issues with anaesthesiologist and occasional nursing shortages, as well as budget 
constraints, all of which made it difficult to maintain optimal OR productivity over 
time. One interviewee saw budget constraints as the main problem preventing the 
team from doing more surgeries despite the growing need in the population. In partial 
response to this OR inefficiency, a pilot project was implemented by one surgeon, 
who was attempting to increase his surgeries from three to four per day to see if this 
would be a sustainable solution.  
Another structural problem seemed to be the large number of patients at the 
hospital waiting for long-term care placement. Although there were three orthopaedic 
units, at the time of our visit roughly one-third of the beds were occupied in this way. 
This reduced capacity on the post-operative wards greatly limited the turnover of 
surgical patients. One explanation offered for this congestion was the fact that a long-
term care facility in the community was undergoing extensive renovations.  
We’ve looked at increasing by one joint per day. So in a ten-hour surgical day, they might 
only be doing three joints right now, but the surgeons, the younger ones feel they could do 
four.[…] But the nursing staff feels that... “Well, we only did three in ten, why are we doing 
four in ten now?” It’s an efficiency thing, so you might have to work not a little faster, just 
more efficiently. And so changing practice is difficult. So we are doing a pilot right now to 
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change from three joints to four over the next couple of months to see if we can do that 
sustainably in the turnover time. (I.3.2.) 
 
I think the single biggest thing would be to create efficiencies in the operating room to allow 
for increased throughput in a day. There are a huge number of impediments to the running of 
the operating room that prevent the number of joint replacements that could be done. (I.3.1.) 
 
Many interviewees mentioned that no incentives were offered to healthcare 
professionals to encourage them to take part in the WTMS. In fact, one said people 
mainly got on board because of peer pressure. The workload had increased since the 
implementation of the strategy at the hospital, so there was a growing need to hire 
more clerical staff to process the referrals. Because the surgeons’ secretaries were 
overworked, and because referrals were now centralized, the team took away the 
secretaries’ clerical tasks: processing referrals, managing wait lists and booking 
patients. Although they were able to get extra clerical staff, the funding was 
temporary, coming from outside of the program’s funding. Therefore, the team was 
looking for ways to increase funding. Luckily, the main clerical staff member used to 
be a nursing assistant, and therefore had the clinical knowledge to properly triage the 
referrals according to the patients’ needs.  
Right now we do have some extra clerical [staff] down there but the funding is coming from 
somewhere else. We’re borrowing it from somewhere where the resources aren’t quite 
required, but it’s not permanent funding for our strategy; we do need to look at increasing 
the funding for it. Where we’ve taken the clerical and admin work away from the surgeon’s 
secretaries – processing the referrals, wait listing, and then booking – a lot of that’s been 
taken away, and now it’s centralized. It’s more than one person’s job for the volume that we 
do here, so we do need to increase the funding for that. (I.3.2.) 
 
With regard to information resources, the manager of the inpatient unit and 
the assessment centre is also responsible for tallying the internal data on the number 
of visits and the type of referrals they get, whether referrals are for the next available 
surgeon or whether patients are directly referred to a particular surgeon, and overall 
wait time 1. He shares this information with his director and with the group of 
surgeons on a quarterly basis. He also collects internal data on hospitalized patients’ 
LOS as well as on what pathway they used during that hospitalization. To do this, he 
works closely with the decision support staff.  
I work closely with Decision and Support to get those reports, whether they’re from our PHS 
system, which is a booking and registration system, where the referrals actually get entered 
into. We pull from that, but we also pull from our discharge abstract database, which is sort 
of retrospective data […]. After they’re discharged we pull that to see length of stay based on 
the type of patient that they were, and we can map pretty much [every] patient that’s come 
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through our hospital. So we can look at… if they were referred for next available, how long 
did they wait, what path did they take through the hospital, how long were they in hospital 
for, and when did they discharge… as compared to someone who selected a particular 
surgeon for their hip or knee arthroplasty. So we can compare all that with in-house [data] 
and we will report some of that to the Department of Health. (I.3.2.) 
 
We’re now able to collect how many patients are in each clinic, how many cancellations, how 
many return visits versus new assessments, how many hours, minutes they spend within the 
clinic doing that. So we can get an average time per patient per surgeon, because some 
surgeons take longer to do an assessment and some shorter… we can track all of that. So I do 
a quarterly report that goes to all our arthroplasty surgeons, and then I do a large report for 
the Department of Health. (I.3.2.) 
   
As part of the strategy, the hospital received funding to re-organize space the 
assessment clinic in the hospital. The assessment clinic is where all the pre-
assessment evaluations are done. (We will return to this aspect in the organizational 
tools section.) In the clinic, there were two nurses working as case managers, as well 
as one physiotherapist and one occupational therapist. The occupational therapist not 
only provided educational classes for patients but also did home visits for post-
operative patients. There was a full-time project manager as well as a full-time 
clerical staff to receive the referrals, process them, wait list them, etc. One 
interviewee mentioned that the clinic space was too small and that the team wished 
they could obtain more space to expand it.  
We received funding for the space of our clinic downstairs. We received funding for our two case 
managers – which are full-time nurses – our full time physiotherapist, we have a 0.5 or half time 
occupational therapist, a full time project manager – myself – and we have a full time clerical to 
receive the referrals, process them, wait list them, do all the background work. (I.3.2.) 
 
Our space, it’s pretty tiny down there, it’s pretty crowded… like we’re getting busier and there’s 
more clinics coming in there, so our space is starting to get too small for us. (I.3.2.) 
10.2.7 Organizational Culture 
The implementation of the strategy was very difficult for the group of 
surgeons, which was a reflection of the organizational culture. Physician buy-in was 
especially difficult at the beginning of the initiative. Most of them did not like the 
idea of a central referral system because they wanted to maintain a long list of 
patients. Although most eventually saw the benefits of this method, one still has not 
bought in and practices in a private clinic outside the hospital. In fact, at the time of 
our visit, a lack of trust toward the clerical staff in charge of the referral process was 
apparent. Some surgeons preferred to look at the referrals coming in each morning 
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instead of allowing the clerical staff to triage them and determine the urgency of the 
patient’s visit to the assessment clinic.  
It seems peer pressure was applied by people who believed in the initiative to 
convince the others who did not. In fact, there was one surgeon in particular who 
motivated his colleagues to buy-in to the initiative. He was often the one who would 
try to do innovative things to improve the team’s work, such as the four-surgeries-a-
day pilot under way at the time of our visit.  
The major challenge was surgeon buy-in because they all owned their own case loads, they 
had their own business per se, and they felt that giving up the referral to somebody else to 
bring in centrally and then farm it out, was taking away from their case-loads. But we’ve 
been doing this for three years, and they all still have very long wait lists, and they have lots 
of patients to see. And so in our opinion it hasn’t had a negative impact… it’s become more 
transparent, and they always have business, they always have patients referring, they always 
have OR times, they’re always busy. But the first stalling block was the surgeon buy-in that 
they didn’t want to give up the referral coming to them individually, that it would go to a 
central place. (I.3.2.) 
 
Some of them take pride in how long their wait list is, like it’s a status symbol for them, or it 
makes them feel good. But why should Dr X care if he’s got an eight-month wait list or a two-
year wait list? He can only do so many surgeries. But yes, there have been resisters within 
the group themselves. (I.3.4.) 
 
It appeared that the main tactic for improving the organizational culture was 
to wait for resistant surgeons to take their retirement and then to teach new surgeons 
the “right way to do things”. In that respect, many interviewees mentioned the 
generational gap and that two camps co-existed among the group of orthopaedic 
surgeons. There were younger surgeons, who did not care as much about pre-
checking the referrals because they knew they would get a hefty caseload of patients 
nonetheless, and then there were the older surgeons. In that sense, the team is hoping 
for the new surgeons to make the push in the right direction in order to develop better 
and more efficient ways of working. Despite this resistance from the older surgeons, 
interviewees mentioned that they had become more supportive of the pre-assessment 
clinic, and appreciative of how it works and the care their patients have been getting.   
You need a retirement to change culture here, it’s that entrenched. We have some people that 
have been doing surgery here for a very long time –twenty-five plus years – and they like it 
the way it was and it’s very difficult to change. Our new surgeons – we have about three or 
four new surgeons – who are very bought into technology, transparency, employing people to 
their maximum potential. And what I mean by that is employing a physiotherapist to do some 
assessments because they’re capable of doing that, using the nurses to do that kind of thing, 
and have the surgeon do surgery-related things, i.e., in the OR, and deeming people 
appropriate for surgery, but not doing things they don’t require to be done. So we have two 
different camps right now. It’s a culture thing, it’s a generational gap as well, and we have a 
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huge push right now to try to change things, but we do meet resistance from… the old boy’s 
club – if you want to call it. (I.3.2.) 
 
The young surgeons know they’re going to be here for the next twenty or thirty years, so they 
want to make the processes now; so there’s a lot of push from these three surgeons to change 
things, which is good. (I.3.2.) 
 
I think most of that resistance was the project part, that they had to get all the surgeons on 
board to actually participate in this clinic; so most of the resistance actually was before I 
started. So since we started… now they love it over here. (I.3.5.) 
 
Another element of the organizational culture was, as one interviewee put it, 
that some people working in this hospital “work to live” and don’t live to work 
(nurses, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, administrative assistants). This 
meant they showed up to work each day and did what was asked of them but no 
more. They did not take initiative or join committees to make proactive changes in 
existing work processes. Young nurses wanted to do their jobs and leave with as little 
responsibility as possible, while older nurses have been around the block and don’t 
feel they need to contribute as much anymore.  
People here work to live. A lot of the in-patient nursing staff don’t feel ownership, so they 
come in for their work and they leave. They don’t join the committees to create change, 
professional practice committees, pathway committees… it’s very difficult to get nursing 
input outside of the work hours. We have some senior nurses that have been here twenty 
years, and they will provide input, but they’re getting closer and closer to retirement so their 
input… they just don’t want to do that anymore, they’ve been around the block before, so they 
don’t feel they need to contribute as much. So it’s very difficult. (I.3.2.) 
 
 
Although they seem to enjoy where they work, the nurses also showed a lot of 
resistance to the suggestion made by the lead surgeon to increase the OR schedule by 
one joint surgery per day. They felt this would increase their workload without added 
incentives. In reply, the surgeon trying to push for the change said the incentive 
would be to go home on time. However, they would be paid overtime if ever they 
stayed 45 minutes beyond their shift. Unfortunately, the nurses seemed to have little 
interest in getting paid overtime because they felt they had been working sufficiently.  
There is resistance from the nursing staff, but the incentive that the surgeons are saying is 
that we need as an organization to say, when you’re done those four joints, you can go home, 
you have done your work here, because the likelihood of starting a fifth joint is not going to 
happen. So as long as the room is clean and ready for tomorrow, you can leave; so if we get 
those joints done in eight hours – go home, because we don’t need you anymore. Now, if you 
[…] stay forty-five minutes over – because it takes forty-five more minutes, ten hours and 
forty-five minutes – then yes, the nurse is going to get paid overtime. But they’re not really in 
it for the overtime anymore, overtime doesn’t work for nurses anymore, they’re not in it for 
that… they work enough. (I.3.2.) 
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10.2.8 Organizational Tools 
As part of the strategy, a hip and knee pathway was developed to ensure 
continuity in care. The pathway begins with the referral form the community GP fills 
out to refer a patient to the hospital. This is sent to the hospital’s central referral 
office at the OAC. Once the referral is received, the date of that referral is entered 
into the system to start wait time 1. The patient is waitlisted until a clinic time for the 
preferred surgeon is available. Depending on how long this time is, the clerical staff 
will send a letter to the GP saying that the preferred surgeon’s wait time is x number 
of days and that choosing the next available surgeon will allow the patient to be seen, 
for instance, in 30 days. Once the patient’s assessment is booked and the appointment 
has occurred, that is entered into the database and that ends wait time 1.  
As one interviewee pointed out, the central referral process allows the team to 
better control the referrals, whereas before the strategy, the referrals were sent to 
individual surgeons’ offices and were handled by their secretaries. Patients would 
sometimes find themselves on all eight of the surgeons’ wait lists.  
Patients are seen at the assessment centre when their appointment date comes 
up. They meet with one of the two nurse case managers who do their health 
assessment. First, the patients fill out a two-page questionnaire. Then, during the 
health assessment, the nurse reviews all of their medical history, their medication, 
and verifies that all their information is up-to-date. However, one interviewee added 
that some patients slip through the cracks when the surgeon is the only one to see 
them in his private office or at the assessment clinic, as this still occasionally 
happens.  
Once the case manager’s evaluation is complete, the surgeon sees the patient, 
does the surgical assessment, and decides whether the patient is fit or not for surgery. 
One surgeon we interviewed felt that it was important for patients to see the surgeon 
before the surgery, in order to look the surgeon in the eye and say: ‘I trust you to 
operate on me; I’m going to let you operate on me.’ Therefore, this surgeon preferred 
the case manager model in which the surgeons see all the patients, as opposed to one 
where an APP would deem the patient fit or not for surgery. During this evaluation, 
the surgeon reviews the most current x-ray, MRI and CT to determine the likelihood 
99 
 
 
 
of success for the patient’s surgery. Once a patient is deemed fit for surgery, the 
surgery is booked and the patient waits. This is entered into the database, and that 
starts wait time 2. Once the patient enters the OR, that ends wait time 2, and that is 
also entered into the pathway’s healthcare system database: Pathways Healthcare 
Scheduling (PHS). The morning of the surgery, the patient is seen at the pre-
admission clinic by an anaesthesiologist to receive the proper anaesthesia.   
A few weeks before the surgery, patients are educated regarding what to 
expect at the time of the surgery, the expected LOS depending on whether they are 
fast-tracked or standard-tracked and what they will need at home after surgery. These 
educational classes are offered twice a week by the case managers. The case 
managers’ role is to optimize patients for surgery, but they do not see them during 
their hospital stay because the orthopaedic units provide their care.  
Patients who are not deemed fit for surgery right away will return to the case 
manager to discuss such issues as smoking cessation, weight loss, necessary follow-
ups, etc. Patients in need of pre-surgery physiotherapy are evaluated by the clinic’s 
physiotherapist. If they need to be seen by an occupational therapist because their set-
up at home is insufficient, the occupational therapist will evaluate their situation at 
home. Once all these evaluations are completed, patients are re-evaluated by the 
surgeon to see if they are ready for surgery.  
I’m one of the two case managers, which means I deal with patients coming in to be looked at 
in regards to having a […] total hip or total knee replacement surgery. We also follow up on 
post-op patients. And also patients who come in who are deemed non-surgical, we try to 
manage their care for them as well. (I.3.3.) 
 
Some of them would have weak thigh muscles from the osteoarthritis, so they really don’t 
need surgery, their symptoms are more related to their weak muscles… so then we would 
refer them to a physiotherapist, or sometimes I’ll get in the room and you can tell by their x-
rays that they may be a candidate for a brace. So we even try to help the non-surgical 
candidates. (I.3.5.) 
 
As previously mentioned, the team uses an IT system to do the booking and 
registration of the referrals, PHS. They also use a discharge abstract database 
containing retrospective data about patients’ LOS based on the type of patient they 
were in order to map every patient who has come through the hospital. They do not, 
however, have an electronic patient health record.  
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The manager of the assessment clinic reports the important data to the 
provincial department of health to justify their funding on a regular basis. In fact, 
being able to monitor wait time 1 and wait time 2 data has allowed the team to justify 
why they have long wait times for hip and knee surgeries and that they need more 
funding, whereas they were not able to do that six or seven years ago. This data is 
extracted from the hospital’s internal database on the number of visits and the types 
of referrals they get. The quarterly reports that go to the director of the orthopaedics 
program are also sent to the government and contain information on how many joint 
surgeries have been performed to date, on wait time 1, wait time 2, volume coming 
out of the assessment clinic, and so on.  
My role is to oversee the assessment clinic, the operation and the management of the 
assessment clinic, and report our wait times to the Department of Health […]. So I collect 
data both from our database, our internal database, on the number of visits and the type of 
referrals that we get, whether it’s the next available surgeon, or whether they’re directly 
referred to a particular surgeon, and I tally the data and do a quarterly report to my director, 
which also then goes on to the Department of Health for their reporting structure and funding 
and all of that. (I.3.2.) 
 
Both she and I provide the quarterly report to the government on where we are with joint 
surgery, wait time 1, wait time 2, what’s our volume coming out of our orthopaedic 
assessment clinic… (I.3.4.) 
 
Once patients have been discharged from the hospital, they come back to the 
assessment clinic for follow-up, usually three months after their surgery and then one 
year after surgery. According to a few interviewees, surgeons disagree as to what the 
frequency of follow-ups should be. Presently, surgeons tell their own patients when 
they expect to see them after their surgery. During these follow-up appointments, 
care is provided by a physiotherapist followed by the surgeon. Ultimately, the goal is 
to have the patient cared for solely by a physiotherapist. According to a few 
interviewees, this follow-up care has taken a lot of the surgeons’ time that would be 
better used for evaluating patients for surgical candidacy assessments.  
We’re working towards a physiotherapy-based follow-up model for certain patients because 
right now it’s difficult with the number of return visits being seen by the surgeon. Their time 
is being spent on that, when it could be spent on assessments, deeming people surgical or 
non-surgical. (I.3.2.) 
 
One interviewee stated that the care pathway offered a more standardized 
approach to care. Professionals and patients seem to be better aligned in their 
understanding of the processes and each other’s expectations. Indeed, patients have 
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expectations of the healthcare professionals, but the professionals also have 
expectations of their patients, and the pathway allows both parties to know each 
other’s expectations, thus facilitating a smoother transition during the patient’s 
hospital stay until discharge. 
In fact, satisfaction evaluations were done with patients who had been seen at 
the assessment centre, which revealed that patients are generally satisfied with the 
services. One interviewee mentioned that this satisfaction stems from the fact that 
they are seen within 90 days of their referral and that they get more attention from the 
case managers, who take the time to do a complete health history, better discharge 
plan and follow-up. 
They come up to the floor, to the unit, after surgery. The process has already begun, the 
plan’s already in place, we know where they’re discharging to. Through this process we’ve 
been able to get [that], whereas before, if they went to an individual surgeon’s office, they 
talked to the surgeon, the surgeon could say, “Yeah, you could stay for as long as you want,” 
or the other surgeon might say, “No, you’re here for three days,” or “No, we’ll send you to 
[…] our sort of care program or rehab.” We had eight different stories before, and now 
we’re all getting the same story, and it’s easier for the […] in-hospital care because of this 
process. (I.3.2.) 
 
The patients quite like it because it’s more comprehensive… with the nurses now involved, 
whereas the surgeons didn’t have the nurses involved in this process before. So they’re 
getting an improved health history, they’re getting a better discharge plan, they’re getting the 
physiotherapy follow-up… whereas before they didn’t have that at all. They would have a 
five-minute visit in the clinic, “Yep, you’re good for surgery, sign you up…,” and that’s it. 
(I.3.2.) 
 
Because the model of care had been implemented a few years ago and 
because most participants think it is working out well, most interviewees felt the wait 
time strategy was in its sustainability phase. One interviewee observed that the 
process needed to be tweaked periodically to sustain it, but that the team had been in 
full-blown activity for the past three few years, since the initiative was first 
implemented. Furthermore, the team has recently expanded their model of care to 
other areas of care, such as spinal surgery.  
I’d say it’s at the sustainability phase. I think it has to be tweaked periodically.  I think you 
have to look at what it is you’re doing and, can you modify this, or change that…. I think it’s 
a process that is evolving, but […] we’re in the full blown activity of this clinic. The 
implementation took place three years ago, so we’re… in full tilt. (I.3.1.) 
 
We’ve actually taken this model and we’re doing it for spine now. We’re going to combine 
the orthopaedic spine and the neurospine for the lumbar spine surgeries and… assess them 
the same way, do all the referrals the same way… Now they’re seeing an orthopaedic 
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surgeon or a neurosurgeon for their issue, but they’ll have a common pathway when it comes 
to the unit. (I.3.2.) 
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Table 5 
Organizational factors that impact WTMS success and sustainability 
Organizational Governance -­‐ Moderate managerial leadership 
from surgical services director + -­‐ Lack of involvement from upper 
management: CEO/VP  -­‐ Inter-organizational partnerships: 
ambulatory orthopaedic unit  
 
Organizational Resources -­‐ Lack of unit or team incentives: peer 
pressure -­‐ Inefficiencies in the OR -­‐ Inadequate capacity: assessment 
clinic space, orthopaedic unit beds  -­‐ Fluctuating staff shortage: 
anaesthesiologists, nurses 
 
Organizational Culture -­‐ Clinical leadership + 
       (one champion surgeon) -­‐ Physician buy-in very difficult -­‐ Lack of trust between surgeons and 
staff -­‐ Generational gap between younger 
and older surgeons  -­‐ Retirement to change culture -­‐ ‘Work to live and don’t live to work’ 
culture -­‐ Negative subculture between 
surgeons and nurses 
Organizational Tools -­‐ Information technology system: PHS 
(possible to do the booking and 
registration of the referrals) -­‐ Hip and knee pathway with clinical 
case managers -­‐ Wait time reporting to the 
department of health -­‐ Perception of being in the 
sustainability phase of the strategy -­‐ Expansion of model of the care to 
spinal surgery 
 
Table 6 
Contextual factors that impact WTMS success and sustainability 
Contextual Governance -­‐ Accountability at a high level: 
audited by Auditor General -­‐ High level coordinating, reporting, 
monitoring structures -­‐ Stakeholder engagement: Ministry 
of health, Bone and Joint Canada, 
Red Cross 
Contextual Resources -­‐ Funding levels provided by the 
government -­‐ Incremental funding for hip and 
knee surgeries -­‐ Increased OR time out of 
neighbouring hospital -­‐ Tension with Dept. of Health about 
year-by-year funding 
 
Contextual Culture  -­‐ Public awareness perceived as a 
negative factor -­‐ Consultation with front-line actors 
has improved over time -­‐ Canada’s healthcare system not 
efficient  
Contextual Tools -­‐ Absence of standards and guidelines  -­‐ Public website makes wait time data 
available -­‐ Collection and reporting of data 
effectively done by director of 
surgical services -­‐ Central registry: data inaccurate 
 
  In the end, it is possible to mention a few elements that characterize the case.  
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  First, the strategy was initiated at the request of the Ministry. At the hospital 
level, few people, including the surgical services manager and one orthopaedic 
surgeon, exercised strong management and leadership in developing the initiative and 
sustaining the change. What lacked was the support from the rest of the team of 
professionals, which took a long time to obtain, and is still a working progress. What 
is also noticeable is the important generational gap between older surgeons and 
younger ones. The group mentality seems to be one of ‘work to live’ instead of ‘live 
to work’. Moreover, there has been no involvement from the CEO for this strategy.  
  The funding they received by the Ministry helped the team renovate the space 
for the assessment clinic and bring on the appropriate team members and to do more 
orthopaedic surgeries. They decided to hire clinical case managers instead of APPs in 
order for patients to be assessed at the assessment clinic. The use of a clinical 
pathway has greatly facilitated the continuity of care for health providers. However, 
the lack of consensus among surgeons regarding the clinical guidelines for choosing 
surgical candidates makes it impossible to standardize care or to control the volume 
of patients that are to receive a surgery. This situation has been added to the already 
lacking capacity in regard to operating room time and available post-operative beds. 
Even if this is a teaching hospital that offers medical and surgical care to the 
population, they are also the trauma center for the entire region. The orthopaedic 
surgeons share OR time with many other specialties and often have to ‘fight’ for their 
surgical time.  Moreover, they have had to deal with nursing and anaesthesiologist 
shortages as well as numerous post-operative beds occupied by patients waiting for 
long-term care placement. However, what has helped them is the arrangement they 
have with a neighbouring hospital to do an additional 500 arthroscopy procedures 
there.  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 11 - DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
AND POLICY-MAKING 
 
This chapter is presented in two parts: discussion and recommendations. In 
the discussion part, we first examine which organizational and contextual factors may 
explain the differences between the three case studies. Second, we take a closer look 
at which factors enhance WTMS’ capacity of being sustainable in reducing surgical 
wait times. Finally, we examine whether the factors essential for the implementation 
of the WTMS are different from those required for its sustainability. In our 
recommendations, we focus on three levels: the hospital decision-maker level, 
managers at the contextual level and the organizational level.  
11.1 Discussion 
11.1.1 Factors that differentiate the three cases from one another 
First, we look at the factors that may explain why the cases are so different 
from one another.  
With regard to Case 2, the team showed an incredible amount of dedication 
and leadership in developing and managing the WTMS. From the thought process to 
the implementation, and to its evaluation, decisions were made to assess how it 
would impact the work processes and the people responsible for it. To do this, they 
used the PDSA cycles of change as well as the PEPPA methodology to guide their 
work and to create a framework to get the initiative off the ground. As Perla, 
Bradbury & Gunther-Murphy (2011) explain, it is important not only to have a clear 
vision as to what the initiative should consist of, but also to set objectives and to turn 
high-level strategy into specific goals with real deadlines (Ganz, 2008; Perla et al., 
2011). Many authors reiterate the importance of planning out the strategy with such 
tools as the PDSA cycles of change in order to adapt implementation to reflect the 
local culture and practice (Gardner et al., 2010; Perla et al., 2011). This highlights the 
need to make complex interventions simple 
106 
 
 
 
and manageable to avoid being overwhelmed by their scale (ExpandNet, 2009; 
McCannon et al., 2007; Perla et al., 2011).  
Thus, one orthopaedic surgeon exercised an incredible amount of leadership 
by promoting change among his teammates and by showing them the benefits of 
having an APP model-based care in his own practice. He subsequently motivated his 
colleagues to become leaders as well. According to Perla et al. (2011), strong 
leadership is consistently referred to in the literature as a key factor in scale-up and 
spread. There is extensive literature about the role of these so-called champion 
change agents who exercise a positive influence and model new behaviour 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Rogers, 2003). Furthermore, the good collaboration 
between this surgeon and the APP as well as the director of operations confirms that 
decision-making/clinical teamwork can create synergy between topic experts, process 
owners, and ultimately, stakeholders (Deming, 1986). 
Another important factor that contributed greatly to the success of the 
implementation and the overall sustainability of this initiative was the stable culture 
that persisted, based on trust and innovation. The fact that the team realized this early 
on was helpful for them. In fact, Gardner et al. (2010) point out that positive cultural 
characteristics include enablement of cross-functional team-work, support for pooled 
knowledge, creation of an urgent need to innovate, and sustained focus on the 
change. All these cultural factors seemed to be present among the team.  
One last crucial factor in this case was related to resources. Countless authors 
mention how important it is to have consistent and adequate financial, infrastructure, 
human and informational resources to implement and sustain an initiative. Case 2 had 
had the good fortune of being in a satellite hospital centre entirely dedicated to hip 
and knee care, including their own rehabilitation unit. Thus, they had the opportunity 
to develop unprecedented expertise in the domain because their context allowed them 
to do so. However, the fact that almost everyone in the team had been working there 
for more than 10 years raises the question of who will take over these positions when 
members of the present team retire, to sustain the expertise. 
With regard to Case 1, although the physician buy-in was not as easy in this 
case as it was in Case 2, it was present to some degree. However, the orthopaedic 
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surgeons felt they had authority over the entire team of healthcare professionals, 
which essentially meant that they would not do anything unless there was something 
in it for them. In that sense, the medical leadership was generally lacking. This 
caused frequent tensions and the development of subcultures among the team before 
the director’s arrival. We strongly suspected that this behaviour reflected a lack of 
trust between surgeons and other professionals in the team. As Davies & Mannion 
(1999) explain, trust arises when a number of conditions hold: when there is a 
relationship of interdependence and obligation between two parties; when there is 
uncertainty about the courses of action that may be taken; and when there is a 
deliberate decision to believe that obligations will be fulfilled.  
Due to his non-clinical background, the director of surgical services had a 
neutralizing effect that helped the team sort out their differences and brought the 
group closer together, and this in turn created a more cohesive, trusting group. As an 
accountant, he was often able to use his financial background to demonstrate whether 
a change was possible from a managerial standpoint, but he also asked nurses and 
surgeons whether what he wanted to implement was feasible from a clinical 
standpoint. In that regard, there was a high level of clinical governance between the 
managers and the surgeons, as well as a sense of collaboration that developed over 
time. Matrix (2003) points out that managers of large-scale change must link changes 
to policy and organizational priorities on an ongoing basis (Matrix, 2003). According 
to ExpandNet (2009), conventional project management is an important resource for 
local change efforts, though large-scale initiatives in healthcare may require a more 
diverse and flexible skill set. The fact that this director was an accountant and not a 
clinician had a positive effect, in our view, on the overall change that occurred in the 
program.  
With regard to Case 3, physician buy-in was difficult at the beginning of the 
implementation and remained so throughout, contrary to Cases 1 and 2. 
Consequently, the organizational culture was quite negative. Also, it was exacerbated 
by the generation gap between older, more cynical surgeons and younger, more 
innovative surgeons. As was mentioned in our literature review section, physicians’ 
involvement in the strategy impacts its success. As we can see, it can also impact the 
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sustainability of the strategy. Overall, this negative culture prevented the team from 
having positive incentives for wanting to be part of the strategy and taking an active 
role in it. Although the doctors would benefit most from the strategy, namely by 
increasing the amount of surgeries they do to reduce wait lists, even the other 
healthcare professionals sometimes refused to take part because that engagement was 
not rewarded financially for them.  
The fact that the orthopaedic surgeons still had not bought into the initiative 
and seen the true benefits of implementing a WTMS perhaps explains, in part, why 
there were no clear guidelines and standards as to which patients should be operated 
on and what their follow-up should be post-operatively. Perhaps fewer patients would 
really require hip or knee surgery if all surgeons accepted the same type of patients as 
candidates. However, this was not the case at the time of our visit, because there was 
no consensus among surgeons. This might partly explain why the team was unable to 
reduce wait time 2. As mentioned earlier, the establishment of clear guidelines and 
standards increases the chances of success for a WTMS. 
Lastly, there were major problems with OR efficiencies and bed management 
at this site. While Case 2’s ORs and physical space were entirely dedicated to hip and 
knee surgery, this was not the situation for Case 3. In fact, one surgeon kept trying to 
promote an increase in the daily number of joint surgeries done. On the other hand, 
one-third of their surgical beds were occupied by patients waiting for placement in 
long-term care. To add to these difficulties, orthopaedic surgeons had to constantly 
fight for OR time in competition with cardiac, spine and trauma surgeons, who had 
priority in the OR for their cases. Lack of resources, once again, could partly explain 
why Case 3’s strategy was not as successful as the others. In fact, in the literature, 
capacity constraints, both in the OR and for post-surgery beds (Ham et al., 2003; 
Tandon et al., 2005) were found to hinder the implementation of WTMS, as 
mentioned in our literature review section. 
11.1.2 Factors that ensure WTMS sustainability  
We were able to observe certain factors that emerged as being able to 
guarantee the sustainability of a WTMS. In fact, the orthopaedic surgeons’ leadership 
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and involvement in the strategy seemed to be a very distinct factor, as mentioned in 
the first part of the discussion as well as in our literature review (Botten et al., 2004; 
Cromwell & Mays, 1999; Gauld & Derrett, 2000; Ham et al., 2003; Hanning, 1996; 
Hanning & Spangberg, 2000; Hefford & Holmes, 1999; Leach et al., 2004; 
Lundstrom et al., 1996; Maddison et al., 2004; McLeod et al., 2003; Ramchandani et 
al., 2002). Because orthopaedic surgeons are so independent, the team needs their 
approval before really being able to start the change process and to sustain it 
(Cromwell & Mays, 1999). Indeed, orthopaedic surgeons need to buy-in to the 
initiative and fully engage in it, as has been shown in the literature (Lélé, 1991). 
Furthermore, there was usually one surgeon champion in each case that tried to instil 
a feeling of urgency to change among his colleagues and to entice other surgeons to 
become leaders. This has often been a necessary step for change initiatives to be 
successful and, ultimately, sustainable (Doppelt, 2003; Pinto & Covin, 1989; Kotter, 
2008).  
In that regard, a strong team spirit and culture are essential components for 
the sustainability of the wait time initiative. In our literature review, Doppelt (2003) 
explained that sustainability visions and strategies become internalized as individuals 
consider what these changes will mean to them personally. As we were able to see in 
our case studies, the teams that were more cohesive and proactive saw the benefit of 
being engaged in the strategy, not only on an individual level but also on a team 
level.  
Another critical factor is being assured of recurring funding for wait time 
reduction initiatives and having the proper resources at the organizational level. 
Having a clear idea of what the funding is going to be for the year allows the team to 
better plan their upcoming workload and the required resources. According to 
Greenhalgh et al. (2004), it seems that dedicated and consistent funding for the 
strategy increase the chances for it to be not only adopted but also sustained over 
time. In fact, this was a problem that each of the three cases had encountered since 
the implementation of their strategy. It seems these WTMS were implemented at a 
time coinciding with budget reductions in the healthcare system. Unfortunately, these 
budget constraints are one of the causes of wait times. Thus, while the system makes 
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exceptions for certain politically sensitive areas of care that are being specifically 
funded (hip and knee surgeries), these can also cause perverse effects for other areas 
of care.  
On another note, a positive relationship with the Health Ministry authorities 
(LHIN, Department of Health) was shown to be an important factor for WTMS 
sustainability. Apparently, the more cohesive the relationships, the better the 
outcomes. We believe the process of collaboration between clinicians and managers 
helps solidify this relationship. If managers of the LHIN or the provincial Department 
of Health are able to understand the micro-challenges clinicians face on a daily basis, 
they can be better managers and overall advocates for the hospital’s needs. In fact, 
the case studies showed that having many occasions to communicate with these 
contextual level organizations helped managers and clinicians at the organizational 
level to have a better grasp on things. The key is to align the objectives of the 
contextual level with those of the organizational level in order to have realistic and 
satisfactory outcomes for both parties. For example, the LHIN needs to be aware that 
announcing different funding levels from one year to the next can impact the work 
processes at the hospital level. The LHIN needs to take into account the hospital’s 
needs and capacity for surgery and inform the hospital of the possible budget for the 
following fiscal year so that the hospital can better plan the upcoming year.   
 Through this study, we were able to identify a case that had been stable and 
sustainable in reducing its wait time 2 for hip and knee surgeries. As mentioned in 
the first part of the discussion, we believe that having an exclusive mandate to do 
only hip and knee replacement surgery greatly helps hospitals sustain their effort to 
reduce wait times. We are conscious that this hospital factory model seems attractive 
only in the context of super-specialized surgery. Having a motivated staff that is not 
distracted by other concerns is beneficial and possible in this context. However, in 
Case 2, patients were actually selected for simple surgeries and presented little risk of 
complications. Case 2 essentially cherry-picks its surgical cases in order to operate 
only on low-risk individuals, and therefore sends other patients with higher surgical 
risk and co-morbidities to be operated on in nearby hospitals. This is the opposite of 
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Case 3, whose orthopaedic surgeons, not being in a single-focused centre, have to 
compete with other surgeons for OR time. 
 Sustainability is a concept in which it is implied that services are rendered to 
the population without causing too many unintended consequences on the 
organizational and contextual levels. Therefore, can we really consider Case 2 as 
being a sustainable case? Case 2 has been stable in maintaining their wait times for 
hip and knee surgery below the national benchmark. However, to be sure it is a 
sustainable case, it would be important to assess the unintended consequences the 
program has had in other regional HCOs (referral to regional hospitals of more 
complex cases with multiple co-morbidities, for example).  
11.1.3 Factors necessary for WTMS implementation versus those necessary for 
its sustainability 
We thought it would be interesting to examine whether the factors necessary 
for the implementation of a WTMS were the same as, or different from, those 
required to sustain an initiative over time. According to Pomey et al. (2009), the 
factors that improve the implementation of WTMS are: 1) greater alignment across 
HCOs; 2) increased and strategic communications among stakeholders; 3) strong data 
at the organizational as well as contextual levels; 4) clinical and administrative 
champion-partners; 5) clear articulation of the value proposition for WTMS; 6) 
patient engagement; 7) health system trade-offs and patient options; 8) incentives for 
clinicians; 9) leadership from the payers (ministries of health); and 10) expectations 
management.   
Although a lot of these factors are favourable to an initiative, they interact 
with different levels of impact on the sustainability of the WTMS.  
While it is beneficial for HCOs to learn from the ones that have put in place 
successful strategies, this doesn’t mean that the HCOs who try to copy the successful 
one will be as successful with their own strategy. That is the first difference we 
noted.  
Second, we agree communication between the organizational level and the 
contextual level needs to be positive. However, that communication needs to evolve 
into something deeper. In fact, there needs to be a good level of collaboration 
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between these parties in order for the objectives to be aligned for both of them. From 
the outset of the strategy, communication needs to be positive and the contextual 
level needs to fully support the hospital at every step of the strategy.   
Although the collection and standardization of data makes it easier for both 
the contextual and organizational levels to keep track of their progress, it  doesn’t 
seem to be a critical factor for WTMS sustainability in our case studies. Also, we 
strongly agree that information technology only helps a change initiative spread in a 
hospital if the proper culture is in place to support that initiative (Green & Plsek, 
2002; Jha et al., 2003). 
We agree that a partnership between clinicians and administrators is 
important. Indeed, it is essential for physicians to be involved in the strategy from the 
outset, but as we saw in our case studies, it is crucial that one surgeon become the 
champion to entice his colleagues into a shared leadership. Therefore, while it is 
essential to have clinical and administrative champions, to sustain the initiative 
everyone needs to be involved. Thus, people need to feel there is something in it for 
them. It is essential to observe who seems to be resisting to the change and question 
them about their preoccupations and worries. This helps include everyone in the 
initiative and turn those resisters into collaborators (Bareil, 2010).  
With regard to patient engagement, it does not seem to have any impact on 
being able to sustain an initiative. Nor do we believe that telling people about the 
health system trade-offs and patient options has any impact, either.  
Although it is important to establish incentives, it doesn’t seem to be a 
significant factor for surgeons, as they are paid on a fee-for-service basis. However, 
doing so for nurses, physiotherapists and other support staff can only motivate them 
more in terms of their involvement in the strategy, although it is not essential for 
sustainability. What is necessary is that everyone involved believes it will eventually 
relieve workplace pressures (Bradley et al., 2004).  
Lastly, having to “manage expectations” may not be essential in order to 
sustain the initiative. As previously mentioned, a carefully and strategically planned 
change initiative should encounter no surprises in terms of the deliverables or the 
limitations of the WTMS being implemented.  
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On that note, it is important to ask how to determine whether a WTMS is in 
its implementation or its sustainability phase. According to Slaghuis, Strating, Bal 
and Nieber (2011), sustainability can be seen as a dynamic process in which actors in 
a targeted work practice develop and/or adapt the organizational routines to a new 
work method (p. 4). We need to evaluate whether a team is able to reach routinization 
before they can even consider the institutionalization phase. Those two dimensions 
conceptualize sustainability, according to these authors. In turn, they define a work 
routine as a monotonous, distinguishable pattern of associated actions, carried out by 
numerous actors. Therefore, if the factors we have presented facilitate WTMS 
sustainability, then it is reasonable to assume that these factors need to be constant 
over time, for the routinization and institutionalization processes to develop in a 
given workplace. Institutionalization is the gradual adaptation of the organizational 
context, including structures and processes, to the new work practice (Slaghuis et al., 
2011, p. 5). Doppelt (2003) adds that communicating the need, vision, and strategies 
for achieving sustainability is essential. 
By deduction, a team that is incapable of routinizing their work because of a 
poor culture, lack of resources or a low level of physician buy-in, is necessarily still 
in its implementation phase and therefore cannot achieve the institutionalization of 
work processes. This can also explain why the team would be unable to achieve a 
consistent reduction in wait times for hip and knee surgeries.  
11.2 Recommendations 
We think it is possible to draw important lessons from this study with respect to 
practice and decision-making. Therefore, we offer recommendations at three levels: 
the hospital decision-makers’ level, managers at the contextual level, and the 
organizational level. 
11.2.1 Decision-Makers’ Level: 
- The funding should be recurrent from one year to the next, and the hospital 
receiving funding should be informed of the amount in advance. A short-term 
policy with a non-recurrent funding is not a long-term solution. That level of 
incertitude does not allow the hospital to plan appropriately.  
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- The increase in surgical volume should ideally lead not only to increased 
income for surgeons but to an additional amount of money for the team. The 
team along with the surgeons should then decide how best to utilize that pool 
of money in order to improve work processes.  
- It is essential for decision-makers to have an idea of what the impact could be 
of increasing the surgical volume in one area of care without doing so for 
other areas.  
- It is important to highlight projects that are successful in order to allow other 
areas of care to learn from them.  
- It is important to realize that wait time data is more important for healthcare 
managers and surgeons than it is for patients, because these professionals can 
better strategize their work with this data. 
11.2.2 Managers at the Contextual Level: 
- It is important for managers at the contextual level to have a good working 
relationship with the HCOs and to be sensitive to the realities encountered at 
the organizational level when it comes time to establishing objectives. For 
example, funding an increase in surgical volume does not necessarily lead to a 
reduction in wait time for those surgeries.  
- It is important to encourage good communication between the organizational 
and contextual organizations so they can learn from one another. This 
communication should not be limited only to the reporting of wait time data 
and performance indicators.  
- It is important to be supportive of innovations done at the organizational level 
and to be proactive about them. An example of this is the implementation of 
the APP role.  
11.2.3 Organizational Level:  
- Surgeons should be involved in the strategy and engage others to develop a 
shared leadership. 
- Healthcare managers should be involved in the initiative, regardless of their 
academic background. For example, the director of surgical services in Case 1 
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was very proactive and respected by the team of healthcare professionals 
despite not having a clinical background.  
- The financial resources obtained from the increased workload in the OR 
should be redistributed so that it benefits not only the surgeons but also the 
rest of the staff.  
- Managers at the organizational level should better predict the effects prior to 
increasing the orthopaedic team’s surgical volume and then assess them 
afterward.  
- It would be useful to incorporate the WTMS into an accreditation process in 
order to have indicators that follow the positive and negative impacts of these 
strategies. 
- Managers at the organizational level should be more vigilant with regard to 
the unintended consequences of one WTMS on other surgeries, as well as on 
the demands of other surgeons and healthcare professionals from those other 
areas of care.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 12 - CASE STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Like any other research study, certain elements need to be present to establish 
the quality of the case studies. The four most common tests are reliability, construct 
validity, internal validity and external validity. In the first section of this chapter, we 
discuss each of them in detail. In the second part, we offer suggestions for future 
studies.  
12.1 Common Limitations 
12.1.1 Reliability 
In order for the study to be considered reliable, the researcher must be able to 
confirm that the data collection procedures can be repeated with the same results. 
This can be achieved by developing a case study protocol, which was done in this 
case. Additional steps were taken throughout this study to ensure the collection of 
data was reliable. The following steps were taken to ensure reliability:  
Overall  
• There is an adequate level of internal consistency, since we used the same 
version of the interview guide for all study sites of the research study.  
• Similar interview questions have been asked in other studies, mainly on the 
implementation process of a change initiative. Therefore, the questions are 
robust.  
• We tested the questionnaire on two healthcare professionals before using it 
for our case study participants.  
Qualitative Data 
• Each interview transcript was reviewed and corrected if necessary in order to 
increase accuracy.  
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• All the notes taken during the on-site visits were compared to the transcripts 
to make sure nothing was left out and to make sure it was all consistent.  
12.1.2 Construct Validity  
Construct validity establishes a relation between a theoretical concept and a 
precise measuring device. It is essential to establish operational measures for the 
concept being focused on in the study. Construct validity can be difficult to achieve 
in case studies. Yin (2002) suggests using various sources of evidence, establishing a 
chain of facts and having a draft case study report reviewed by the study’s 
participants.   
In our case, multiple sources of evidence were used to link certain findings 
related to changes occurring within the HCOs internally and externally. Triangulation 
was done using the theoretical framework and the multiple sources of data such as 
internal documents and the qualitative data received, which resulted in a chain of 
evidence. Also, to compensate for any possible bias, once the interviews were 
completed for the three case studies, the results were shared with the participants in 
the study in order for them to confirm that all the information collected was correct 
and that the draft case study report reflected the reality. 
12.1.3 Internal Validity  
The study’s results must be shown to be internally valid. This involves 
measuring how well one can conclude that the changes occurring to the dependant 
variable were produced by the independent variable and not by other, external, 
factors. Internal validity has been proven in these case studies when conclusions are 
drawn in regard to the changes that occurred after the implementation of the specific 
initiative in each of the three sites. As with construct validity, using the triangulation 
technique allowed us to ensure internal validity of a case study because links have 
been made among the results. Triangulation rarely produced contradictory responses, 
increasing internal validity. 
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12.1.4 External Validity 
External validity refers to how well the study’s results can be generalized to other 
contexts and settings. Each case study was different, based on the classification we 
established: sustainable, moderately sustainable and unsustainable. Two of those 
three cases were located in Ontario. These elements could be perceived as limits to 
generalizability. As well, the sustainability factors identified were specific to the 
contexts of the three case studies, which in itself produces limitations. Therefore, 
these factors are particular to the cases and do not necessarily offer a framework that 
can be applied in every HCO. Although this limits the external validity, this reflects 
great internal validity.  
12.1.5 Qualitative Data Limitations 
There are limitations in the qualitative data we collected. First, it was not 
always easy to distinguish the actual WTMS from the organizational and contextual 
factors that impacted it. For example, one aspect of the strategy was the incremental 
funding received for hip and knee surgeries, which is also a contextual resource. 
Additionally, it would have been better to start collecting wait time data from the 
start of the implementation process for each of the three cases instead of choosing a 
random period, as was done in this study: April 2009-September 2010.  
More positively, given that this work is of a qualitative nature and involves 
participants’ perceptions of the WTMS in place in their HCO, we validated the 
information provided to us by the participants with objective data sources. This 
allows us to say that the quality of this data is good.  
12.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
The results reported in these three case studies suggest a promising avenue for 
future research. Referring to Warren’s (2012) study that focused on developing a 
checklist of factors that facilitate the implementation process of a WTMS, it would 
be interesting to develop a similar tool for factors that help sustain a WTMS. This 
would require creating a work group to build the tool and test it. This can also be 
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useful for helping policy-makers understand the challenges faced by the HCOs when 
it comes to sustaining their initiative. 
It would be interesting to conduct a study that also takes into consideration wait 
time 1, from referral to consultation with an orthopaedic surgeon, as opposed to only 
wait time 2, from consultation with the surgeon to surgery, as was done in this study. 
It could be useful to send out a questionnaire to all the settings doing HKR 
surgeries to assess the challenges they have had to overcome to sustain their strategy 
and to find out whether they have been using the same tools. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 13 - CONCLUSION 
This study has helped to reduce the knowledge gap between what factors help in 
implementing a change initiative and the ones that help to sustain it. Although it is 
important to promote WTMSs, it is crucial that these initiatives offer more mid- and 
long-term results without causing unintended consequences on other areas of care 
within the HCO and in other HCOs in the region. It is also essential to take into 
account the opinions of the healthcare providers involved in other areas of care. With 
regard to unintended consequences, it is important to consider these when assessing 
whether a WTMS is truly successful and sustainable. Although the purpose of this 
particular study was not to explore the unintended consequences of the WTMS, there 
is another study within this overall research project that will specifically focus on 
these effects of WTMSs.  
In the context of our study, the most important factors that were seen to support 
the sustainability of WTMS are:  
- exclusive mandate to do only hip and knee replacement surgery; 
- motivated staff who were not distracted by other concerns;  
- strong team spirit. 
Other important factors included having recurrent funding for hip and knee surgeries 
from one year to the next, strong leadership shared by all orthopaedic surgeons, and 
positive collaboration between the hospital and the LHIN or Department of Health, 
which were present in all three cases to varying degrees. This gradient of factors 
found among the three cases reinforces the robustness of the study’s results. In fact, 
the two least sustainable cases studied had to contend with a medical culture that was 
less homogeneous and less focused on meeting targets, resources that were dispersed, 
and unclear inter-organizational policy. Therefore, while the hospital factory model 
might seem attractive in the context of super-specialized surgery, patients are 
selected for simple surgeries, with little risk of complications, and so this cannot be 
considered a best practice model for others to emulate. 
121 
 
 
 
Altogether, the information collected for these three case studies supports the 
questions formulated prior to the start of this study. The data collected confirm that 
there are some WTMS for TJR that have had more success in reducing wait times 
than others and have been sustainable in doing so over time. This work also 
highlights specific advice for decision-makers, who need to be aware of the 
challenges HCOs face in attempting to achieve federal, provincial and territorial 
objectives with regard to wait time reduction for specialized healthcare services.  
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Appendix 1: Theoretical Framework 
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Appendix 2: Semi-directed interview guide: Interviews with 
people involved in wait time management for HKR in 
Regional Health Authorities and Hospitals or Clinics 
 
Background 
Objectives of the study 
- To validate the results of the wait time management strategy (WTMS) 
- To understand the factors that enhance or inhibit the implementation and the 
sustainability of WTMS for total joint replacement surgeries in Canadian 
provinces in order to reduce waiting times to the times targeted by 
provincial/regional and federal authorities (6 months or less) 
- To identify factors that could apply to other organizations 
- To identify the impact of WTM strategies for total joint replacement surgery on 
other programs in healthcare organizations 
- To look at the side effects of WTM strategies at the organizational level or other 
levels (e.g., primary care) within the healthcare system  
 
Who will be interviewed in each site:   
- The medical director 
- The director of operations 
- The orthopaedic OR chief officer Other orthopaedic surgeons and high-volume 
surgeons 
- Health professionals involved in triage or initial assessment 
- Health professionals involved in post-operative care for HKR patients 
- The person responsible for surgical bookings 
 
Information and documents to be sent before the meeting 
- Wait times between the decision to treat and surgery over the last 18 months or 
longer 
- Report on the WTMS if available 
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- The organizational diagram  
- Etc. 
 
Interview guide 
Background 
1. When did you start working in healthcare? 
2. What is your educational/professional background? 
3. What organization and sector do you work in? 
4. What are your title and your functions? 
5. What is your role in WTM strategies for total joint replacement surgeries? 
 
WTM Strategy 
1. Can you describe the strategy that was implemented in your organization to 
reduce wait times for HKR? 
a. How did the strategy originate? Did it start out as a provincial, a 
regional or a local initiative? 
b. In what context was the strategy implemented?  
c. At the time that the strategy was implemented, what were the major 
causes of the problem? Examples: inadequate resources, a lack of 
coordination, a lack of governance at the provincial/regional/local 
level, a lack of leadership, the wrong management tools 
d. What were the motivations for fixing the problem?  
e. Has the WTM strategy changed from its beginnings to now? 
(for the interviewer: description of the WTMS and classification of the means used to 
reduce wait times) 
 
2. Can you validate the impact of the strategy on the waiting time between the 
decision to treat and surgery?  
(For the interviewer: statistics that we have collected and statistics that we have asked 
of the WTM coordinator) 
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3. What would you consider a successful WTM strategy? Would you 
characterize this initiative as a sustainable strategy, a moderately sustainable 
strategy, or a strategy that should be improved? Why? 
(For the interviewer: our own definition to discuss with the interviewee) 
 
4. How do you personally define a sustainable WTM strategy? 
(For the interviewer: our own definition to discuss with the interviewee) 
 
Implementation phase 
1. When did the strategy’s implementation process begin? 
2. What time frame do you feel corresponds to the implementation phase? Are 
we still in that phase? 
3. What factors enhanced or inhibited the implementation phase? 
a. What governance factors? 
i. Were the Board and the CEO involved in designing and 
implementing the WTM strategy?  
ii. Who was responsible for the implementation of the strategy? 
iii. Were/are you involved at the project’s implementation phase? 
If so, how? 
iv. What type of governance measures were put in place for 
implementing the strategy? (special committees, etc.) 
b. What cultural factors? 
i. How would you categorize the culture of this organization? 
(hierarchical / rational / group / developmental) 
ii. Were physicians involved from the beginning? 
iii. What were physicians’ roles and responsibilities regarding the 
initiative? 
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c. What resource factors? 
i. Were specific resources dedicated to the project: human, 
financial, infrastructure, information resources?  
ii. In the implementation phase, did you have access to reliable 
information to help manage wait times? 
iii. Has the hospital conducted its own studies to measure the 
impact of WTM strategies on waiting times? Are reports 
available? 
d. What tool factors? 
i. Were specific tools or procedures used? 
ii. Did you use operational research, prioritization tools, an 
organizational care process, the patient pathway? 
 
Sustainability phase 
1. Were new conditions necessary to sustain this strategy? 
2. Did you receive resources earmarked for sustaining the initiative, either from 
outside or inside the organization? 
3. Did you have to change the governance of the WTM strategy in order to 
sustain the strategy?  
4. Did factors that affected the implementation process, change in the 
sustainability phase? 
5. Did you face challenges in maintaining the WTM strategy’s impact on 
waiting times? 
a. If so, what did those challenges lead to?  
i. E.g.: a difficulty to maintain motivation around the strategy 
b. What challenges were identified? 
i. Inadequate resources, a lack of coordination, a lack of 
governance at the local/regional/provincial level… 
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Conclusion 
1. Reflecting on the helpful and unhelpful factors discussed here, which factors 
do you think were the most crucial to implementing and sustaining the WTM 
strategy in your organization? 
2. What do you think others could learn from your experience?  
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Appendix 3: Provincial wait time management strategies  
Quebec 
The Quebec Ministry of Health did not agree to a common benchmark of hip fracture 
repair within 48 hours of admission. Quebec decided to apply its own wait time 
management plan, in accordance with the goals, standards and criteria established by 
the relevant Quebec authorities. In September 2004, the premiers of Quebec and the 
other Canadian provinces signed a bilateral agreement entitled “Asymmetrical 
Federalism That Respects Quebec’s Jurisdiction”. This asymmetrical agreement 
allows for the existence of specific agreements and arrangements adapted to Quebec's 
specificity. The Public Administration Act adopted in 2000 suggested a new results-
oriented management method. Results are measured using indicators, which are 
crucial for this type of management, not only for the actual measurement of the 
results and performance assessment, but for making decisions, developing and 
reviewing the strategic plan and action plans, allocating resources, improving 
services and service provision methods and developing the organization as well 
(MSSS, 2005). 
 
This new management framework requires the Ministry to produce a multi-annual 
strategic plan, an annual expense management plan and an annual management 
report. 
 
The Ministère de la santé et des services sociaux (MSSS) signed management and 
accountability agreements during the summer of 2005 with its regional health 
agencies. 
Quebec has its own data collection tool, which is an exception from other provinces, 
for whom the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) accumulates data. 
The information system for access to specific specialized services, called SIMASS, 
makes it possible to track wait lists everywhere in Quebec and conformity with 
targets in each hospital. Therefore, data on wait times, number of patients who 
undergo surgery, and number of patients waiting for different interventions (hip 
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arthroplasty, knee arthroplasty, cataract surgery, and other outpatient and inpatient 
surgeries) are available for each region and hospital.  
The Health Commissioner is responsible for reporting to the Government of Quebec 
on Quebec's health system and does so in collaboration with CIHI. 
 
Funding made available by the Government of Canada was used by the Government 
of Quebec to implement its own plan for renewing Quebec's health system (MSSS, 
2005).  
 
However, Quebec agreed to do all hip and knee surgeries within six months for 
patients whose data have been entered into SIMASS since June 1, 2007 (MSSS, 
2005). If the wait time benchmark cannot be guaranteed, one of the following 
alternatives must be offered to the patient:  
• Being operated on by another surgeon at their hospital;  
• Being operated on by another surgeon at another hospital in their region;  
• Being operated on by another surgeon at another hospital outside their 
region.  
• Being operated on in a specialized medical centre (SMC, CMSA).  
In Quebec, a patient is seen by his GP, who refers the patient to an orthopaedic 
surgeon. The surgeon decides whether the patient is a surgical candidate, and if so, 
the patient is placed on the wait list, at day 0. The patient receives a letter confirming 
placement on the wait list and the phone number of the access coordinator. The 
patient receives a phone call within 30 days with a surgical date scheduled within six 
months. If the benchmark cannot be respected, the patient is offered other 
alternatives, as described above.  
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British Columbia 
In 2006, the British Columbia government (2010) provided funding to build a 
specialist centre to increase existing surgical capacity for hip and knee joint 
replacement (HKR) by 1,600 cases per year. In fact, the British Columbia Ministry of 
Health (BCMOH) announced a 60.5 million dollar WTMS. An investment of 21.8 
million dollars was made in each of the 2006/07 and 2007/08 financial years to 
finance the development and implementation of a provincial specialty resource 
surgical program. The ultimate goal was to achieve a wait time target of 26 weeks.  
 
British Columbia strives to create a more accountable approach to health care 
delivery through the elaboration of services plans, annual reports, publications, the 
BC progress Board, as well as Health Authorities Performance Agreements 
(BCMOH, 2009). 
 
Alberta 
In 2001, The Premier’s Advisory Council on Health presented a report entitled A 
Framework for Reform to the Government of Alberta, which made recommendations 
for many areas of health system reform. The Council advised that there be a 90-day 
access guarantee. As a result, the Ministry of Health consulted many clinical and 
medical experts to determine the wait time goals and ways to achieve these 
objectives.   
 
As an example of the work done, the Alberta Orthopaedic Society (AOS) did an 
initial comprehensive analysis and redesign of the continuum of care for hip and knee 
replacement surgeries in order to lessen long wait times for patients waiting for a 
consultation with a surgeon or for the actual surgery in 2003/2004  (ABJHI, 2007). It 
was presented to Alberta’s Ministry of Health and Wellness, who then provided 
funding to pilot the new continuum of care for 1,200 patients. Therefore, many 
administrative structures are accountable for reporting, achieving outcomes as well as 
financial management.  
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Saskatchewan 
According to the Government of Saskatchewan website (2010), a promise was made 
to address the wait times issue as a priority in its Throne Speech on October 21st, 
2009. The Saskatchewan Surgical Initiative (SSI) started following its announcement 
in Saskatchewan’s 2010-2011 budget, which included a 10.5 million dollar 
investment for the SSI. For example, a new provincial clinical pathway for hip and 
knee patients has been developed to improve access, flow and patient satisfaction and 
foster good quality service and care for more patients. The pathway underpins the 
patient’s process from meeting with the GP to post-operative rehabilitation. It 
includes a GP referral form, intake through a multi-disciplinary clinic, pre- and post-
surgery educational processes, new ward flow and dedicated operating room times 
and beds. An HKR referral scoring tool was created to be filled out by the GP and 
sent to one of the four assessment clinics. 
Saskatchewan’s target time frames for non-emergency surgeries are:  -­‐ Priority Level 1 (urgency score 80-100): 95 % within three weeks -­‐ Priority Level 2 (urgency score 65-79): 90 % within six weeks -­‐ Priority Level 3 (urgency score 50-64): 90 % within three months -­‐ Priority Level 4 (urgency score 1-49): 90 % within 12 months 
As the report states, the aim of the provincial funding was to do:  -­‐ 3,000 additional surgeries -­‐ 2,500 more CT scans -­‐ Renovations to enhance OR and post-operative bed capacity -­‐ Implementation of an electronic Surgical Information System in two regions -­‐ Numerous system improvement initiatives 
 
Ontario 
As a result of the national Wait Time Strategy declared by Canada’s first ministers in 
the fall of 2004, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care invested 410 
million dollars on May 18, 2006, for additional procedures such as: 43,850 cataract 
surgeries, 18,210 hip and knee replacements, 16,650 cardiac procedures, 11,260 
cancer surgeries and 182,700 MRI scans (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 
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2006). Consequently, there has been a clear increase in the rate of WTS targeted 
procedures. 
 
Most of the 14 Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs), which had been 
established by the Ontario Government as community-based organizations, decided 
to implement initiatives to reduce hip and knee replacement surgery wait times. Their 
role is to work with the Ontario Government, local health service providers, 
community agencies, residents and others to ensure a well-coordinated system of 
health services. They established accountability agreements with HCOs that specified 
expectations regarding outputs (e.g. access requirements, websites, provincial access 
targets) and short-term outcomes (clear roles and responsibilities, performance 
measured against expectations, and organization accountability) (Solomon, 2006).  
As an example of HKR WTMS put in place, one particular LHIN developed the 
LHIN Joint Health and Disease Management Program (JHDMP) Steering Committee 
to implement a comprehensive program for active management of patients needing 
hip and knee replacement surgery across the entire continuum of care.  
 
New Brunswick 
When New Brunswick started its surgical access management initiative, it embraced 
all surgeries and moved forward to improve access. As of March 10, 2009, the 
province had reached 80 % of all hip replacements being done within 26 weeks, but 
only 60 % of knee replacements were being done within that time frame; across the 
province, these percentages varied from site to site. Since it became possible to report 
wait times using the provincial surgical access registry, there has been significant 
progress. 
 
 
PEI/Territories/Newfoundland 
In our research, we found no concrete WTMS in Prince Edward Island or the 
Territories. In Newfoundland, a new strategy is being implemented, but it began less 
than one year ago. For this reason, we excluded it from our study.  
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Manitoba 
In October 2005, Manitoba launched a new Wait Time Reduction Strategy to 
improve access to five priority areas agreed to by Canada’s First Ministers: 
1. Diagnostic tests such as MRI and CT scans 
2. Cancer treatment 
3. Cardiac care 
4. Hip and knee replacement 
5. Sight restoration (primarily cataract surgeries) 
The Government of Manitoba’s plan focused on the priorities of Manitobans, with 
considerable funding committed to programs such as hip and knee replacements and 
diagnostic tests. The 155 million dollar plan was developed in close consultation with 
physicians and regional health authorities, reflecting the needs of Manitobans.  
There are five main components to the strategy: 
• more surgeries – 57.1 million dollars;  
• more diagnostic testing –25.5 million dollars;  
• more health professionals – 12.4 million dollars;  
• prevention and health promotion – 17.2 million dollars; and  
• system innovation and better wait-list management – 10.5 million dollars.  
With regard to better wait-list management, the government is working with 
healthcare partners to develop the Manitoba Patient Access Network (MPAN) to  
improve patient access to care and co-ordinate wait lists on a regional and provincial 
basis. As an example of an HKR initiative, the Government of Manitoba has invested 
$600,000 to expand its "pre-habilitation" program, which opened in the fall of 2007 
(Government of Manitoba, 2006). 
 
Nova Scotia 
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In 2008, as part of a broad-based strategy, Nova Scotia’s Department of Health 
approved a contract between one regional hospital and an ambulatory clinic at 
another regional hospital that enabled more than 500 additional orthopaedic surgeries 
to be performed over the following year. Under this arrangement, the hospital’s 
surgeons were able to use the clinic’s OR facilities to do publicly insured, minor 
orthopaedic surgical procedures. The project also provided more space at the main 
hospital site for surgeons to tackle more difficult orthopaedic cases. The Department 
of Health allocated almost 1 million dollars to the project. 
 
The Patient Access Registry (PAR) was launched across the province in February 
2010. The Registry is a provincial database of all patients waiting for surgery. It 
allows hospitals to be better informed about surgical wait times and the factors that 
contribute to longer than appropriate wait times. 
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Appendix 4: Case 1 Wait Times for Hip and Knee 
Replacements and Surgical Volumes, April 2009-September 
2010 
 
  
Fiscal Month 
Mean 
Wait 
90th 
Percentile 
Wait   
Fiscal 
Month 
Mean 
Wait 
90th 
Percentile 
Wait 	   	  
Hip	  
Dec	  09	   109	   233	  
Knee	  
Dec	  09	   150	   281	   	   	  
Jan	  10	   142	   249	   Jan	  10	   175	   316	   	   	  
Feb	  10	   124	   180	   Feb	  10	   146	   232	   	   	  
Mar	  10	   108	   193	   Mar	  10	   152	   356	   	   	  
Apr	  10	   135	   236	   Apr	  10	   139	   282	   	   	  
May	  10	   88	   179	   May	  10	   129	   254	   	   	  
Jun	  10	   88	   173	   Jun	  10	   112	   243	   	   	  
Jul	  10	   88	   172	   Jul	  10	   93	   189	   	   	  
Aug	  10	   103	   252	   Aug	  10	   93	   170	   	   	  
Sep	  10	   120	   225	   Sep	  10	   103	   192	   	   	  
Oct	  10	   99	   200	   Oct	  10	   113	   177	   	   	  
Nov	  10	   94	   175	   Nov	  10	   94	   191	   	   	  
Dec	  10	   94	   203	   Dec	  10	   95	   173	   	   	  
Jan	  11	   77	   121	   Jan	  11	   99	   184	   	   	  
Feb	  11	   116	   256	   Feb	  11	   140	   252	   	   	  
Mar	  11	   103	   172	   Mar	  11	   107	   167	   	   	  
Apr	  11	   69	   146	   Apr	  11	   133	   239	   	   	  
May	  11	   53	   105	   May	  11	   99	   200	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Fiscal Month 
Mean 
Wait  
90th 
Percentile 
Wait    
Fiscal 
Month 
Mean 
Wait  
90th 
Percentile 
Wait  	   	  
Hip	  
Apr	  09	   110	   285	  
Knee	  
Apr	  09	   121	   277	   	   	  
May	  09	   60	   113	   May	  09	   117	   262	   	   	  
Jun	  09	   83	   117	   Jun	  09	   127	   212	   	   	  
Jul	  09	   81	   140	   Jul	  09	   130	   246	   	   	  
Aug	  09	   111	   167	   Aug	  09	   151	   275	   	   	  
Sep	  09	   131	   226	   Sep	  09	   128	   287	   	   	  
Oct	  09	   126	   207	   Oct	  09	   137	   254	   	   	  
Nov	  09	   127	   244	   Nov	  09	   129	   210	   	   	  
Dec	  09	   109	   233	   Dec	  09	   150	   281	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Month	  &	  Year	  
	  
Hip	  and	  	  
Knee	  
Replacement	  
Volume	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
April	  2009	   49	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
May	  2009	   46	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
June	  2009	   59	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
July	  2009	   47	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
August	  2009	   46	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
September	  2009	   39	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
October	  2009	   63	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
November	  2009	   47	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
December	  2009	   67	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
January	  2010	   62	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
February	  2010	   47	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
March	  2010	   72	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
April	  2010	   69	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
May	  2010	   55	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
June	  2010	   61	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
July	  2010	   52	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
August	  2010	   57	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
September	  2010	   58	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
October	  2010	   69	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
November	  2010	   53	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
December	  2010	   41	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
January	  2011	   44	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
February	  2011	   65	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
March	  2011	   76	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
April	  2011	   53	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Appendix 5: Case 2 Wait Times for Hip and Knee Surgeries 
and Surgical Volumes, April 2009-September 2010 
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Appendix 6: Case 3 Wait Times for Hip and Knee 
Replacements and Surgical Volumes, February 2010-
September 2010 
 
 
 Hip Replacement 
  Volume Median 90th Percentile 
  February 2010 55 126 379 
  March 2010 44 139 508 
  April 2010 62 163 449 
  May 2010 66 155 370 
  June 2010 48 126 491 
  July 2010 54 130 602 
  August 2010 51 98 357 
  September 2010 66 110 471 
  Knee replacement  
  Volume Median 90th Percentile 
  February 2010 64 197 598 
  March 2010 74 218 445 
  April 2010 68 216 444 
  May 2010 78 219 616 
  June 2010 74 222 559 
  July 2010 58 223 540 
  August 2010 54 139 433 
  September 2010 76 175 498 
 
  
xxviii 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Cross-analysis of the three case studies 
 
This section demonstrates the similarities and differences among the three case 
studies. From this, we can see which factors may explain why one WTMS is more 
likely to succeed than another, and ultimately to be sustainable in keeping its wait 
times within the federal benchmark. Tables 7 to 14 are divided into the eight 
dominant themes, which represent the organizational and contextual factors of the 
WTMS implemented in each of the three cases. The factors in bold in the tables are 
the ones that make each case truly unique.  
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Table 7 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: organizational governance 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- Strong organizational 
leadership ++ 
 
 
- Very Strong organizational 
leadership from medical 
director, physiotherapists 
and director of operations 
who kick-started the APP 
model of care +++ 
- Moderate organizational 
leadership from director of 
surgical services + 
 
 - Dedicated decision-making 
and management structure 
 
 
- Director of surgical services 
not clinical, background in 
accounting  
 
- Director of operations has a 
background in administration 
and business 
 
- Director of surgical services 
has a clinical background 
 
 
- Nothing new in terms of 
governance created due to 
initiative 
 
- Many new committees 
emerged including: 
outpatient care committee, 
the new model of care 
leadership team, as well as 
the patient service 
innovation team 
 
- Nothing new in terms of 
governance created due to 
initiative 
 
- Lack of involvement from the 
CEO 
 
- Involvement from the CEO, 
executive VP and chief nursing 
officer and support of the 
model  
 
- Lack of involvement from the 
CEO 
 
- Effective partnership with 
the regional rehabilitation 
centre 
- Many local partnerships 
emerged with the YMCA, 
shoppers’ home health, college 
of physiotherapists 
- Effective partnership with 
neighbouring regional 
hospital 
 
 
- Very stable governance 
overall even before the 
strategy 
 
 
 - The positions of medical 
director and head of 
orthopaedics were merged into 
one position 5 years ago 
 
 
 - Accountability of clinicians: 
they take their jobs seriously 
and know their job can 
impact others 
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Table 8 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: contextual governance 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- The provincial healthcare 
ministry has guaranteed that 
hip and knee surgeries would 
be done within 182 days 
 
- The provincial healthcare 
ministry has guaranteed that 
hip and knee surgeries would 
be done within 182 days 
- The provincial healthcare 
ministry has guaranteed that 
hip and knee surgeries would 
be done within 182 days 
 
 
- Benchmark of LOS 
established at 4 days 
- Benchmark of LOS 
established at 4 days 
- Benchmark of LOS 
established at 4 days for 
standard track and 3 days for 
fast track patients 
 
- LHIN monitors the 
implementation of the strategy 
in the healthcare 
establishment ++ 
 
- LHIN very involved in 
monitoring the 
implementation of the 
strategy in the hospital but 
staff perception of this 
involvement varies +++ 
 
- Department of health 
involved in implementation of 
strategy + 
 
- Accountability agreements  
signed between the hospital 
and the LHIN 
 
- Accountability agreements  
signed between the hospital 
and the LHIN 
 
- Accountability agreements  
between the hospital and the 
Department of Health 
 
 
- Hip and knee working group 
at the LHIN level created to 
discuss the WTMS 
 
- Hip and knee working group 
at the LHIN level created to 
discuss the WTMS 
 
- Steering committee for 
implementation of the WTMS 
created 
 
- LHIN didn’t encourage the 
implementation of APP role 
 
- LHIN did encourage APP 
model 
 
- No APP model in place 
 
- Stakeholder engagement +: 
Ontario Medical Association 
opposed to LHIN’s suggestion 
to publish surgeons’ individual 
wait times 
 
- Stakeholder engagement 
+++: College of 
Physiotherapists/ Arthritis 
Society/ Shoppers Home 
Health  
 
- Stakeholder engagement ++: 
Ministry of health, Bone and 
Joint Canada, Red Cross 
 
 
 - Team involved in the 
implementation and expansion 
of the model in other hospitals 
(APP model, electronic referral 
tracking system) 
 
 
- The Ministry of Health 
conducted an evaluation of the 
WTMS with an independent 
evaluator 
- Hip and knee expert panel 
conducted a review of the 
program  
 
- Program audit by Auditor 
General 
 - Booking clerks think  
benchmark is added pressure 
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Table 9 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: organizational culture 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- Physician leadership ++ - Physician leadership +++ - Physician leadership + 
- Negative subculture between 
surgeons and 
anaesthesiologists 
- Negative subculture between 
surgeons and 
anaesthesiologists 
 
- Negative subculture between 
surgeons and nurses 
 
 - Negative subculture between 
surgeons and nurses 
 
- Workload increased since 
implementation of strategy 
 
- Workload increased since 
implementation of strategy 
 
- Workload increased since 
implementation of strategy 
 
- Perception of being a small 
organization because the team 
is now tight-knit  
 
- Perception of being a small 
organization because the team 
is now tight-knit  
 
- Generational gap between 
surgeons 
 
 
- Important clinical 
governance between the 
surgeons and the director of 
surgical services  
 
 - Retirement to change 
culture 
 
 
- Evolution from culture 
based on hierarchy and fear 
to innovation and trust 
 
- Culture stable from onset 
built on trust and innovation 
 
- Lack of trust between 
surgeons and staff 
 
 
- Top-down decision 
 
- Bottom-up decision: 
collegial decision process 
 
- Top-down decision 
 
- A lot of work had to be done 
to ensure buy-in from the 
physicians 
- Buy-in from physicians 
good from outset 
 
- Physician buy-in very difficult 
 
- Neutralizing effect of 
manager of surgical services 
that helped the culture  
 
 - Work to live and don’t live 
to work culture 
 
 - All the healthcare 
professionals working in this 
hospital have been here for a 
long time (i.e. more than 10 
years) 
 
 
 - Theory of small steps (ex: 
implementation of APP role) 
 
 
 - Everything and everyone is 
accessible, easy to talk to 
people   
 
 
 - Clear communication among 
team members has also played 
a role in better planning  
 
 
 - Clear communication with 
patients of team’s intention of 
implementing the APP model  
 
 - The team has a willingness to 
remain the best, to be creative 
and innovative 
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Table 10 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: contextual culture 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- A lot of work done to 
consult GPs about the 
RJAC. Moderate relationship 
 
- Work has been done to 
communicate with GPs. 
Improvement in relationship 
 
- Work done to communicate 
with GPs and improve the 
referrals. Strong relationship 
 
- Some GPs use the 
standardized referral form  
 
- Few GPs use the 
standardized referral form  
 
- Many GPs use the 
standardized referral form 
 
- Public awareness taken into 
consideration +  
- Public awareness taken into 
consideration ++ 
 
- Public awareness 
perceived negatively by the 
organization 
 
 
 - APPs have published 
articles about patients’ 
satisfaction 
 
 
 - Articles published about 
the model of care and its 
implementation 
 
 
 - Network with many hospitals 
regionally, nationally and even 
internationally 
 
 
 - Tool kit developed for 
knowledge transfer 
 
 
 - Recipient of 3M quality of 
care awards 
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Table 11 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: organizational resources 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- Increase of human resources 
with implementation, especially 
nurses and anaesthesiologists 
 
- Increase of human resources 
with implementation, especially 
nurses and anaesthesiologists 
 
- Intermittent shortages of 
anaesthesiologists and 
nurses 
 
 
- Dependence on funding 
levels 
- Dependence on funding 
levels 
- Dependence on funding 
levels 
 
- Internal wait time reporting 
sheets and assessment of 
data every month by staff and 
management 
 
- Internal wait time reporting 
sheets and assessment of 
data every month by staff and 
management 
 
- Internal wait time reporting 
sheets and assessment of data 
on a quarterly basis by 
managers and surgeons 
 
- Inefficiencies in the OR + 
 
- No inefficiencies in the OR 
 
- Inefficiencies in the OR ++ 
 
- Importance of having the 
right amount of human 
resources and equipment to do 
this amount of work 
 
- Importance of having the 
right amount of human 
resources and equipment to do 
this amount of work 
 
- Importance of having the right 
amount of human resources 
and equipment to do this 
amount of work 
 
 - A lot of 65 + year old 
surgeons 
 
 
 - Centre of Excellence for 
Hip and Knee care in Ontario 
 
 
 - Difficulty in planning hire of 
new surgeons 
 
 
- Upcoming retirement of 
anaesthesiologists 
 
  
- Many surgical residents 
+++ 
 
- Very few surgical residents + 
 
- Surgical residents ++ 
 
 - Entire centre dedicated to 
hip and knees 
 
 
- 12 OR rooms 
 
- 4 OR rooms  
 
- 5 OR rooms  
 
- Dedicated space for RJAC 
 
- Dedicated space for the 
assessment clinic ++ 
 
- Dedicated space for the 
assessment clinic 
 
- 1 APP 
 
- 5 APPs 
 
- 0 APPs 
 
- Surgical blitz in winter 
(double OR model) 
- Surgical time increased (no 
double OR model) 
 
 
- Bed management difficult + 
 
- No bed blockers or bed 
management problems 
 
- Difficulty with bed 
management ++ 
 
 - Hospital center closes 
during winter for 2 weeks 
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- New roles: the nurse in the 
OR and the registered nurse 
first assistants 
 
- 700 surgeries  
 
- 2,100 surgeries 
 
- 1,500 surgeries at hospital 
and neighbouring hospital total 
 
  - Ambulatory OR at 
neighbouring hospital 
 
- 7 orthopaedic surgeons - 10 orthopaedic surgeons at 
the satellite center 
 
- 9 orthopaedic surgeons  
 
- Need increase in resources 
in order to increase their 
capacity by 25-30% 
 
- No ICU, emergency room 
or burn unit 
 
 
 - Own rehabilitation unit 
 
 
 - A lot of effort is put into 
selecting patients who are in 
relatively good health without 
too many co-morbidities 
 
 
 - All the time dedicated to the 
strategy not accounted for 
 
 
 - Pre-op and post-op classes 
provided to patients by 
physiotherapists 	  
- Pre-op classes provided to 
patients by case managers 
 
 - Multiple informational 
resources: leadership team 
meets monthly to review the 
data and to track their 
progress, a one-hour forum is 
hosted by the hospital’s 
leadership, use of email 
communication among 
employees, program 
newsletter has been 
developed 
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Table 12 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: contextual resources 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- External funding for the 
incremental hip and knee 
surgeries 
 
- External funding for the 
incremental hip and knee 
surgeries 
 
- External funding for the 
incremental hip and knee 
surgeries 
 
- Funding reassessed yearly 
 
- Funding reassessed yearly 
 
- Funding reassessed yearly 
 
- Tension with LHIN about not 
getting the same funding 
yearly; 
Incertitude about being able to 
pursue initiative each year 
 
- Tension with LHIN about not 
getting the same funding 
yearly Incertitude about being 
able to pursue initiative each 
year 
 
- Tension with Department of 
Health about not getting the 
same funding yearly 
- Healthforce Ontario funds to 
kick-start initiative 
 
  
- Part of the funding for the 
RJAC provided by the 
government 
 
- Part of the funding for the 
assessment centre provided by 
the government 
- Funding for the space of the 
assessment clinic as well as 
the staff who works in it 
 
- Academic teaching hospital 
 
- Not teaching hospital 
center 
 
- Academic teaching hospital 
 
- Incremental funding used for 
double OR rooms 
 
 - Dedicated OR space at a 
neighbouring hospital 
- Funding level according to 
who is in power 
 
  
 - Part of the funding was for 
the electronic referral tracking 
system 
 
 
- Fear of losing funding if they 
do too well 
- More surgeries give surgeons 
more money = incentive for 
surgeons but not for the other 
professionals 
 
- No incentives for the team 
  - Government provided a 
resource to develop a website 
for patient information about 
surgery. No data as to how 
often it is consulted 
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Table 13 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: organizational tools 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- Wait time system used by the 
decision support manager as 
well as the IT systems 
department was initially a 
province based wait time 
system software 
- Wait time system used by the 
decision support manager as 
well as the IT systems 
department was initially a 
province-based wait time 
system software 
 
- Information technology 
system: PHS (possible to do 
the booking and registration of 
the referrals) 
 
- They decided to transform 
the existing tools into their 
own using a very common 
program: Excel 
 
  
- Lack of involvement from 
the group of surgeons who 
resisted the requirement that 
they enter their data into the 
system 
 
  
- The data quality was poor 
and unable to produce 
accurate results 
 
  
- The Wait Time Strategy’s 
outcomes are also included in 
the organization’s balance 
scorecard 
 
- The Wait Time Strategy’s 
outcomes are also included in 
the organization’s balance 
scorecard 
 
 
- The team has their own 
indicators which they monitor, 
in addition to the data being 
sent to the provincial level 
 
- The project manager 
mentioned that her team has 
their own indicators which they 
monitor, in addition to the data 
being sent to the provincial 
level 
 
- The team has their own 
indicators which they monitor, 
in addition to the data sent to 
the provincial level  
 
 
- Being able to understand the 
data from the wait time trends 
has helped managers better 
plan strategically and made 
professionals more 
accountable ++ 
 
 
- Being able to understand the 
data from the wait time trends 
has helped managers better 
plan strategically and made 
professionals more 
accountable +++ 	  
 
- Being able to understand the 
data from the wait time trends 
has been able to help 
managers better plan 
strategically and make 
professionals more 
accountable + 
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- A standardized request for 
consultation form has been 
developed to support GPs 
 
- A standardized request for 
consultation form has been 
developed to support GPs 
 
- A standardized request for 
consultation form has been 
developed to support GPs 
 
- Guide for Patients Having Hip 
or Knee Replacement  
- Guide for Patients Having Hip  
or Knee Replacements 
 
- Website for patients 
awaiting surgery 
 
- Introduction of a total knee 
and hip clinical pathway in July 
2007. The pathway consists of 
three different paths: the slow 
track, the regular and the fast 
track 
 
- Care pathways were 
developed to guide and 
standardize the care of patients 
after their surgery (discharge 
checklist, post-op day 0-4, pre-
admission clinic) 
 
- Hip and Knee care pathway. 
The pathway consists of two 
different paths: the standard 
track and the fast track  
 
 
- The RJAC was created, and 
provides patients with timely 
access to a full assessment 
of their hip or knee problem 
(1 APP) 
 
 
- The assessment centre has 
been created, and provides 
patients with timely access to a 
full assessment of their hip or 
knee problem 
 
(APP role developed in 2006 
before the assessment 
centre was created) 
 
- The assessment centre has 
been created, and provides 
patients with timely access to 
a full assessment of their hip 
or knee problem (case 
managers) 
 
 
 - A patient focus group was 
conducted in order to gain 
information about their 
perception on wait times and 
the need for more education 
about their health problem 
 
 
 - Use of Plan-Do-Study-Act 
cycles of change (PDSA) 
methodology 
 
 
 The Participatory Evidence-
Based Patient Focused 
Process (PEPPA) theoretical 
framework was used in order 
to establish the critical 
pathway for the development 
of the APP role 
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 - The team developed an 
electronic referral tracking 
system in collaboration with the 
Ministry 
 
 
 - Surgeons developed a 
three-month practice 
development program for 
APPs modeled after a 
provincial university’s 
training program for surgical 
residents 
 
 
 
 - The team received help from 
the College of Physiotherapists 
as well as two provincial 
Universities to get advice 
regarding the appropriate 
training 
 
 
- Training on how to enter data 
in the IT system was offered to 
physicians 
 
- Administrative assistants who 
also acted as booking clerks 
received training on data entry 
and collection, as well as on 
how to proceed for OR 
bookings 
 
 
 - The Interdisciplinary 
Assessment Form is an 
assessment tool used to collect 
bio-psycho-social information 
on the patient 
 
 
 - The Regional Anaesthesia 
Program and Acute Pain 
Program were created and 
include anaesthesiologists and 
nurses, and respiratory 
therapists whose goal is to 
improve post-op experience of 
patients 
 
 
 - Visitor’s guide with resources 
was created to inform visitors 
about the centralized intake 
and referral management, the 
assessment centre model, the 
design of new conservative 
treatment programs and patient 
education materials that 
support the model and 
standardized patient follow-up 
care 
 
 
- Wait times 1 and 2 collected 
by decision support manager 
and IT team and sent to the 
LHIN (difficulty in collecting 
accurate data) 
 
- Wait times 1 and 2 collected 
by project manager’s team and 
the rest collected by the IT 
department to be sent to LHIN 
 
 
- Wait times 1 and 2 collected 
by project manager’s team and 
the rest collected at the IT 
department to be sent to 
Department of Health 
 
- Perception of being in the - Perception of being in the - Perception of being in the 
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implementation phase 
 
sustainability phase 
 
 
sustainability phase 
 
- Expansion of the model into 
other areas of care within the 
hospital 
- Expansion of the model into 
other areas of care within the 
hospital: spinal surgery 
 
- Expansion of the model for 
the spine program within the 
hospital 
 
- No internal performance-
recording tool yet 
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Table 14 
Cross-analysis of the three case studies: contextual tools 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
- Public website 
 
- Public website 
 
- Public website 
 
- Collection and reporting of 
data difficult (with 
physicians mainly) 
 
- No difficulty in collecting 
the data for the LHIN 
because physicians don’t do 
it.  
 
- Collection and reporting of 
data effectively done by 
director of surgical services 
 
- Iport tool weak, initially used  
only for simple data collection 
  
- Disagreement on 
pertinence of using the 90th 
percentile for hip and knee 
wait times. 
Involvement of the LHIN to 
improve data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- No single data system in 
the region 
- Central Registry 
 
- Central Registry but data 
inaccurate 
 
- Standards and guidelines ++ 
 
- Standards and guidelines 
+++ 
 
- No standards and 
guidelines as to which 
patients should be operated 
on, or for follow-up care 
 
 - The Hip and Knee 
Replacement Program (HKRP) 
was the pilot for the 
development of the provincial 
Wait Time Information System 
(WTIS) 
 
 
 - Collaboration seemed to be 
an important factor when it 
came time to develop this IT 
system 
 
 
 -MOHLTC Access to Care 
group provided data analysis 
to link wait time 1 data with 
wait time 2 data 
 
 
 - The LHIN’s Joint Health and 
Disease Management Program 
Steering Committee receives 
the data on wait times for hip 
and knee surgeries as well as 
on indicators from the hospital 
on a monthly basis 
 
 
- Patient satisfaction surveys in 
order to demonstrate how 
useful the RJAC was to them 
- Patient satisfaction surveys in 
order to demonstrate how 
useful the post-operative clinic 
was to them 
- Patient satisfaction surveys 
were done with patients who 
had been seen at the OAC 
 
  
 
 
